

THESIS

POLITICAL IDENTITIES, VOTE CHOICE, AND PARTICIPATION: EXPLORING THE
IMPACT OF EXPRESSIVE IDENTITIES AND COMPETING ISSUE POSITIONS

Submitted by

Penny Thomas

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Fall 2016

Master's Committee:

Advisor: Kyle Saunders

Sandra Davis
Michael Lacy

Copyright by Penny Thomas 2016

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL IDENTITIES, VOTE CHOICE, AND PARTICIPATION: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF EXPRESSIVE IDENTITIES AND COMPETING ISSUE POSITIONS

America's contemporary political structure has emphasized a single liberal-conservative ideological dimension. Yet, a substantial number of citizens do not neatly reflect this elite divide in their issue positions across both economic *and* social issues. These "dual ideologues" may feel unrepresented and alienated by a political system that does not offer many choices in candidates or parties that are consistent with their issue positions. However, it remains unclear whether dual ideologues identify with either of the two major parties or ideological groups in the United States based on non-ideological factors. An analysis of data from the 1980 to 2008 American National Election Study shows that although dual ideologues identify with political groups at similar rates to consistent ideologues, one group of dual ideologues – libertarians -- hold weaker connections to these political groups. The study further examines the importance of expressive versus instrumental identities in influencing whether dual ideologues vote consistently with their chosen party and participate in electoral activities at the same rates as more consistent ideologues. These findings add further support to the importance of political identities, but they also indicate that the effects of strong, consistent issue positions cannot be dismissed, as a strong identity alone cannot overcome the lack of representation for those with competing issue positions. Strong and consistent issue positions play an important role in influencing many forms of political behavior, independently of political identity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
POLARIZATION AND THE ROLE OF ISSUE POSITIONS.....	3
PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY AS SOCIAL IDENTITIES.....	6
DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGY	9
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF DUAL IDEOLOGUES.....	10
CHAPTER 2: DATA AND METHODS	16
CHAPTER 3: WHO ARE DUAL IDEOLOGUES?	20
CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL IDENTITY.....	23
CONCLUSIONS.....	37
CHAPTER 5: CANDIDATE CHOICE.....	39
CONCLUSIONS.....	51
CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	53
CONCLUSIONS.....	64
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.....	66
REFERENCES	70
APPENDIX.....	74

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

American politics today can at best be described as contentious and at its worst acrimonious. More than at any other time in recent history, politics and governing have become a fierce battle between two distinct and opposing sides with little room for compromise or conciliation. But it was not always this way. At one time, Democrats and Republicans were not as split ideologically and issue positions often overlapped between these groups in a way that made compromise feasible. What has caused such vitriol today? Research has pointed to growing polarization as conflicts extended to cultural issues that have raised the rancor between groups in a way that previous conflict over economic issues did not (Hunter 1992; Shafer and Claggett 1995). This ‘culture war’ has pitted social conservatives against social liberals, while at the same time the political parties have become virtually synonymous with ideology, with Republicans holding conservative positions and Democrats holding liberal positions.

Indeed, it has become widely accepted that the parties and political elites in the United States have become more polarized over the past several decades. Although disagreement remains over the level of polarization among the mass public, at the very least elite polarization has clarified individuals’ views of the parties, increased awareness of the ideological differences between the parties, and led to a resurgence in the role and importance of parties (Hetherington 2001). The growing polarization between parties has also encouraged greater engagement with politics as a growing number of citizens indicate they care who wins an election, recognize differences between the parties and candidates, vote, and participate in other electoral activities (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Hetherington 2008).

While the level of ideological polarization among the mass public remains contentious, some have argued that affective polarization between members of the two parties and ideological groups has increased substantially over the past several decades (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Malka and Lelkes 2010). In particular, as predicted by social identity theory, levels of partisan bias and anger have increased between Republicans and Democrats (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) and strong partisan identities have led to greater participation. Although partisan identity has received the bulk of attention, strong ideological identity also plays a role in participation independently from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

Most discussions about the political identities of the mass public revolve around whether they are Republican versus Democrat or conservative versus liberal with little consideration of their actual issue positions or whether citizens so neatly reflect the elite positions represented by the parties. In fact, a substantial number of citizens do not clearly reflect the elite divide of conservative or liberal issue positions across both economic *and* social issues. If these issue positions are salient to the individuals (dual ideologues) who have conservative positions on one set of issues (economic or social) and liberal positions on the other set, they are left with no party to adequately represent them in government.

While strong party and ideological identities have been shown to positively influence levels of voting and other forms of electoral participation, it remains unclear how political identities affect political behavior for those citizens who do not mirror the single liberal-conservative ideological dimension of elites. Based on issue positions alone, we may expect citizens who hold competing positions that do not match party or candidate choices to be less likely to identify with a party or ideological group, to vote for opposing parties more frequently, and to participate less frequently than those with consistent ideologies. But, if dual ideologues

identify with a party or ideology based on social affiliations or other factors that promote an emotional attachment to a party independently of specific issue positions, than we would not expect competing issue positions to impact political identity or behavior.

This paper will explore how those with conflicting issue positions interact with a political system that does not adequately represent their views. In addition to considering whether dual ideologues hold similar levels of partisan and ideological identities as their more consistent counterparts, I also consider how political identities impact behavior such as candidate choice and electoral participation and whether any variance in these behaviors can be explained by differences in identity or a lack of consistent issue positions. While both expressive and instrumental perspectives on partisanship and ideology claim empirical support, much of the literature has argued that the social identity aspects of partisanship, and to a lesser extent ideology, play a more substantial role in influencing political behavior and particularly electoral participation. By considering the role of identity among individuals who hold strong issue positions, but contrasting those who hold consistent and those who hold competing issue positions, this paper will add further support to the importance of political identities; but it also argues that the effects of strong, consistent issue positions cannot be dismissed, as a strong identity alone cannot overcome the lack of representation for those with competing issue positions. Strong and consistent issue positions play an important role in influencing many forms of political behavior, independently of political identity.

Polarization and the Role of Issue Positions

It has become widely accepted that the parties and political elites in the United States have become increasingly polarized over the past several decades. Republican and Democrats in

Congress have increasingly diverged ideologically and vote as two distinct blocs (Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 2001). However, the level of polarization among the mass public remains more controversial. On one hand, evidence points to multiple areas of increasing fractures among the electorate. The differences are especially apparent among cultural issues, such as abortion and gay marriage, which comprise the “culture war” between social conservatives and liberals (Hunter 1992). As the parties polarized on these issues and increasingly brought them into the electoral arena, one group of scholars has argued that the public has also polarized across the issues. As the parties have become more distinctive, party identification among citizens has become more ideological, a trend that is particularly notable among the politically engaged (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). According to the ‘conflict extension’ theory, the polarization we see today has arisen as the parties became divided across several major issue areas at once. In this view, cultural issues have become an important part of party conflict, but have not displaced previous issues such as social welfare or racial cleavages. These multiple areas of conflict increase polarization and extreme partisanship among the general public (Layman and Carsey 2002). The increased importance of partisanship became evident in the 1990s and 2000s as both partisan defection and split-ticket voting in elections became less common (Hetherington 2001; Niemi and Stanley 2010).

Another view, however, argues that the public is not polarized, but instead remains generally centrist and that a growing share are politically independent. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2005) argue that the culture war has been largely overstated and that the electorate remains moderate. Rather, as elite cues on partisanship and ideology have become clearer and more consistent, the public has simply sorted themselves into ideological camps that match with their partisan leanings (Levendusky 2009). Thus, although common in earlier decades, a conservative

Democrat has become rare. So, although ideology and issue positions now tend to align with partisanship, this has not increased the overall degree of polarization in the electorate especially as most remain moderates and many have become independent (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005).

Although disagreement remains over the level of polarization among the mass public, at the very least elite polarization has clarified individuals' views of the parties, increased awareness of the ideological differences between the parties, and led to a resurgence in the role and importance of parties (Hetherington 2001). One consequence of these clearer views of the parties and their ideological differences should be to prompt individuals to more closely align their chosen party with their issue positions. Carsey and Layman (2006) argue that citizens who are aware of party differences on an issue and who find that issue salient should change their party to match their issue positions. Those who are aware of the party's position on the issue, but do not find the issue salient, should change their issue position to match the chosen party's position. While those who are not aware of party differences will have no reason to change either their chosen party or issue position (Carsey and Layman 2006).

Whether citizens are polarized or not, this theory suggests that most individuals should have a clearer view of the parties, and that either by changing party or changing issue positions, most citizens will move towards having their issue positions match those of the party they belong to. However, not all citizens have been so neatly sorted and not all have brought their issue positions into alignment with their chosen party or ideological group. Indeed, although political elites and many citizens can be described along a single ideological spectrum, a subset of the citizenry maintains competing issue positions between economic and social issues— holding conservative issue positions on one dimension but liberal positions on the other.

In addition to traditional liberal and conservative groups, two other groups also represent a significant proportion of the public – those who mix conservative economic beliefs with liberal social beliefs and those who mix liberal economic beliefs with more conservative social positions. The former have been called libertarians, the latter populists (Boaz and Kirby 2006; Maddox and Lilie 1984) or communitarians (Janda et al. 2012). These dual ideologues do not mirror the elite single dimensional liberal-conservative framework, but are still a significant portion of the electorate as they have made up anywhere from 10-30% of the electorate over the past few decades. For those that find issues across both domains to be salient, it would be nearly impossible for these citizens to change their party or issue positions to match across both economic and social domains.

Partisanship and Ideology as Social Identities

So, how do these dual ideologues interact with a political system in which the dominant ideological alignment of economic and social issue positions do not match with theirs? At first glance these inconsistent issue positions might not seem surprising given the predominant view among political scientists that citizens are largely incapable of ideological thought and that issue positions play only a secondary role to factors such as party identity when it comes to making political decisions (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1962). Indeed prominent theories of party identification and ideology would suggest that issue positions are irrelevant, indicating that we should not expect dual ideologues to behave any differently than consistent ideologues.

The role and meaning of ideology in the United States has remained a contentious subject since Converse (1962) first argued that the great majority of citizens do not approach politics in ideological terms. Indeed many individuals do not even clearly understand the meaning of

common terms such as liberal or conservative. In addition, this line of research suggests that citizens display minimal constraint across issue positions with most issue positions not bound together by any broader cognitive structure. Even individual issue positions are held only lightly and are incredibly susceptible to elite and media manipulation (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Zaller 1996; Zaller and Feldman 1992). More recently, Ellis and Stimson (2012) suggest that citizens choose their issue preferences somewhat randomly, do not understand the meaning of these positions for actual policy outcomes, and choose their ideological identity based on symbolic factors. The clearest example of this are those who identify as conservative because of the clear religious connotations versus any real conservative issue positions.

While ideology is seen as having little role in citizen preferences and behavior, party identification is still seen as being the single strongest influence on how the public assesses candidates, views political news, and determines political attitudes. Early work viewed partisanship as a long-standing psychological attachment to a party, which originates from childhood socialization (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Lewis-Beck 2009). For those who identify with a party, partisan cues frequently take the place of well-thought out issue positions and attention to political news and campaigns (Brader 2006). These partisans are seen as automatically and uncritically accepting messages coming from their own party while rejecting any messages from the opposing party (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009; Zaller 1996).

This theory of partisanship draws heavily on social psychology and social identity theory, which proposes that an individual feels a sense of belonging to a group that promotes a desire to strengthen the position of that group. Under this expressive view of partisanship, individuals identify with a party just as they do any other group such as a religion or social class. Social

identity theory also requires both a positive sentiment toward one's own group as well as negative sentiment towards opposing groups (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1979). While the level of ideological polarization among the mass public remains contentious, to explain the level of acrimony seen in politics today, some have argued that affective polarization between members of the two parties and ideological groups has increased substantially over the past several decades (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Malka and Lelkes 2010). In particular, as predicted by social identity theory, levels of partisan bias and anger have increased between Republicans and Democrats (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) and strong partisan identities have led to greater participation. Mason (2015: 58) argues that partisans have become "prejudiced against each other, active just for the sake of winning, and increasingly angry. We might believe that we are responding to specific policy disputes, but to a very real extent we are also being driven by an automatic, basic need to defend our social group." Although partisan identity has received the bulk of attention, strong ideological identity also plays a role in participation independently from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

However, the importance of issue positions should not be so easily dismissed. Since Converse's seminal article, several factors, including the increase in elite polarization have led to an increase in ideological awareness and thinking among the public (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman and Carsey 2000). Citizens are unlikely to view partisan conflict in ideological terms in a party system that does not highlight well-known and easily identified ideological brands (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976); but, as we've seen, the parties have become more distinctive and their relative issue positions more identifiable, which increases the ability of citizens to base their partisanship on ideological considerations. Indeed, the framing of politics in the United States today often invokes a struggle between liberalism and conservatism over

symbols, policy, and culture (Ellis and Stimson 2012). As Abramowitz (2010: 159) argues “The Democratic and Republican parties today offer voters a clear-cut choice between coherent policy packages, one liberal and one conservative, and most voters appear to have little difficulty choosing the party whose package is more to their liking.” This is especially true among the most politically active.

Dimensions of Ideology

However, even as citizens have become more ideological, the appropriateness of common measures of ideology has been questioned. Ideology is typically discussed as though it is arrayed along a single liberal-conservative dimension. This description adequately portrays political elites. The distinction between liberals and conservatives has only become more prominent in the current era of polarization as elites and the two major parties have become more clearly differentiated and consistently ideological in their policy positions across a range of both economic and social issues (Poole and Rosenthal 2000, 2001). Certainly, some portion of the electorate mirrors this consistency on the liberal-conservative scale, and for these citizens strong ideology can lead to higher electoral participation. The distinction between parties should give partisans further reinforcement for their existing policy preferences and encourage greater engagement with politics to ensure that their policy preferences win out. Indeed, a growing number of citizens indicate they care who wins an election, recognize differences between the parties and candidates, and participate in electoral activities (Hetherington 2008).

It’s not clear, though, that a single dimension of ideology can adequately describe all members of the mass public as not all citizens display the same level of constraint across issues. Rather, recent research has shown that ideology is better conceived of as two dimensional for at

least some portion of the electorate that have inconsistent views on issues across economic and social domains (Klar 2014; Shafer and Claggett 1995; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009). The traditional conception of the liberal-conservative framework was based on economic and social welfare issues, such as the government's role in managing the economy and programs such as social security that resulted from the New Deal. But as social and cultural issues such as abortion, drug use, and women's rights became more prominent in the 1970s, these issues did not fit as easily into the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum, which led to a growing number of citizens with conflicting liberal/conservative positions across social and economic issues (Shafer and Claggett 1995).

Political Behavior of Dual Ideologues

The question of how dual ideologues interact with a political system in which the dominant ideological alignment of economic and social issue positions does not match with theirs has become even more relevant as polarization has created more distinct parties with clearer issue positions. Existing theory predicts disengagement as citizens' attitudes conflict with available candidate and/or party choices. For those with conflicting ideologies between economic and social dimensions, the increased polarization of the parties has left them cross-pressured and with few choices among parties or candidates who match their beliefs. Thus, we might expect these individuals to be less likely to identify with a party or ideology group, be more likely to vote for candidates of differing parties, and to participate less. Despite strong ideologies, any party or candidate this group might support would likely only match their ideological views on one of the two dimensions, which makes choosing a party to belong to or a single candidate to support more difficult (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011). Further, while consistent

ideologues are likely to vote regularly for their party, individuals who disagree on a major policy issue are more persuadable voters and may be more likely to respond to campaign information and change their vote choices (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Given this, we might expect these individuals to also participate in electoral activities less frequently since their candidate choice is less solid. In addition to being cross-pressured by competing issue positions, dual ideologues may also feel unrepresented and alienated because of the lack of candidates that adequately reflect their views. Alienation and indifference to existing political choices have been shown to significantly decrease the likelihood of voting (Plane and Gershtenson 2004; Zipp 1985).

However, while cross-pressures and alienation have the potential to reduce engagement with politics, there remains some segment of the population who do not recognize that their issue positions conflict with the party structure despite the increased clarity of the party positions. To be meaningfully cross-pressured by issues, citizens must both care about those issues and recognize party and candidate differences on them (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Although political elites have polarized over the past few decades, not all voters are entirely aware of this dramatic shift and many still report that there are few differences between the parties. This is particularly true for those in lower income groups and those with lower levels of education. Those in the highest income categories often see a larger difference between candidates and parties than do those in lower income groups (Leighley and Nagler 2013). The impact of cross-pressures on depressing turnout and participation is likely to be limited by citizen's accurate knowledge of the differences between the parties and candidates.

In fact, previous literature presents a much more complicated story than simple disengagement when considering participation among two-dimensional ideologues. Two previous studies have found that one group of dual ideologues largely votes at the same level as

consistent ideologues, while the other group participates at levels significantly below all other groups (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011; Hussey 2011). Both studies find that libertarians vote at similar rates to consistent ideologues – and actually vote at higher rates than consistent liberals. This group does participate in slightly fewer campaign activities, although the difference with consistent liberals is small. Communitarians on the other hand are significantly less engaged as they vote and participate at substantially lower rates than all other groups – even moderates (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011; Hussey 2011). Despite the strong potential for dual ideologues to feel cross-pressured, most are not. In the 2000s, just 7% of communitarians felt cross-pressures, while 29% of libertarians did. The lack of cross-pressures among communitarians is likely due to a low understanding of party positions. On questions about abortion, for example, only 30% of the group was able to correctly place Democrats to the left of Republicans (Hussey 2011).

The reasons for the substantially different participation rates among dual ideologues are not entirely clear. Hussey (2011) finds that while dual ideologues do participate less, cross-pressures had no significant effect on voting or participation for these groups. While the two groups differ substantially in a number of demographic characteristics, the differences in participation rates remain even after controlling for these variables. One possibility is that major party candidates have been more likely to run on libertarian ideals than populist ones leaving communitarians particularly unrepresented (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011). One again, however, this explanation is only valid for those who recognize and understand differences between candidates, which is not true of all members of the electorate and particularly problematic among the communitarian group.

One area that has not been given sufficient attention is whether and how dual ideologues identify with a party or ideological group. Partisan and ideological identities have been shown to act as social identities (Bartels 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), that have the power to affect behavior. Given that partisan and ideological identities play an important role in explaining campaign activity (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015), the extent to which dual ideologues identify with a party or ideological group, despite their competing issue positions, may influence their levels of participation. Some research predicts that many who have conflicting positions on social and economic issues will self-identify as a moderate on a unidimensional scale of ideology as a sort of averaging effect (Klar 2014). Even so, most citizens place more emphasis on the economic dimension which continues to have a greater influence on both ideological and partisan self-placement as well as on vote choice (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012; Klar 2014). Thus, we might expect dual ideologues to self-identify as more moderate than consistent ideologues, but also to be swayed towards one side by their economic positions.

These theories take an instrumental view of ideology and consider party choice to be based primarily on issue positions and the desire to advance certain policy goals. As predicted by social identity theory, however, the expressive approach to partisanship suggests that these social affiliations promote an emotional attachment to a party independently of specific issue positions (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Expressive partisanship therefore results in a desire to help the party one belongs to rather than the desire to advance specific issues or policy goals. The role of expressive partisanship has likely only increased in the current era of polarization with Republicans and Democrats showing increasing hostility toward one another. This hostility is not consistently founded in policy attitudes but is strongly based on group

identity (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). Furthermore, the desire to protect and advance the party one belongs to has a significant effect on campaign activism (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

Although party identity has received the majority of attention, ideological identity also plays an important role. In addition to the conception of ideology as an integrated value system, as measured by consistent issue positions, we should also consider ideological identity as measured by self-categorization (Malka and Lelkes 2010). Ideological identity functions as a psychological attachment to a particular group, much like partisan identity and functions separately from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). While partisan identity has the largest and most consistent effect on activism, ideological identity also has a significant effect, and at least one study finds ideological identity to be more important than issue intensity, which played a more inconsistent and smaller role in campaign activism (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

If party and ideological identities play a stronger role in predicting voting and campaign activism, we may not expect the competing issue positions of dual ideologues to be a significant hindrance to electoral participation if these ideologues identify with political groups for reasons other than issue preferences. Given that dual ideologues do participate at lower rates, these findings lead to the questions of whether dual ideologues are less likely to identify with a party or ideological group than consistent ideologues and whether significant differences in identification exist between the two dual ideologue types. Further, does identification with a partisan or ideological group affect candidate choice or participation for dual ideologues in the same way that it does for consistent ideologues?

If issue positions matter to electoral behavior, we should see dual ideologues behaving differently than their more consistent counterparts. Nonetheless, issue positions should not be

expected to completely mitigate the effects of expressive interests, indicating an important role of identities even for dual ideologues. Dahl (1971) argues that participatory democracy requires citizens to take two distinct actions: first to decide whether or not to participate and second to decide on elected representatives. Following this, in addition to partisan identity, I examine the differences between consistent and dual ideologues on measures of candidate choice and electoral participation. The competing roles of expressive and instrumental identities and their influence on behavior lead to the following hypotheses regarding political identity, vote choices, and electoral participation. First in regards to political identities:

- 1) Although many dual ideologues will identify with a party and ideological group, they should be less likely to identify than similar consistent ideologues.
- 2) The likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party and ideological group has declined over time as the parties' positions have been clarified.

In regards to vote consistency:

- 1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities should be less likely to defect or split their ticket.
- 2) Dual ideologues should be more likely to defect from their chosen party and split their ticket than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.
- 3) Over time, dual ideologues should become more likely to defect and split their ticket in comparison to consistent ideologues.

Finally, in regards to electoral participation:

- 1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities will be more likely to vote and to engage in other forms of electoral participation.
- 2) Dual ideologues should be less likely to vote and less likely to participate in other electoral activities than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.
- 3) Over time, dual ideologues should become less likely to vote and participate in other electoral activities in comparison to consistent ideologues.

CHAPTER 2

DATA AND METHODS

This study's data come from the cumulative file of the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1984 through 2008. The ANES asks respondents about their positions on multiple policy questions as well as a series of questions about political identity, vote choices, and which political activities the respondent engaged in. I begin analysis in 1984 to insure consistency across the issue questions being used. Prior to 1984, differences in the policy questions asked of respondents make comparison across time more difficult.

Political identity variables are constructed based on the self-reported strength of partisanship and ideology. These variables were created without respect to which side the respondent prefers (i.e. Democrat versus Republican or conservative versus liberal), but rather the strength of identity. The partisan identity variable is a 4 point scale ranging from 0 for those who describe themselves as independent with no partisan affiliation to a 3 for those with a strong partisan identity. A 1 on this scale represents those who initially indicate that they are independent, but in follow-up questions indicate that they "lean" toward a particular party. A 2 indicates someone with a self-described weak identity. While partisan strength is a weaker measure of social identity than a multi-item scale would be, it serves as an appropriate proxy although results may be weaker than if a full identity scale was used (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

Analysis also includes self-reported ideological strength as a proxy for ideological identity. This measure utilizes the ANES question asking respondents to place themselves on a 7 point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Similarly to partisan identity this variable is also folded to reflect the strength of an individual's ideology regardless

of whether they identified as conservative or liberal. Given that many respondents indicated that they didn't know to questions about ideology, this variable includes these respondents as the base category in order to capture this subset of citizens who either do not understand the ideological system or who simply choose not to place themselves on the ideology scale (such that 0= Don't know; 1= Independent; 2= Weak ideology; 3 = Strong ideology). Although we cannot know the exact reasons for individuals not placing themselves on the ideological scale, this group represents a substantial part of the sample at 27% and should not be simply left out of the analysis.

Two measures of vote consistency are used. First, those who defect from their party or ideology by voting for an opposing presidential candidate (i.e. a self-described Republican votes for a democratic or independent candidate). Although presidential candidates do not run as liberals or conservatives, in the current political climate it is generally expected that Republicans are conservative and Democrats are liberal, thus allowing me to consider whether individuals defect from their ideological identity. The second measure of vote consistency is those who split their ticket by voting for one party for president and an opposing party for House and/or Senate races. This includes all respondents whether or not they identify with a party or ideological group.

Two dependent variables are also analyzed to measure two different facets of electoral participation: first, whether the respondent voted in a given election and second, political activity beyond voting. The second dependent variable represents the level of an individual's political activity by counting five specific activities measured by the ANES: 1) trying to influence someone else's vote, 2) displaying a campaign sign or button, 3) attending a political meeting or rally, 4) working on a political campaign, and 5) making a monetary contribution to a party or

candidate. These variables were used to create a participation count that ranged from 0 to 3 indicating how politically active respondents were in each election year. The top category of 3 includes all of those who participated in 3 or more activities because the percentage of those participating in 4 or 5 activities was very small (1.5% and .8% respectively). For the sample as a whole, 75% of respondents said they voted while 25% reported not voting. Sixty-one percent of the sample reported participating in zero campaign activities, while 26% reported one activity, 8% two activities and 5% three or more electoral activities.

An independent variable of ideologue types was created using self-reported issue positions on several policy related questions within both the economic and social dimensions. First, an index of political issue items was created for both the economic and social dimensions. The ANES includes multiple policy questions measuring liberal or conservative policy views on a range of issue types. Questions used to create the social scale included when abortion should be allowed, whether laws should be enacted to protect homosexuals from discrimination, and whether women should have an equal role. Questions used to create the economic scale included whether government should provide health insurance, whether the government should guarantee jobs, the appropriate level of government-funded services, and aid to blacks. Each of these questions was coded on a 1-7 scale such that lower scores indicate more liberal responses and higher scores indicate more conservative responses. Scores were averaged to create a mean score across all questions in each dimension.

Ideologue types were identified based on these scores. Those with consistently conservative responses in both the economic and social domains were labeled as conservatives and consistently liberal responses coded as liberals. Those who displayed liberal responses to economic issues but conservative responses to social issues are labeled communitarians and

those who displayed conservative responses to economic issues but liberal responses to social issues are labeled as libertarian. Included as the base category for comparison are moderates who report moderate issue positions on both the economic and social issues scales.

In addition to these constructed variables, control variables include education, age, gender, race, region (south versus non-south), as well as measures of political knowledge and political efficacy.

A logistic regression model is used to analyze how ideologue type, party identification, and ideological identification impact the dichotomous variables of party defection, ticket-splitting, and voting. An ordered logistic regression is used to estimate the two identity models. A negative binomial regression model is used to estimate the electoral activity model since the participation activities function as a count variable. Since there is significant evidence of over dispersion in the data ($G^2 = 135.9$, $p < .001$) the negative binomial regression model is preferred to the poisson model.

CHAPTER 3

WHO ARE DUAL IDEOLOGUES?

Although liberals and conservatives receive the most attention, the two dual ideologue groups also make up a substantial portion of the electorate; however the relative proportion has changed significantly over the years. Those with consistently liberal issue positions has increased from roughly 12% in 1984 to nearly 25% of the electorate in 2008. Though the numbers of consistent liberals and conservatives were roughly equal in 1984, the numbers of conservatives declined to just under 10% by 2008. However, the number of libertarians (economically conservative, but socially liberal) increased during the same time period to almost 15% of the electorate in 2008. Communitarians had the most consistent downward trend over this time period. Although they represented 13% of the electorate in 1984 (second only to conservatives in that year), their numbers declined to just under 5% of the electorate in 2008. Other citizens, not included in this graph or subsequent analysis, hold liberal or conservative issue positions on one dimension and moderate views on another and accounted for about 40% of the electorate.




Figure 1: Percent Within Each Ideologue Type

Table 1 displays a number of significant demographic variables among each of the four types of ideologues as well as moderates for comparison. Those in the communitarian group show pronounced differences particularly in education and income where they lag substantially behind all other groups. Communitarians have a mean education level of 2.14 on a 1-4 scale where a 1 indicates grade school or less, 2 equals high school, 3 indicates some college, and 4 is a college or advanced degree. Just 6% of communitarians have a college degree in contrast to the 36% of libertarians who have a degree. Libertarians have the highest mean education level at 2.93, but this is on par with that of liberals.

Communitarians similarly lag substantially behind the other groups in income level. The majority of this group (58%) fall in the lowest levels of income below the 34th percentile. Just 16% fall above the 68th percentile in income. Libertarians, however, have the largest income overall with a mean of 3.28 with 47% falling in the highest income percentiles. Among other demographic characteristics of these groups, the clearest difference comes from race with minorities representing 48% of the communitarian group, but only 17% of the libertarian group.

Given their competing issue positions, some may expect dual ideologues to have weaker positions on issues than their more consistent counterparts. Despite some variation in issue strength, this largely does not hold up. The strength of issue positions displayed in Table 2 are based on mean scores across the aforementioned economic and social issues. Each issue is rated

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics by Issue-based Ideology Type

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
% of Electorate	10	15	11	9	6
Average Age	47	42	48	47	47
% Female	53	63	45	51	56
% Minority	26	34	15	17	48
Average Education level	2.66	2.92	2.69	2.93	2.14
Average Income level	2.87	2.81	3.06	3.28	2.22

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Table 2: Strength of Issue Positions

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Economic Issues	4.02	2.47	5.58	5.38	2.39
Social Issues	3.45	1.39	5.77	1.49	5.69

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

on a scale of 1-7 with lower numbers indicating more liberal positions and higher numbers ones that are more conservative and scores closer to the middle of the range indicating positions that are more moderate. Based on this data, libertarians are slightly more moderate than conservatives on economic issues (5.38 versus 5.58) and slightly more moderate than liberals on social issues (1.49 versus 1.39). However neither of these are significant differences. Communitarians are slightly more moderate on social issues than conservatives (5.69 versus 5.77), but actually more liberal than liberals on social issues. This indicates that dual ideologues are remarkably similar to their more consistent counterparts on the strength of their issue positions.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL IDENTITY

Expressive and instrumental views of identity give different explanations for why citizens join political parties. A sizeable literature identifies partisan identity as a result of socialization with children typically following along with their parents' party (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973). While a more instrumental view of identity suggests that individuals' choice of political party and ideological group is an outcome of the relative closeness of that party to the individuals' issue positions (Downs 1957). The importance of issue positions has become significantly more prominent as a result of ideological realignment, especially as elites emphasize ideology more frequently (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). The conflicting views about expressive versus instrumental antecedents of political identity suggest that while many dual ideologues will identify with political groups based on factors such as socialization or group interest, at least some members of this group are unlikely to identify because the two main parties and ideological groups do not adequately represent their issue positions. Further, the role of issue positions should have increased over time as the parties' positions became clearer and dual ideologues became more aware that their own issue positions do not match up. This leads to the following two hypotheses:

- 1) Although many dual ideologues will identify with a party and ideological group, they should be less likely to identify than similar consistent ideologues.
- 2) The likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party and ideological group has declined over time as the parties' positions have been clarified.

Despite conflicting issue positions, the vast majority of dual ideologues do identify with a party. Among libertarians, 90% identify with a party, a number not significantly different from the 92% of conservatives and 91% of liberals who do. Communitarians do identify at a slight lower though still substantial rate of 84%. A more substantial difference between groups lies in

whether they identify as strong or weak partisans. While 38% of liberals and 40% of conservatives identify as strong partisans, only 30% of libertarians do. Despite lower numbers identifying as a partisan overall, more communitarians identify as a strong partisan (36%) than libertarians do. As expected, most conflicted ideologues' partisanship matches with their economic positions although a sizeable number are clearly influenced by cultural issues. Sixty percent of libertarians identify as Republicans and 63% of communitarians identify as Democrats.

An even greater difference exists among groups in whether they identify with a conservative or liberal ideology. Seventy-one percent of consistent conservatives self-identify with an ideological group (69% as conservatives, 2% as liberals), representing the highest number among all groups. However, libertarians are more likely to identify ideologically than the other two ideological types including consistent liberals. Overall, 64% of libertarians self-identify, while only 58% of liberals do. Communitarians lag far behind this, however, with only 32% identifying as either conservative or liberal. Although existing theory predicts that dual ideologues will be more likely to identify as moderate – a way of averaging out their conflicting

Table 3: Political Identity by Issue-based Ideology Type

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
% Republican	35	11	69	60	21
% Democrat	53	80	23	30	63
% Strong Partisan	24	38	40	30	36
% Weak or Leaning	48	54	51	60	49
% Independent	13	8	8	10	15
% Identify as Conservative	23	5	69	58	11
% Identify as Liberal	13	53	2	6	21
% Strong ideology	12	39	52	32	17
% Weak ideology	27	21	21	35	16
% Self-Identify as Moderate	39	16	9	17	18
% Saying “don’t know”	19	22	17	15	48

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

issue positions – this trend is not strongly evident in ideological identification among these groups. Only a slightly higher percentage of libertarians and communitarians identify as moderate versus consistent liberals. Consistent conservatives are the least likely to identify as moderate at 10%. Of note in Table 3 is the high percentage of communitarians who responded that they don't know when asked to place themselves on the ideological scale. At 48%, this group responded 'don't know' at a much higher rate than any other group – liberals, the next highest group responded don't know just 22% of the time. Given communitarians' low levels of education, political knowledge, and lack of understanding of the parties' relative ideological positions, it seems likely that this answer reflects a lack of understanding of the ideological system rather than a belief that they fall outside of the system. Also notable is that dual ideologues are less likely to identify as a strong ideologue than consistent ideologues are. This is especially true among communitarians who identify as a strong ideologue just 17% of the time, while 39% of liberals and 52% of conservatives identify as a strong ideologue. While still identifying with an ideology, libertarians are much more likely to identify as a weak ideologue than other groups and do so 35% of the time compared to 21% for liberals and conservatives.

One potential explanation for why dual ideologues are willing to identify with a party or ideological group despite their mismatched issue positions is that they simply don't understand the parties positions or that their own positions do not match their chosen party. Given communitarians lower levels of education overall, we might expect them to have a lower understanding of the parties' positions and whether their own issue positions match up. To test this possibility, we can compare the ability of individuals to correctly place the parties in the appropriate order on the liberal conservative dimension. Those who incorrectly place the Republican candidate to the left of the Democratic candidate are likely to have a limited

understanding of the issue positions of the parties and to be unaware that their own issue positions do not match up. As Table 4 shows, at nearly 31%, a far greater percentage of communitarians were unable to correctly place the parties than the other groups. Libertarians are only modestly worse at placing the candidates than liberals or conservatives. Interestingly, a much higher percentage of communitarians also indicated that they saw no difference between the candidates. While the liberal conservative scale may be particularly difficult for some individuals, these results hold true when comparing candidates and parties on common issues such as abortion as well.

These numbers indicate that communitarians do have a significantly more difficult time in correctly placing the candidate and therefore may be unaware that their own issue positions do not match up with either of the parties. The data suggest, however, that understanding cross-pressures is only modestly related to whether one identifies with a party or ideological group and how strongly. Among communitarians for example, of those who incorrectly placed the candidates only 8% identify as independent and nearly 42% identify as a strong partisan. But these numbers are only marginally different for those who correctly understood the difference between candidates. Among this group, 12% identify as an independent and 37% held a strong partisan identity (percentage in the leaning and weak categories were almost identical). This trend was similar for libertarians, indicating that for both dual ideologue groups, understanding that they are cross-pressured does not necessarily affect whether they hold a strong affinity for political groups.

Table 4: Placement of Parties' Relative Ideological Positions

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
% With incorrect placement	22.6	12.87	11.23	14.93	30.86
% Who see no difference	9.39	6.93	4.18	6.86	15.59

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Another important aspect of identity, according to group identity theory, is that it prompts positive evaluations of the in-group, while creating lower evaluations of outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In the current polarized era, this has become a particularly important trend as partisans have increasingly rated their own party more positively and the opposing party more negatively (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). However, this is one area where dual ideologues differ from their more consistent counterparts. Feelings towards both parties and ideological groups is measured on the ANES by asking respondents to rate each group on 0-100 thermometer scale with 100 indicating a warm feeling toward the group and 0 indicating a cool feeling. Naturally, it is expected that individuals will rate the group that they belong to more warmly than an outside group. Tables 5 and 6 display the average thermometer ratings for each group based on the party with which they identify. By breaking out the data this way, we can more accurately compare group differences because dual ideologues are slightly less consistent in party choice (for example, nearly 80% of liberals identify as Democrats and only 11% as Republicans, but only 60% of communitarians identify as Democrats and 21% identify as Republicans).

Based on this data, we can see that dual ideologues typically rate their chosen party somewhat similarly to their more consistent counterparts. For example, self-identified Democrats who hold consistent liberal issue positions rate the Democratic Party at 74.68 on the thermometer scale, while Libertarians rate them at 72.01 and Communitarians rate them even higher at 79.70. This similarity holds across groups in each of the party ratings. This is not surprising given that this is their chosen party. However, where dual ideologues differ is in their ratings of the opposing party. Keeping with the same example, liberals who identify as Democrats rate the Republican Party at a low 32.22, while the dual ideologue groups rate them over 10 points higher at 45.64 and 46.48. While these are still generally negative ratings, they are not as low as those

of liberals, and create smaller differences between their ratings of the two groups. Although not the subject of this paper, it is also notable that those with conservative issue positions who self-identify as Democrats, rate the Democratic Party higher at 72.40, but also rate the Republican Party higher than any other group does at 49.86.

These trends are even more pronounced for ideological groups with significantly smaller differences in ratings of the two groups among both dual ideologue groups. As previous literature suggests, ideology groups are not as affectively charged as the parties (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). But among consistent ideologues, we still see generally higher and positive ratings of the ideology that matches with their chosen party as well as lower and negative ratings of the out-group. This is especially notable among self-identified Republicans with conservative issue positions who rate the conservative ideological group at 74.34 and the liberal ideological group at 33.27 for a difference of over 41 points. Dual ideologue groups, especially those who identify as conservative, display much more positive ratings of the ideological out-group and typically show only a very small difference in their ratings of conservative and liberal ideological groups. These higher ratings of the out-group among dual ideologues may indicate at least some recognition that their issue positions do not line up, which moderates the impact of identity and affective polarization as well.

Table 5: Group Thermometer Ratings for Self-identified Democrats

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Republican Rating	45.33	32.22	49.86	45.64	46.48
Democrat Rating	72.30	74.68	72.40	72.01	79.70
Difference	26.97	42.46	22.54	26.36	33.22
Conservative Rating	56.04	46.5	61.51	59.72	55.70
Liberal Rating	57.51	68.22	51.23	60.45	56.73
Difference	1.47	21.72	10.28	.73	1.03

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Table 6: Group Thermometer Ratings for Self-identified Republicans

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Republican Rating	70.27	64.01	73.67	69.30	73.91
Democrat Rating	49.03	51.65	34.77	41.64	48.58
Difference	21.24	12.36	38.9	27.66	25.33
Conservative Rating	63.49	57.29	74.34	66.56	60.28
Liberal Rating	50.20	46.15	33.27	45.91	50.28
Difference	13.29	10.14	41.07	20.65	10.00

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Thus far, the relationship between issue consistency and political identities has been mixed. While dual ideologues tend to identify with a party and ideological group at similar rates as their more consistent counterparts, despite understanding that the parties do not fully represent their issue positions, libertarians do tend to identify at weaker levels than either communitarians or consistent ideologues. Furthermore, the differing affective evaluations of the parties, based on the thermometer scores, suggest that identity plays a lesser role for dual ideologues than for more consistent ideologues.

To further test whether being a dual ideologue impacts political identity, I next turn to an ordered logistic regression model. In addition to the standard control variables mentioned previously, in this section I also include a dummy variable that measures whether one understands the placement of the parties in order to control for the fact that those who do not understand that their issue positions are different from their party of choice cannot be reasonably expected to behave any differently than consistent ideologues whose issue positions do match up.

Results of the logit model for both party identity and ideological identity are displayed in Table 7. Each of the consistent ideologue type variables are statistically significant in predicting whether one expresses a higher level of partisan identity. For consistent liberals and conservatives, the odds of reporting a higher level of partisan identity than moderates are 57%

Table 7: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Party ID and Ideological ID

VARIABLES	(1) Party ID	(2) Ideological ID
Liberal	0.454*** (0.0898)	0.726*** (0.0891)
Conservative	0.518*** (0.0911)	1.449*** (0.0938)
Libertarian	0.0882 (0.0973)	0.514*** (0.0959)
Communitarian	0.457*** (0.116)	-0.0512 (0.116)
Education	0.106*** (0.0395)	0.399*** (0.0398)
Income	-0.0236 (0.0316)	0.0253 (0.0318)
Age	0.0175*** (0.00203)	-4.94e-05 (0.00203)
Female	0.233*** (0.0628)	-0.142** (0.0631)
Race	0.0316 (0.0487)	-0.149*** (0.0492)
South	0.0982 (0.0680)	-0.0960 (0.0690)
Knowledge	0.0279** (0.0112)	-0.00519 (0.0114)
Efficacy	0.0762 (0.0514)	0.172*** (0.0519)
Correct Placement	0.0123 (0.0858)	0.624*** (0.0881)
Constant cut1	-0.742*** (0.211)	0.462** (0.208)
Constant cut2	1.063*** (0.208)	1.718*** (0.209)
Constant cut3	2.377*** (0.211)	3.013*** (0.213)
Pseudo R ²	.24	.28
Observations	3,624	3,632

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(z=5.051 p<.001) and 68% respectively (z=5.685 p<.001), holding all other variables at their means. The results for dual ideologues are mixed. Communitarians show little difference from consistent ideologues in expressing partisan identity with the odds of reporting a higher identity

being 58% ($z=3.948$ $p<.001$) higher than moderates. Libertarians on the other hand show only small and insignificant odds of expressing a stronger political identity.

Similarly for ideological identity, each of the consistent ideologue groups show a positive and significant effect. The odds of reporting a higher level of ideological identity increase by 107% ($z=8.147$ $p<.001$) for consistent liberals and by 98% ($z=7.902$ $p<.001$) for consistent conservatives. Again, the results for dual ideologues are mixed, but in the opposite direction. Unlike party identity, the odds of libertarians reporting a strong ideological identity increase by 67% ($z=5.357$ $p<.001$) over moderates. However, communitarians show only a small negative and insignificant effect. Interestingly, being able to correctly place the parties on the ideological continuum has no effect on party identification but increases the odds of a higher ideological identity by 87% ($z=7.091$ $p<.001$).

Figure 2 displays the probability of each ideological group identifying with each strength of party identity. The probability of any group identifying as an independent is small and does not differ in a statistically significant way across groups. Similarly, the probability of identifying as a weak partisan is virtually the same across all groups (at about 31.5%). The probability of a




Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Party Identification




Figure 3: Probability of Ideological Identification

libertarian identifying as a leaning partisan at 29.4% is only marginally different from that of consistent ideologues (23.9 and 22.9% for liberals and conservatives). The major difference between groups lies in the probability of libertarians identifying as a strong partisan, as this group has a much lower probability (at 29.7%) than any other group. Communitarians' probability of identifying as a strong partisan (37.9%) nearly matches that of consistent liberals (37.8%) and is only slightly lower than that of consistent conservatives (39.4%).

On the other hand, the probability of identifying at each level of ideological identity varies considerably among these four groups (Figure 3). Conservatives are the least likely to be unable to place themselves on this scale, with only a 6.7% probability of saying they don't know. Libertarians and liberals display a slightly higher propensity to respond 'don't know' at 15.5% and 12.9% probabilities respectively. Communitarians on the other hand respond don't know much more frequently, with a predicted probability of 24.4%. Liberals and libertarians display similar probabilities of identifying as moderate (21.3% and 23.7% respectively), with communitarians only slightly higher (28.7%). Consistent conservatives are least likely to

identify as a moderate with a predicted probability of only 13.5%. The probabilities of identifying as a weak ideologue are similar across groups, although with more variation than we see among weak party identification. Again conservatives are the least likely to identify as a weak ideologue (27.8% predicted probability), while consistent liberals are actually the highest at 31.3%, with libertarians and communitarians falling between these extremes. Once again, the greatest variation comes among those with a strong identity. Consistent conservatives are extremely likely to have a strong identity with a 52% predicted probability with liberals and libertarians falling somewhat below this at 34.4% and 29.8% respectively, while communitarians have a probability of a strong ideological identity of only 19.4%.

Next we turn to whether or not the likelihood of identifying with a party or ideological group has changed over time as polarization has increased and as the parties have become more distinct. In order to ensure an adequate number of cases within each time point, I pool data across decades to compare results from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (full logit results for each decade can be found in Tables 14 and 15 in the appendix). As expected, among consistent ideologues, the odds of expressing a stronger identity increases in each subsequent decade. The odds of an increased identity for each group over time are displayed in Table 8. For instance, in the 1980s, consistent liberals have odds of 35% ($z=1.964$ $p<.001$) of expressing a higher partisan identity, which increases to 64% ($z=3.797$, $p<.001$) in the 1990s, and increases again to 102.3% ($z=3.159$, $p<.001$) higher odds in the 2000s. Once again, we see mixed results for the two dual ideologue groups, however. Consistent with the overall data discussed previously, libertarians show no statistically significant increased odds of expressing a stronger identity and the effects that do exist are small and actually negative in the 2000s. Communitarians, on the other hand, show increased odds of identifying at stronger levels of partisanship in each subsequent decade

and actually show a higher propensity to have a strong party identity in the 2000s than either consistent ideologue group. In the 1980s, communitarians have marginally significant odds of 37% ($z=1.940$ $p<.1$) of expressing a higher partisan identity, which increases to 65% ($z=2.559$, $p<.05$) in the 1990s, and increases again to 141% ($z=2.126$, $p<.05$) higher odds in the 2000s.

As with the overall data for ideological identification, the over-time results vary substantially within and between groups. Liberals show increased odds of a strong identity from the 1980s to the 2000s, although this drops somewhat in the interim 1990s. Conservatives though, show a sustained increase in each subsequent decade with a particularly large increase in the 2000s. Libertarians show a similar pattern to liberals with an overall increase from the 1980s

Table 8: Odds of a Stronger Identity Strength

Party Identity Strength				
	<u>Overall</u>	<u>1980s</u>	<u>1990s</u>	<u>2000s</u>
Liberal	57.4*** (5.051)	35.0** (1.964)	64.2*** (3.799)	102.3*** (3.159)
Conservative	67.9*** (5.685)	47.2*** (2.724)	85.5*** (4.547)	70.0** (1.994)
Libertarian	9.2 (.906)	18.1 (1.118)	3.0 (.193)	-9.0 (-.373)
Communitarian	57.9*** (3.948)	37.1* (1.940)	65.2** (2.559)	141.4** (2.126)

Ideology Identity Strength				
	<u>Overall</u>	<u>1980s</u>	<u>1990s</u>	<u>2000s</u>
Liberal	106.7*** (8.147)	116.4*** (5.060)	72.6*** (4.202)	224.5*** (5.402)
Conservative	326.0*** (15.443)	263.1*** (8.901)	306.7*** (10.070)	996.8*** (7.777)
Libertarian	67.1*** (5.135)	92.9*** (4.542)	19.9* (1.186)	145.3*** (3.528)
Communitarian	-5.0 (-.442)	-7.2 (-.461)	-4.7 (-.245)	-16.4 (-.453)

Note: Odds displayed as percentage. Z scores in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

to the 2000s, with a decrease in the 1990s. Despite the growing strength of libertarian's odds of a stronger ideological identification, the increase is significantly less substantial than that of liberals or conservatives suggesting that their expressive identities were moderated somewhat by the divergent issue positions. Communitarians are once again the outlier, as they display no statistically significant change in their odds of a stronger ideological identity.

The differences between the ideologue groups become even more prominent when we consider the predicted probabilities of having a strong partisan identity and how this changes over time for each group as displayed in Figure 4 (Table 16 in the appendix shows predicted probabilities for each group over time). In the 1980s, few differences between the groups existed, with only a small divergence between groups at strong levels of party strength. Between the 1980s and 2000s, both consistent liberals and conservatives increased significantly in their




Figure 4: Probability of Party Identification Over Time

probability of being strong partisans. Liberals increased from a 35.9% to a 46.5% probability, while conservatives increased from 37.9% to 42.2%. During this same time period, libertarians decreased in the probability of being a strong partisan from 32.8% to 28.1%. But, consistent with previous trends of communitarians, this group increased more than even the consistent ideologues from 28.1% to 50.9%.

Changes in the predicted probability of a strong ideological identity are also notable over time as seen in Figure 5. Both liberals and conservatives display an increased likelihood of holding a strong ideological identity with liberals increasing from 35.4% in the 1980s to 41.5% in the 2000s (with a small dip in the 1990s), and conservatives increasing from 47.9% in the 1980s to 67% in the 2000s. Libertarians experienced only a small change during this time period increasing from a predicted probability of 32.8% in the 1980s to 34.9% in the 2000s.




Figure 5: Probability of Ideological Identification Over Time

Communitarians on the other hand, marginally decreased from a 19% probability of holding a strong ideological identity, to only a 15.5% probability. Despite increased elite messaging about the relative issue positions of the parties and the increased alignment of ideology and partisanship over this time, communitarians increased in their likelihood of saying ‘don’t know’ during this time frame from a 25% to 30.6% predicted probability. Libertarians remained relatively consistent on this response while liberals and conservatives decreased in their likelihood of responding ‘don’t know’.

Conclusions

Overall, I find mixed support for the hypotheses about the political identification of dual ideologues. The first hypothesis stated that dual ideologues should be less likely to identify with partisan and ideological groups than consistent ideologues. On partisan identity, this is certainly true for libertarians, who showed no difference in their propensity to identify with a party than do moderates while both consistent ideologue groups showed substantially increased and statistically significant odds of identifying with a party. Similarly, libertarians have a much lower probability of identifying as a strong partisan than either consistent group. Communitarians, though, contradict this hypothesis as they are just as likely to identify with a party and to identify as a strong partisan as the consistent ideologues.

I also find mixed results in regards to ideological identity. Communitarians are substantially less likely to identify with an ideological group or to identify with a strong ideology than either group of consistent ideologues. Libertarians on the other hand are more likely to identify with an ideological group than moderates, but this effect is weaker than that for either

consistent liberals or conservatives. Libertarians are also more likely to identify as moderates than are consistent ideologues.

Mixed results hold for the over-time models as well. My second hypothesis stated that the likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party or ideological group has declined over time as the parties' relative positions have been clarified. On the partisan identity measure, this is patently not true for communitarians, who actually increased their likelihood of identifying with a party and identified as a strong partisan even more than the consistent ideologue groups. However, being a libertarian showed no statistically significant effect on party identification, although the overall trend did show a decrease in party identification from the 1980s through the 2000s.

Once again, similar but mixed results hold for ideological identity. The effects for communitarians were not statistically significant at any point in time, although the trend showed a small decrease in the odds of communitarians displaying stronger identity. Contradicting expectations, libertarians did show an increase in their probability of identifying with an ideological group. Although both consistent ideologues and libertarians have responded to polarization by increasing their ideological strength, consistent ideologues have increased identity at a much higher rate overall than did libertarians indicating that this group's dueling issue positions did moderate the effects over time.

CHAPTER 5

CANDIDATE CHOICE

Candidate choice and whether or not it aligns with one's party has become particularly salient as polarization has become more prominent in recent decades. While the majority of citizens who identify with a party typically vote for that party's candidates, defection was not always uncommon. Beginning in the 1990s, however, defection has become increasingly unlikely. As the parties have become more homogenous and clearer about their competing issue positions, it is easier for citizens to pick a party that matches their issue positions, with fewer issues pulling them to the other side (although see Hillygus and Shields discussion about the role of wedge issues). Further, affective polarization suggests that individuals view their party as "their team" and increasingly view the out-party in more negative terms (Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Malka and Lelkes 2010). Voting for the opposing party would be antithetical to this group mentality, regardless of issue positions.

In this section, I consider two types of voting behavior and whether that behavior differs for consistent and dual ideologues. First, I look at whether an individual defects from her party in the presidential contest by voting for the opposing party or an independent candidate. It should be noted that this is more likely in certain election years with a strong third party candidate such as Ross Perot in 1992 or Ralph Nader in 2000. Prior to the 1990s, high proportions of partisans regularly voted for the opposing party. Between 1952 and 1988, at least 18% of partisans voted for the opposing party, but this number declined substantially in all 2000 elections through 2008 when only 9% of partisans voted for a candidate of the opposite party.

Second, I consider split-ticket voting when an individual votes for one party in the presidential race and an opposing party in House and/or Senate elections. Straight-ticket voting

has also increased substantially as the role of party identity has increased and as the electorate has become more polarized (Hetherington 2001; Niemi and Stanley 2010). Because of their competing issue positions, dual ideologues may be more likely to be swayed by the opposing candidate’s appeals, although the expressive nature of partisanship may influence many to stick with their ‘team’. The decrease in presidential vote defection and split-ticket voting leads to the following hypotheses about whether dual ideologues display the same levels of vote consistency as consistent ideologues and whether these have changed over time.

- 1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities should be less likely to defect or split their ticket.
- 2) Dual ideologues should be more likely to defect from their chosen party and split their ticket than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.
- 3) Over time, dual ideologues should become more likely to defect and split their ticket in comparison to consistent ideologues.

Table 9 displays the percentage within each of the dual and consistent ideologue groups who defected in a presidential race or split their ticket. Dual ideologues are several percentage points more likely to both defect and split their ticket during the period from 1984 to 2008. Vote defection is only slightly more likely among Libertarians and Communitarians (at 17% and 16% respectively), while liberals and conservatives defect between 10% and 14% of the time. However ticket-splitting occurs at much higher rates and with more variation. Ticket-splitting is especially prominent among libertarians who split 30% of the time, compared to just over 20% among conservatives and 17% for liberals. Communitarians also split more than consistent ideologues with nearly 25% splitting their ticket.

Table 9: Vote Defection and Split Ticket Rates

	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Vote Defection	19.34	10.93	13.90	16.77	15.83
Split Ticket	30.81	17.38	20.60	29.58	24.48

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.




Figure 6: Percent Defecting From Party




Figure 7: Percent Splitting Ticket

Figures 6 and 7 show these trends over time. Both dual ideologues and consistent ideologues show similar trends of defecting over time with large upticks among all groups in 1992 (with third party candidate Ross Perot receiving a number of these votes). Libertarians showed the highest propensity for defecting of the ideologue groups and are on par with moderates from 1988-2000, when communitarians overtook them. Again, we see much more variable trends for ticket-splitting, but with both dual ideologue groups showing substantially higher propensities for ticket-splitting than consistent ideologues, especially after 2000. As expected, ticket-splitting decreased significantly after 1996 for consistent ideologues. However, for dual ideologues, after declining somewhat in the 1990s, ticket-splitting actually became much more common in the 2000s, defying the general trends seen as a result of polarization. Although ticket-splitting did dip somewhat in 2008 for dual ideologues, these groups still voted for opposing parties at much higher rates than consistent ideologues (for example, 24% of the time for libertarians compared to only 11% for liberals). This suggests that dual ideologues have not responded to polarization in the same manner as consistent ideologues and remain less attached to their party of choice.

Table 10: Logit Results for Vote Defection and Split Ticket Voting

VARIABLES	(1) Vote Defection	(2) Split Ticket
Liberal	-0.469*** (0.156)	-0.364*** (0.140)
Conservative	-0.172 (0.152)	-0.333** (0.140)
Libertarian	-0.0324 (0.158)	0.0607 (0.143)
Communitarian	-0.212 (0.203)	-0.136 (0.186)
Education	-0.167** (0.0668)	-0.0824 (0.0595)
Income	0.00262 (0.0540)	0.177*** (0.0505)
Age	-0.00992*** (0.00344)	-0.00730** (0.00319)
Female	0.166 (0.107)	0.260*** (0.0968)
Race	-0.309*** (0.0981)	-0.171** (0.0840)
South	0.0720 (0.117)	0.230** (0.105)
Knowledge	0.00346 (0.0190)	0.0199 (0.0174)
Efficacy	-0.152* (0.0897)	-0.0851 (0.0800)
Party Strength	-0.575*** (0.0663)	-0.433*** (0.0503)
Ideology Strength	-0.169*** (0.0516)	-0.207*** (0.0467)
Constant	2.022*** (0.403)	0.824** (0.355)
Pseudo R ²	.22	.18
Observations	2,871	2,620

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To consider the effects of identity on vote choice and what these tell us about the effects of instrumental versus expressive identities, I next turn to logit models for both presidential vote defection and ticket-splitting. The logit results for both models are displayed in Table 10. Among the various types of ideologues, none of the groups have a statistically significant connection to defecting in the presidential vote except for liberals who are 34% less likely to defect than

moderates. The other groups are all less likely to defect, but none approach levels of significance.

However, both partisan and ideological identity have a significant effect on whether one will defect. Ideology is statistically significant with a coefficient of .169, although this is substantially below that of the strength of partisan attachment with a coefficient of .575. A one category change in the strength of partisan identity decreases the odds of defecting by 59% ($p < .001$), while a one category change in the strength of ideology decreases the odds of defecting by 20% ($p < .001$), holding all other variables constant at their means.

The importance of partisan and ideological identities on the probability of defecting in the presidential vote as well as their differing impacts on consistent and dual ideologues can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. As expected, those with strong identities are less likely to defect across all ideological groups. Further, as is clear from Figure 8, the differences between groups lessens as party strength increases. While liberals are the least likely to defect at every party strength, libertarians are the most likely to defect, although the gap between groups narrows to only .03 at the strongest level of party identity. Those with strong liberal issue positions, but who describe themselves as independent (group 1) have .32 predicted probability of defecting (95% CI: .25,




Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Defecting, by Party Strength




Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Defecting, by Ideology Strength

.39), while those who have a strong party identity (4) have only a .08 probability of defecting (95% CI: .06, .1). While liberals have the lowest chance of defecting overall, libertarians have the highest across all party strengths with a .42 (95% CI: .34, .50) probability of defecting for those who describe themselves as independent and a .11 (95% CI: .09, .14) probability for those who see themselves as strong partisans. While the overall trend is similar for all groups with stronger partisans statistically less likely to defect, it should be noted that the differences within each party strength category are not statistically significant. So while a weak liberal is predicted to defect less than a weak communitarian or liberal these differences are not statistically significant for the overall period of 1984-2008. As we will see later in this section however, the differences become significant when we look at the trends over time.

As expected, the effects of ideological strength are lower than those of party strength but generally move in the same direction, with liberals having the lowest rate of defection and libertarians the highest. As discussed previously, because of the high number of individuals who are unable or refuse to place themselves on the ideology continuum, the ideology strength variable has a base category (0) consisting of those who say they 'don't know' in response to the question which asks them if they are liberal or conservative. For those with liberal issue positions, but who are unable to identify with an ideology group, .15 (95% CI: .12, .19) are predicted to defect, while only .09 (95% CI: .08, .11) with a strong ideological identity can be expected to defect. Unlike party identity, however, the differences between groups do not narrow quite as substantially at the high levels of ideology strength with a .06 difference in the probability of defecting between liberals and libertarians with a strong identity.

Ticket-splitting shows similar trends to defecting although with statistically significant differences between libertarians and both consistent ideologue groups at the lower levels of party




Figure 10: Predicted Probability of Split Ticket, by Party Strength




Figure 11: Predicted Probability of Split Ticket, by Ideology Strength

and ideological identity (Figures 10 and 11). The predicted probability of self-described independents with liberal issue positions splitting their ticket is .34 (95% CI: .29, .39), while that of libertarians is .48 (95% CI: .42, .55). Communitarians fall in between consistent ideologues and libertarians in the likelihood of splitting their ticket at .43 (95% CI: .35, .52), although this difference is not statistically different from either group. Again, the trends are similar across groups based on ideology strength instead of party strength.

Liberals and conservatives have the lowest probability of ticket-splitting across all ideology strengths, while libertarians have the highest probability – even higher than moderates. Among liberals, those who are unable to identify themselves as having an ideology, .24 (95% CI: .20, .28) are predicted to split their ticket while only .15 (95% CI: .12, .18) of those with a strong ideology can be expected to vote for different parties. On the other hand, libertarians who are unable to identify themselves as having an ideology, .36 (95% CI: .31, .41) are predicted to split their ticket while only .24 (95% CI: .20, .28) of those with a strong ideology can be expected to vote for different parties. Libertarians with a strong identity have the same probability of splitting their ticket as do consistent liberals and conservatives with no ideological identity at all, indicating an important difference between these groups other than just identity.

The trends and differences between groups, independent of party and ideological identities, become particularly notable when we consider the probabilities of defecting and ticket-splitting over time. Although there exists some within group variation, the overall trends for the probability of both vote defection and ticket-splitting indicate an increasing difference between the dual and consistent ideologue groups. All groups were less likely to defect and ticket-split in the 2000s, especially among those with strong political identities, which is expected given increasing polarization. But, liberals and conservatives declined at a much higher rate than dual ideologues, thus increasing the gap between groups and suggesting that the importance of identities and affective polarization has had a much more significant impact on consistent ideologues than those with competing issue positions.

The probability of defecting from one's party in the presidential races of the 1980s was fairly consistent across groups at all levels of partisan and ideological identities as seen in Figure 12. For those with no partisan identity, the probability of defecting differs by only .03 between the highest and lowest groups and only .02 for those with strong party identity. Similarly, the difference between those with no partisan identity and a strong partisan identity ranges is relatively low at an average of only .13 among all groups. Beginning in the 1990s, we see the effects of polarization as the differences between groups and between identity strengths begin to take shape. Although the overall rates of defection in the 1990s were higher than the previous decade (a result of Ross Perot's strong independent bids), the impact was especially great among those claiming no partisan identity. Liberals who claimed to be independents had a .4 (95% CI: .34, .45) predicted probability of defecting, while those with a strong party identity had only a .08 (95% CI: .05, .10) probability of defecting. This difference of .32 is the lowest among groups (libertarians see a difference of .44) and is significantly higher than the difference of only .13




Figure 12: Probability of Vote Defection Over Time, by Party Strength

between high and low identity strength in the 1980s. Also notable in the 1990s is the widening gap between groups, particularly among those who have weaker levels of party identity.

Consistent liberals consistently have the lowest level of defection, while libertarians become significantly more likely to defect, with communitarians and conservatives occupying the middle ground during the 1990s.

However, the differences between consistent ideologues and libertarians becomes especially pronounced in the 2000 elections. Among all levels of party strength, both consistent liberals and conservatives have low probabilities of defecting (ranging from .3 for no party identity, .02 for high party identity). Libertarians on the other hand have relatively high predicted probabilities of defecting at .48 for those with no partisan identity, but still a low probability of only .06 for those with a strong identity.




Figure 13: Probability of Vote Defection Over Time, by Ideology Strength

Ideological identity plays a role remarkably similar to that of partisan identity although the overall probabilities of defection are lower for each level of ideological strength as seen in figure 13. For those with no ideological identities, the predicted probability of defecting ranges from only .15 to .18 (as compared to .20 to .23 for partisan identity). Similarly, in the 2000s, the probability of defecting shows greater variability among groups, although the overall probability is lower than for partisan identity. In the 2000 presidential elections, liberals with no ideological identity had a probability of defecting of only .07 (95% CI: .05, .09), while libertarians had a probability of defecting of .14 (95% CI: .11, .17). However, at the highest end of ideological strength, there exists more variation between groups than we saw with partisan identity. So, while liberals with a strong ideological identity had a predicted probability of defecting of .05 (95% CI: .03, .08), libertarians had a probability of .10 (95% CI: .09, .13).




Figure 14: Probability of Split Ticket Over Time, by Party Strength

Comparing consistent ideologues with libertarians generally conforms to expectations with larger differences in defection rates for the dual ideologue group, although this difference is especially pronounced at weaker levels of party identification and only marginally significant for those with a strong partisan or ideological identity. Communitarians, on the other hand, defy expectations for dual ideologues and have a low probability of defecting across the decades. In the 2000s, communitarian's probability of defecting was particularly low and on par with both consistent ideologue groups.

The trends for ticket-splitting are similar but more pronounced than those for defection in the presidential race alone (see Figure 14). Overall rates of ticket-splitting also remained higher than defection even for those with strong identities. Although there was significant differences between the ideologue groups at each level of both partisan and ideological identity, there is a




Figure 15: Probability of Split Ticket Over Time, by Ideology Strength

clear downward trend in the probability of splitting one's ticket from the 1980s through the 2000s, as we would expect given increasing polarization. For example, in the 1980s, strong liberals had a .18 probability (95% CI: .15, .21) of ticket-splitting, in the 2000s this fell to only .1 (95% CI: .07, .14). Most notable about ticket-splitting, however, is the significant differences among dual and consistent ideologues even for those with strong partisan and ideological identities. While consistent liberals with a strong party identity had a .1 probability of ticket-splitting in the 2000s, libertarians had a .2 probability (95% CI: .17, .24), with communitarians not far behind at a .19 probability (95% CI: .16, .22). Differences between these groups, but based on a strong ideological identity, are even more pronounced (Figure 15). Liberals with a strong ideology had a .11 (95% CI: .08, .15) probability of a split ticket, while libertarians had a .25 probability (95% CI: .22, .27), and communitarians had a .24 probability (95% CI: .20, .29).

Conclusions

Overall then, the data for presidential vote defection and ticket-splitting largely confirms the hypotheses about differences between dual and consistent ideologues at least in considering libertarians. The first hypothesis stated that those with stronger partisan identities would be less likely to defect or split their ticket. This was overwhelmingly confirmed with an increase in the strength of both partisan and ideological identity resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of both defecting and ticket-splitting across all ideologue groups. The second hypothesis stated that dual ideologues would be more likely to defect and to ticket-split than consistent ideologues. In the vote defection model, the general trends for party identity point in this direction, with dual ideologues more likely to defect, but none of the differences approached statistical significance especially at the strongest levels of identity. This is also true of ideological identities but with stronger, statistically significant differences between liberals and libertarians at the weaker levels of identity.

The evidence in the ticket-splitting model was stronger with larger and statistically significant differences between liberals and libertarians who are independent, although again this gap narrows for those with a strong identity. In both the vote defection and ticket-splitting models, communitarians display different effects than do libertarians as they typically fall between libertarians and consistent ideologues in their probability of defecting or ticket-splitting but with no statistically significant differences with either of these groups.

Once again the differences between libertarians and consistent ideologues become more pronounced over time as expected in the third hypothesis of this section. In the 1980s, few differences existed between the probability of dual ideologues versus consistent ideologues to defect or split their ticket. These gaps widen significantly in the 1990s and 2000s with

libertarians becoming significantly more likely to defect and split their tickets than both liberals and conservatives. Again, communitarians defy expectations for dual ideologues, however, as their probability of defecting or splitting their ticket remained similar to that of the consistent ideologues groups.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Previous literature suggests that those who identify more strongly with a party or ideology also vote and participate at higher rates (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). As polarization and political identities have increased, so too has participation, especially in the 2000s. For several decades prior to the 2000s, little over half of the eligible electorate voted in presidential elections; but in 2004, 61% voted and in 2008, 59% voted. More importantly, participation in electoral activities beyond voting also increased substantially. Based on data from the American National Election Studies, in 2000, only 10% of citizens displayed a campaign sign, button or bumper sticker. In 2004, this increased to 21%. And in 2004, 48% of citizens reported trying to influence someone else's vote during the campaign, an increase of 16% over levels seen in 2000.

However, substantial demographic differences between the ideologue groups should in itself point to differences in participation levels. Those with higher incomes and education are more likely to participate regardless of ideology (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), which indicates that libertarians should participate at higher levels. However, high levels of partisan identity should also make the communitarian group more likely to participate, while the significant differences in ideological identification between libertarians and communitarians should also prompt differences in participation rates. Overall communitarians display several factors that may each prompt lower participation including lower incomes and education, as well as significantly lower rates of ideological identification. Given these factors, I examine the following hypotheses in this section:

- 1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities will be more likely to vote and to engage in other forms of electoral participation.

- 2) Dual ideologues should be less likely to vote and less likely to participate in other electoral activities than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths. Although this will be more pronounced for communitarians than libertarians.
- 3) Over time, dual ideologues should become less likely to vote and participate in other electoral activities in comparison to consistent ideologues.

As expected, given the above factors, clear differences exist in voting rates – but only for one type of inconsistent ideologue. While 75% of conservatives voted, only 47% of communitarian respondents reported that they did so. This pattern does not hold for libertarians. Among this group, 73% voted, which is actually higher than the 70% of consistent liberals who voted. The trend is similar among communitarians for electoral participation beyond voting. While 39% of both liberals and conservatives participated in at least one activity beyond voting, only 18% of communitarian respondents did so. Libertarians respondents also reported participating at lower rates than consistent ideologues, but only slightly at 34%.

These trends largely hold up over time and while all groups show fluctuations in their participation rates, the up and down patterns are fairly consistent across groups. As Figure 16 displays, communitarians have lagged behind voting rates in every election since 1984. The other groups have shown much more variation in their relation to each other. In 1984, liberals voted at lower rates than either conservatives or libertarians. In 2008, the three groups voted at nearly the same rate, with liberals just slightly voting at a higher rate than the other two. While




Figure 16: Percent Voting




Figure 17: Participation Beyond Voting

libertarians lagged behind conservatives in many years, in 2004, libertarians voted more than either conservatives or liberals.

A similar story is evident with participation beyond voting as seen in Figure 17. Communitarians lag substantially behind the other groups with less than 30% participating in any sort of campaign activity until 2004, when they participated at rates similar to moderates, approaching 40%. Libertarians do have slightly lower rates of participation from 1984 to 1996, but in 2000 their participation rate increases to be on par with consistent ideologues. However, after 2000, their participation rate did not increase at the same rates as liberals and conservatives. While the clearest trend is that communitarians voted at substantially lower rates than the other ideological groups as well as moderates, libertarians do not display the same level of disengagement despite their dual ideologue status.

Clearly, substantial differences between these groups exist and a number of factors likely contribute to the differences in participation – especially that seen among communitarians. Table 11 displays the result of a logit model of voting (column 1) and a negative binomial regression model of electoral activity (column 2). Several variables are statistically significant in predicting voting. As expected, higher levels of education and income lead to a higher likelihood of voting. Education has the highest magnitude with a coefficient of .656. Among the various types of ideologues, none of the groups have a statistically significant connection to voting. All groups, except communitarians, have a positive coefficient, indicating they would be more likely to participate than moderates but none approach levels of significance.

However, both partisan and ideological identity have a significant effect on voting. Ideology is statistically significant with a coefficient of .187, although this is substantially below the strength of partisan attachment with a coefficient of .458. A one category change in partisan

Table 11: Logit (model 1) and Negative Binomial (model 2) Results

VARIABLES	(1) Voting	(2) Electoral Participation
Liberal	0.138 (0.120)	0.292*** (0.0595)
Conservative	0.254 (0.129)	0.143** (0.0614)
Libertarian	0.0120 (0.138)	-0.130 (0.0705)
Communitarian	-0.169 (0.134)	0.0789 (0.0803)
Education	0.656*** (0.0587)	0.154*** (0.0248)
Income	0.299*** (0.0422)	0.0912*** (0.0203)
Age	0.0310*** (0.00273)	0.00196 (0.00127)
Female	0.148 (0.0857)	-0.0416 (0.0399)
Race	-0.157*** (0.0604)	-0.0146 (0.0322)
South	-0.363*** (0.0878)	0.00464 (0.0428)
Knowledge	0.0718*** (0.0149)	0.0375*** (0.00718)
Efficacy	0.0718 (0.0698)	0.116*** (0.0317)
Party Identity	0.458*** (0.0428)	0.174*** (0.0215)
Ideological strength	0.187*** (0.0388)	0.184*** (0.0203)
Constant	-4.343*** (0.293)	-2.485*** (0.141)
Pseudo R^2	.21	.14
Observations	4,169	4,169

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

identity increases the odds of voting by 58% ($z=10.692$ $p<.001$), while a one category change in the strength of ideology increases the odds of voting by 21% ($z=4.804$ $p<.001$).

The full effects of partisan and ideological strength for each ideological group can be seen in Figures 18 and 19. For all ideology types, someone who reports a strong partisan identity is more likely to vote than someone in lower categories is. The least likely to vote in all groups is someone who reports an independent identity. As we can see from Figure 18, communitarians are the least likely to vote at all levels of party strength. However, there are no statistically significant differences between the groups within the same levels of partisan identity. For example, the probability of a consistent conservative with a strong party identification voting is .90 (95% CI: .88, .92), the highest probability of all groups. The probability of a communitarian, also with a strong party identification, voting is .86 (95% CI: .82, .89). However, the probability of a communitarian with strong party identity voting is significantly greater than that of either a consistent liberal or consistent conservative who report either independent or only leaning partisanship, indicating the importance of party identity in influencing whether one votes. The probability of an independent conservative voting is .69 (95% CI: .65, .75). A strong party identity among libertarians and communitarians can overcome competing issue positions to encourage voting at higher rates than independents or leaning partisans among consistent ideologues. In fact, even a communitarian with a weak party identity is more likely to vote (probability of .79, 95% CI .76, .83) than an independent liberal or conservative, although about as equally likely to vote as a leaning liberal or conservative (.78, 95% CI: .76, .82). In addition, the gap between consistent and dual ideologues narrows at the top of the scale. Among those identifying as independents there is a .09 difference in the predicted probability of conservatives versus communitarians voting (the highest and lowest group respectively). At the top of the scale, among those identifying as strong partisans, the difference narrows to just .04.

The impact of ideology strength on voting is less pronounced than that of party identity. As portrayed in Figure 19, the least likely to vote among all groups are those who say they “don’t know” when asked to identify their ideology, however the differences between the majority of categories are not statistically significant. For both consistent and dual ideologues those with a strong self-reported ideology are more likely to vote than those who report “don’t know” within the same ideologue group. However, ideological identity does not have the same impact as partisan identity among dual ideologues. Even communitarians with a strong ideological identity are no more likely to vote than consistent conservatives or liberals who say they don’t know or are moderate. The predicted probability of strong communitarians voting is .82 (95% CI: .78, .86), while that of moderate consistent conservatives is .83 (95% CI: .8, .86).

The story is somewhat different for electoral participation beyond voting. In this model, both consistent conservatives and liberals are more likely to participate than moderates and dual ideologues. Being a consistent liberal increases the expected number of activities by 34% (.196 activities significant at $p < .001$), holding all other variables constant. Consistent conservatives are expected to see an increase of 15.4% (.089 activities, $p < .05$) over moderates. Although libertarians have a negative coefficient, this effect is not significant at the .05 level. However, on




Figure 18: Predicted Probability of Voting, by Party Strength




Figure 19: Predicted Probability of Voting, by Ideology Strength

average, holding all other variables constant, a libertarian is expected to participate in .16 fewer activities than a conservative and .27 fewer than a liberal (both effects significant at $p < .001$).

Similarly, a communitarian is expected to participate in .15 fewer activities than a liberal ($p < .01$), and .12 fewer activities than a libertarian ($p < .05$), holding all other variables constant.

Figure 20 displays the effects of party strength for each type of ideologue. In all cases, increasing party strength decreases the likelihood of not participating in an electoral activity beyond voting. Within each ideologue group, an increase in party strength equals a significant decrease in the probability of no participation, but significant differences also exist between groups. A strong liberal has a .42 probability of not participating, while a strong communitarian has a .61 probability of not participating, a difference of .19 ($p < .01$). Libertarians with a strong party identity have a .55 probability of not participating.

In all ideology groups, those with a strong party identity have higher probabilities of participating in one, two, or three (or more) activities than do those with lower levels of party identity. Among conservatives, those who identify as moderate have a .28 probability of participating in one activity and a .061 probability of participating in two. Those with a strong identity have a probability of .35 and .128 in participating in one or two activities respectively, a




Figure 20: Predicted Probability of No Participation, by Party Strength




Figure 21: Predicted Probability of No Participation, by Ideology Strength

difference of .07 in both cases ($p < .001$). Dual ideologues have similar levels of change between levels of identity, indicating a similar magnitude of effect for party identity across ideologue types.

Unlike the voting model where the magnitude of partisan strength's effect on voting was much larger than ideological identity, in this model the two have very similar effects. Figure 21 displays the effects of ideology strength for each type of ideologue. Just as in the discussion of party strength, in all cases, increasing ideology strength decreases the likelihood of not participating in an electoral activity beyond voting. Within each ideologue group, an increase in party strength equals a significant decrease in the probability of no participation, but once again significant differences also exist between groups. A liberal who identifies as having a strong ideology has a .41 probability of not participating, while a strong communitarian has a .56 probability of not participating, a difference of .15 ($p < .01$). Libertarians with a strong ideological identity fall in the middle with a .54 probability of not participating. However, despite the impact of party and ideological identity, dual ideologues still participate at significantly lower rates than consistent ideologues.

Over time, dual ideologue groups show much greater variation in their propensity to vote than do the consistent groups indicating a more uncertain response to increasing polarization. In the 1980s, there was only small differences between the groups in their probability of voting as shown in Figure 22. At the low end of party strength, the difference between communitarians, who were least likely to vote, and conservatives and libertarians, who were most likely to vote, is only .09. At the strong identity strength, the difference narrows further to only .05, but none of these differences between groups is statistically significant.




Figure 22: Predicted Probability of Voting Over Time, by Party Strength

In the 1990s, however, the differences between consistent and dual ideologues become more pronounced. Liberals and conservatives increased their probability of voting during this time. Communitarians also increased their probability of voting, but not to the same degree as the consistent groups, while libertarians greatly decreased in the likelihood of voting. The differences between communitarians and consistent ideologues increased even further in the 2000s with communitarians decreasing substantially in their likelihood of voting especially at the lower levels of party identity. For independents, communitarians showed a .15 lower probability of voting than consistent ideologues. However, once again we see the important effects of party identification on voting as those with a strong identity show less significant differences with only a .06 lower probability of voting for communitarians. Libertarians, however, increased their




Figure 23: Predicted Probability of Voting Over Time, by Ideology Strength

participation in the 2000s and are on par with consistent ideologues in this decade further contradicting hypothesis 3.

The effects of ideological identity on voting show similar trends with communitarians always the least likely to vote regardless of ideology strength, but with libertarians decreasing in their likelihood of voting in the 1990s. The trends over time for electoral participation beyond voting further reinforce the overall trends discussed earlier. In the 1980s, based on both party and ideological strength, communitarians are the most likely to not participate in any activities, while liberals are the least likely to not participate. Unlike voting, libertarians are not as inclined to participate otherwise, with their levels of participation only slightly higher than that of communitarians. These trends are only magnified in the 1990s and 2000s, as expected given growing polarization, as the differences in participation levels increase between dual and




Figure 24: Predicted Probability of No Participation Over Time, by Party Strength

consistent ideologues at all levels of party and ideology strength. Consistent ideologues decreased in their probability of not participating at all levels of party and ideological identity between the 1980s and 2000s, but this trend is particularly notable among those with low identity strengths. In the 1980s, liberals with a strong ideological identity were 14% more likely to participate than communitarians, but in the 2000s, they were 19% more likely to participate in at least one electoral activity beyond voting. During this timeframe, all groups with a strong ideological identity were less likely to not participate at all in the 2000s. However, among dual ideologues, those with no identity or a moderate identity actually increased in their probability of not participating with consistent ideologues the same identity strength decreased in their probability of not participating further widening the gap among the ideologue groups.




Figure 25: Predicted Probability of No Participation Over Time, by Ideology Strength

Conclusions

Overall, stronger identities do lead to higher levels of voting and participation across all cases as expected based on the first hypothesis. Further, strong and consistent issue positions play an important role in influencing campaign activity, although not voting, independently of political identity. While the overall trend for voting shows that dual ideologues vote less than their consistent counterparts, there was no statistically significant difference between these groups based on party identity and only small differences based on ideological identity, especially at strong levels of identity. Even among those with a strong identity, however, dual ideologues do not participate at the same rates as consistent ideologues with the same strength of identity, as was expected and stated in hypothesis two. Finally, the overtime trends show that while both groups of ideologues have generally increased their participation between the 1980s

and 2000s, consistent ideologues have become much more likely to participate while dual ideologues have seen increases that are more modest and a wider gap between their participation levels and that of consistent ideologues especially in relation to ideological identity.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Clearly partisan and ideological identity affect consistent and dual ideologues similarly, which reinforces the strong role given to political identities in previous literature. Across all tests of political behavior, those with a strong identity voted more consistently and participated more frequently than those with weaker identities. The effect of partisan identity was significant and strong in influencing both voting consistency and political participation. The effect of ideological identity was not as strong as that of partisanship in influencing voting, but was on par with partisanship in its effect on participation in other electoral activities.

Issue positions do matter, however, in the propensity of at least some dual ideologues to identify with a party and ideological group, although results were mixed. Libertarians have a much lower likelihood of identifying with a party and those that do identify with a party are much more likely to identify as a weak rather than strong partisan. Communitarians, though, defy expectations and are just as likely to identify with a party and to identify as a strong partisan as the consistent ideologues and over time they increased their party identification in response to polarization just as consistent ideologues did. In regards to ideological identity, libertarians were more likely to identify than were communitarians, although their likelihood of a strong ideological identification were again smaller than those of consistent ideologues. Communitarians were substantially less likely to identify with an ideological group or to identify with a strong ideology than either group of consistent ideologues; this did not change over time.

Still, the effect of identity does not explain all of the differences in political behavior between dual and consistent ideologues. Even among the highest categories of ideological and partisan identity strengths, differences in participation also persisted across ideology types. Even

among those with a strong identity, dual ideologues do not participate at the same rates as consistent ideologues with the same strength of identity. This is especially pronounced for communitarians who routinely voted and participated in other electoral activities at rates far below those of the other groups in all categories of identity.

At least one group of dual ideologues was also more likely to split their ticket between opposing parties. Although the differences were less pronounced among those with strong identities, libertarians consistently split their ticket more frequently than consistent ideologues, a difference that only grew over time with increasing polarization. Notably however, although the general trend showed more vote defection among libertarians, the differences between groups were not statistically significant indicating that dual ideologues are just as likely to vote with their party in presidential races. However, communitarian's behavior on this measure conflicted with expectations as they were no more likely to defect from their party than consistent ideologues.

While identities do matter, something else is clearly also keeping dual ideologues from behaving in the same way as consistent ideologues. As Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) state, expressive identity plays an important role in campaign participation, but considering partisanship as either instrumental or expressive may over-simplify the situation. Further, dual ideologues' behavior may differ from election to election as different issues are made salient, especially given that that ideology as a motivator for political participation varies over time depending on the strength of ideological cues given by party leaders and candidates (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).

While this paper finds that both political identities and issue positions matter the determinants of political identity are still uncertain. Much more research is needed to specify

how political identities are formed, and what factors influence the attitude of a weak versus strong identity. While many factors likely impact identity, issue positions may play a stronger, yet indirect role in behavior such as participation by impacting the strength of political identities.

Thus, further research is needed to clarify and elaborate on the relationship between expressive partisanship and ideology and how they interact with strong issue positions. First, more robust measures of partisan and ideological identity would strengthen the results here. While self-identification is an important expression of identity, it may also conflate strong issue positions with identity, especially for ideological identity. A multi-item scale for both identity measures would allow the ability to better tease out the differing effects of identity versus issue positions.

Finally, this paper raised a number of questions about the variability between libertarians and communitarians. Despite both having competing issue positions, these two groups showed very different propensities to identify with political groups, to vote consistently, and to participate in elections, even when controlling for strong demographic differences in areas such as education and income. These variations between groups raise a number of questions about why communitarians react differently to the incongruence between their own issue positions and that of political elites. On one hand, communitarians report strong partisan identities and when they do vote, routinely vote faithfully for their chosen party, which suggests that they have not become disaffected or alienated from the system despite political groups not adequately representing their interests. However, despite strong partisan identity, communitarians have much lower rates of ideological identity, often indicating that they can't place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale and even when they do reporting weak identities. Further this group both votes and participates at much lower rates than any other group despite their strong partisan

identity. More research is needed to understand the sources of these incongruent findings and to determine whether competing issue positions are a driving factor for this group's behavior or whether some other influential factor has not yet been considered.

REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. Yale University Press.
- Abramowitz, Alan I, and Kyle L Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate." *The Journal of Politics* 60(3): 634–52.
- . 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?" *The Journal of Politics* 70(2): 542–55.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2002. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behavior* 24(2): 117–50.
- Boaz, David, and David Kirby. 2006. "The Libertarian Vote." *Cato Institute Policy Analysis Series* (580).
- Brader, Ted. 2006. *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work*. University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E Converse, Warren E Miller, and E Donald Stokes. 1960. "The American Voter."
- Carmines, Edward G, Michael J Ensley, and Michael W Wagner. 2011. "Issue Preferences, Civic Engagement, and the Transformation of American Politics." *Facing the challenge of democracy: Explorations in the analysis of public opinion and political participation*: 329–53.
- . 2012. "Political Ideology in American Politics: One, Two, or None?"
- Carsey, Thomas M, and Geoffrey C Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 464–77.
- Converse, Philip E. 1962. *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*. Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. "A Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition." *New Haven*.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *The journal of political economy*: 135–50.
- Ellis, Christopher, and James A Stimson. 2012. *Ideology in America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris P, Samuel J Abrams, and Jeremy C Pope. 2005. *Culture War?* Pearson Longman New York, NY.

- Goren, Paul, Christopher M Federico, and Miki Caul Kittilson. 2009. "Source Cues, Partisan Identities, and Political Value Expression." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 805–20.
- Green, Donald P, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press.
- Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." In Cambridge Univ Press, 619–31.
- . 2008. "Turned off or Turned on? How Polarization Affects Political Engagement." *Red and blue nation* 2: 1–33.
- Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Todd G Shields. 2008. *The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Huddy, Leonie, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe. 2015. "Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity." *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 1–17.
- Hunter, James Davison. 1992. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America*. Basic Books.
- Hussey, Laura S. 2011. "Polarized Politics and Citizen Disengagement: The Role of Belief Systems." *American Politics Research*: 1532673X11416441.
- Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology a Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(3): 405–31.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J Westwood. 2014. "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Janda, Kenneth, Jeffrey Berry, Jerry Goldman, and Deborah Schildkraut. 2012. *The Challenge of Democracy*. Cengage Learning.
- Jennings, M Kent, and Richard Niemi. 1974. "The Political Character of Adolescents."
- Klar, Samara. 2014. "Identity and Engagement among Political Independents in America." *Political Psychology* 35(4): 577–91.
- Layman, Geoffrey C, and Thomas M Carsey. 2000. "Ideological Realignment in Contemporary American Politics: The Case of Party Activists."
- . 2002. "Party Polarization And Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science*: 786–802.

- Leighley, Jan E, and Jonathan Nagler. 2013. *Who Votes Now?: Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States*. Princeton University Press.
- Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 2009. *The American Voter Revisited*. University of Michigan Press.
- Maddox, William S, and Stuart A Lilie. 1984. *Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Reassessing the Political Spectrum*. Cato Institute.
- Malka, Ariel, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2010. "More than Ideology: Conservative–liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues." *Social Justice Research* 23(2–3): 156–88.
- Nelson, Thomas E, Rosalee A Clawson, and Zoe M Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 567–83.
- Nie, Norman, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik. 1976. "The Changing American Voter." *Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press*.
- Niemi, Richard G, and Harold W Stanley. 2010. "The American Presidential Election of 2008." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 20(2): 147–51.
- Plane, Dennis L, and Joseph Gershtenson. 2004. "Candidates' Ideological Locations, Abstention, and Turnout in US Midterm Senate Elections." *Political Behavior* 26(1): 69–93.
- Poole, Keith T, and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*: 228–78.
- . 2000. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford University Press.
- . 2001. "D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*: 5–29.
- Rosenstone, Steven, and John Hansen. 1993. "Mobilization, Participation, and American Democracy." *New York: McMillan*.
- Saunders, Kyle L, and Alan I Abramowitz. 2004. "Ideological Realignment and Active Partisans in the American Electorate." *American Politics Research* 32(3): 285–309.
- Searing, Donald D, Joel J Schwartz, and Alden E Lind. 1973. "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems." *American Political Science Review* 67(2): 415–32.
- Shafer, Byron E, and William JM Claggett. 1995. *The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modern American Politics*. JHU Press.

- Swedlow, Brendon, and Mikel L Wyckoff. 2009. "Value Preferences and Ideological Structuring of Attitudes in American Public Opinion." *American Politics Research* 37(6): 1048–87.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1970. "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination." *Scientific American* 223(5): 96–102.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." *The social psychology of intergroup relations* 33(47): 74.
- Zaller, John. 1996. "The Myth of Massive Media Impact Revisited: New Support for a Discredited Idea." In *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, eds. Diana Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Zaller, John, and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences." *American journal of political science*: 579–616.
- Zipp, John F. 1985. "Perceived Representativeness and Voting: An Assessment of the Impact of 'Choices' vs. 'Echoes.'" *American Political Science Review* 79(1): 50–61.

APPENDIX

Table 12: Predicted Probabilities of Party Identity Strength

	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Independent	.064 (.058-.078)	.095 (.057-.074)	.067 (.059-.09)	.068 (.054-.081)
Leaning	.239 (.218-.259)	.229 (.208-.250)	.294 (.261-.319)	.238 (.208-.269)
Weak	.315 (.299-.330)	.314 (.298-.329)	.314 (.297-.329)	.315 (.299-.330)
Strong	.378 (.349-.408)	.394 (.362-.425)	.297 (.266-.328)	.379 (.334-.424)

Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Table 13: Predicted Probabilities of Ideological Group Identity Strength

	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
'Don't Know'	.129 (.113-.145)	.067 (.057-.078)	.155 (.134-.176)	.244 (.208-.281)
Moderate	.213 (.195-.232)	.135 (.119-.150)	.237 (.216-.257)	.287 (.266-.309)
Weak	.313 (.296-.330)	.278 (.260-.297)	.310 (.293-.327)	.274 (.252-.297)
Strong	.344 (.329-.373)	.520 (.486-.554)	.298 (.267-.315)	.194 (.163-.226)

Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Table 14: Ordered Logit Results for Party Identification

VARIABLES	(1) 1980s	(2) 1990s	(3) 2000s
Liberal	0.300** (0.153)	0.496*** (0.131)	0.705*** (0.223)
Conservative	0.387*** (0.142)	0.618*** (0.136)	0.531** (0.266)
Libertarian	0.166 (0.149)	0.0296 (0.153)	-0.0942 (0.253)
Communitarian	0.315* (0.163)	0.502** (0.196)	0.881** (0.415)
Education	0.0981 (0.0610)	0.131** (0.0601)	0.0631 (0.112)
Income	-0.0573 (0.0494)	-0.0431 (0.0483)	0.0946 (0.0821)
Age	0.0180*** (0.00321)	0.0199*** (0.00314)	0.0129** (0.00571)
Female	0.317*** (0.0971)	0.0472 (0.0965)	0.551*** (0.169)
Race	0.0677 (0.0801)	0.0297 (0.0755)	-0.0187 (0.114)
South	0.0345 (0.108)	0.0712 (0.103)	0.375** (0.175)
Knowledge	0.0293* (0.0175)	0.0197 (0.0174)	0.0278 (0.0317)
Efficacy	0.220** (0.0920)	0.0539 (0.0716)	-0.143 (0.132)
Correct Placement	-0.0704 (0.125)	0.123 (0.137)	0.0394 (0.242)
Constant cut1	-0.713** (0.329)	-0.668** (0.321)	-0.844 (0.593)
Constant cut2	1.018*** (0.325)	1.146*** (0.317)	1.203** (0.588)
Constant cut3	2.369*** (0.330)	2.549*** (0.322)	2.209*** (0.595)
Pseudo R ²	.24	.21	.22
Observations	1,518	1,582	1,123

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: Ordered Logit Results for Ideological ID

VARIABLES	(1) 1980s	(2) 1990s	(3) 2000s
Liberal	0.772*** (0.153)	0.546*** (0.130)	1.177*** (0.218)
Conservative	1.289*** (0.145)	1.403*** (0.139)	2.367*** (0.304)
Libertarian	0.657*** (0.145)	0.181 (0.153)	0.897*** (0.254)
Communitarian	-0.0745 (0.162)	-0.0486 (0.198)	-0.179 (0.395)
Education	0.319*** (0.0616)	0.521*** (0.0609)	0.293*** (0.113)
Income	0.0287 (0.0496)	0.0362 (0.0485)	-0.0739 (0.0828)
Age	-0.000439 (0.00320)	0.00122 (0.00315)	-0.00412 (0.00569)
Female	-0.155 (0.0972)	-0.179* (0.0973)	0.143 (0.169)
Race	-0.123 (0.0805)	-0.243*** (0.0760)	-0.0417 (0.118)
South	-0.0440 (0.111)	-0.176* (0.104)	0.0535 (0.177)
Knowledge	-0.0128 (0.0178)	0.0147 (0.0179)	-0.0458 (0.0321)
Efficacy	0.321*** (0.0928)	0.0919 (0.0728)	0.166 (0.133)
Correct Placement	0.578*** (0.127)	0.661*** (0.144)	0.722*** (0.243)
Constant cut1	0.371 (0.328)	0.643** (0.317)	0.205 (0.593)
Constant cut2	1.602*** (0.328)	1.943*** (0.320)	1.477** (0.597)
Constant cut3	2.918*** (0.334)	3.273*** (0.326)	2.724*** (0.605)
Pseudo R ²	.24	.26	.23
Observations	1,521	1,584	1,121

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: Predicted Probabilities of Party Identity Strength Over Time

1980s				
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Independent	.076 (.057-.095)	.070 (.054-.086)	.086 (.065-.106)	.075 (.055-.095)
Leaning	.241 (.205-.279)	.228 (.197-.260)	.260 (.225-.296)	.238 (.200-.278)
Weak	.324 (.301-.349)	.323 (.299-.348)	.325 (.301-.350)	.325 (.300-.349)
Strong	.359 (.307-.410)	.379 (.333-.426)	.328 (.280-.377)	.281 (.203-.359)
1990s				
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Independent	.065 (.051-.080)	.058 (.044-.072)	.100 (.075-.126)	.065 (.042-.088)
Leaning	.235 (.205-.265)	.217 (.186-.248)	.306 (.265-.347)	.234 (.181-.287)
Weak	.336 (.311-.360)	.332 (.307-.356)	.329 (.304-.355)	.335 (.310-.360)
Strong	.364 (.322-.406)	.393 (.346-.406)	.264 (.216-.312)	.365 (.286-.445)
2000s				
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Libertarian</u>	<u>Communitarian</u>
Independent	.051 (.032-.071)	.061 (.032-.089)	.108 (.064-.141)	.044 (.010-.077)
Leaning	.244 (.194-.295)	.273 (.200-.346)	.376 (.307-.444)	.217 (.103-.331)
Weak	.239 (.200-.278)	.244 (.205-.283)	.236 (.196-.276)	.230 (.176-.285)
Strong	.465 (.395-.535)	.422 (.320-.524)	.281 (.203-.359)	.509 (.324-.694)

Note: 95% Confidence intervals in parentheses.

SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study.

Table 17: Logit Results for Vote Defection

VARIABLES	(1) Vote Defection 80s	(2) Vote Defection 90s	(3) Vote Defection 00s
Liberal	-0.114 (0.293)	-0.757*** (0.210)	-0.566 (0.466)
Conservative	-0.0699 (0.259)	-0.252 (0.208)	-0.550 (0.628)
Libertarian	0.0239 (0.271)	0.0222 (0.229)	0.149 (0.469)
Communitarian	-0.171 (0.302)	-0.259 (0.322)	-0.645 (1.139)
Education	-0.253** (0.114)	-0.204** (0.0936)	0.164 (0.228)
Income	0.0276 (0.0948)	0.0577 (0.0753)	-0.290* (0.169)
Age	-0.00294 (0.00576)	-0.0198*** (0.00504)	-0.00143 (0.0115)
Female	0.240 (0.184)	0.0864 (0.151)	0.439 (0.352)
Race	-0.251 (0.170)	-0.269* (0.138)	-0.410 (0.297)
South	0.513*** (0.192)	-0.0849 (0.168)	-0.443 (0.390)
Knowledge	0.0224 (0.0321)	-0.00492 (0.0273)	0.0186 (0.0666)
Efficacy	-0.574*** (0.196)	-0.0982 (0.114)	0.256 (0.259)
Party Strength	-0.329*** (0.113)	-0.695*** (0.0943)	-0.916*** (0.227)
Ideology Strength	-0.204** (0.0848)	-0.155** (0.0732)	-0.144 (0.182)
Constant	0.957 (0.718)	3.190*** (0.574)	1.420 (1.254)
Pseudo R ²	.29	.27	.24
Observations	1,180	1,262	929

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: Logit Results for Split Ticket Voting

VARIABLES	(1) Split Ticket 80s	(2) Split Ticket 90s	(3) Split Ticket 00s
Liberal	-0.445* (0.229)	-0.221 (0.208)	-0.622** (0.247)
Conservative	-0.165 (0.197)	-0.640*** (0.228)	-0.278 (0.325)
Libertarian	0.271 (0.202)	-0.388 (0.254)	0.338 (0.251)
Communitarian	-0.221 (0.238)	-0.290 (0.366)	0.220 (0.396)
Education	-0.144* (0.0851)	-0.00586 (0.0973)	0.0810 (0.114)
Income	0.0739 (0.0746)	0.299*** (0.0820)	0.0746 (0.0853)
Age	-0.00822* (0.00456)	0.00206 (0.00537)	-0.00278 (0.00588)
Female	0.272** (0.137)	0.163 (0.159)	0.0565 (0.178)
Race	-0.200 (0.127)	-0.220 (0.142)	0.186 (0.120)
South	0.350** (0.152)	0.283 (0.172)	-0.0840 (0.189)
Knowledge	0.00388 (0.0250)	-0.0113 (0.0291)	0.0523 (0.0327)
Efficacy	-0.398*** (0.0712)	-0.429*** (0.0838)	-0.407*** (0.0944)
Party Strength	-0.182*** (0.0660)	-0.276*** (0.0768)	-0.0848 (0.0868)
Ideology Strength	1.260** (0.504)	-0.0175 (0.565)	-0.725 (0.615)
Pseudo R ²	.24	.26	.23
Observations	1,150	1,076	965

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Logit results for Voting Participation Over Time

VARIABLES	(1) Voting 1980s	(2) Voting 1990s	(3) Voting 2000s
Liberal	-0.0205 (0.193)	0.241 (0.183)	0.219 (0.313)
Conservative	0.185 (0.187)	0.281 (0.206)	0.687 (0.440)
Libertarian	0.157 (0.207)	-0.109 (0.221)	-0.0128 (0.358)
Communitarian	-0.204 (0.189)	0.00609 (0.225)	-0.614 (0.450)
Education	0.607*** (0.0870)	0.667*** (0.0944)	0.775*** (0.164)
Income	0.314*** (0.0616)	0.314*** (0.0682)	0.196* (0.118)
Age	0.0312*** (0.00402)	0.0325*** (0.00449)	0.0218*** (0.00772)
Female	0.0864 (0.126)	0.206 (0.137)	0.311 (0.242)
Race	-0.0727 (0.0946)	-0.281*** (0.0945)	-0.0589 (0.155)
South	-0.267** (0.132)	-0.506*** (0.139)	-0.303 (0.240)
Knowledge	0.0610*** (0.0214)	0.107*** (0.0244)	0.0489 (0.0465)
Efficacy	0.0294 (0.114)	0.0786 (0.104)	0.158 (0.189)
Party Strength	0.408*** (0.0615)	0.482*** (0.0701)	0.613*** (0.124)
Ideology Strength	0.112** (0.0563)	0.332*** (0.0636)	-0.0570 (0.110)
Constant	-4.089*** (0.441)	-4.661*** (0.468)	-4.272*** (0.829)
Pseudo R ²	.18	.19	.19
Observations	1,790	1,803	1,275

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: Negative Binomial Results for Participation Beyond Voting Over Time

VARIABLES	(1) Participation 1980s	(3) Participation 1990s	(5) Participation 2000s
Liberal	0.266*** (0.100)	0.265*** (0.0888)	0.412*** (0.146)
Conservative	0.00249 (0.0984)	0.249*** (0.0905)	0.316* (0.177)
Libertarian	-0.124 (0.107)	-0.201* (0.117)	-0.0134 (0.175)
Communitarian	0.00938 (0.115)	0.0910 (0.141)	0.516** (0.228)
Education	0.177*** (0.0397)	0.119*** (0.0380)	0.115* (0.0637)
Income	0.0947*** (0.0333)	0.0890*** (0.0311)	0.0966** (0.0479)
Age	0.00109 (0.00206)	0.000736 (0.00200)	0.00432 (0.00326)
Female	-0.0371 (0.0646)	-0.0745 (0.0613)	0.0863 (0.0988)
Race	-0.0132 (0.0542)	-0.111** (0.0535)	0.0972 (0.0659)
South	0.00469 (0.0719)	0.0464 (0.0642)	-0.0972 (0.101)
Knowledge	0.231*** (0.0347)	0.110*** (0.0328)	0.176*** (0.0529)
Efficacy	0.0349*** (0.0118)	0.0474*** (0.0112)	0.0393** (0.0179)
Party Strength	0.187*** (0.0569)	0.0791* (0.0453)	0.0450 (0.0763)
Ideology Strength	0.152*** (0.0314)	0.227*** (0.0323)	0.119** (0.0507)
Constant	-2.715*** (0.231)	-2.105*** (0.213)	-2.436*** (0.371)
Pseudo R ²	.21	.25	.23
Observations	1,882	1,804	576

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1