DISSERTATION

COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN ETHIOPIA: FINDING THE LOCUS OF GOVERNANCE

Submitted by
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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Community management of Natural Resources is a growing trend throughout the world. Common Pool Resource theory has proliferated in recent years, suggesting that institutional dynamics of resource management regimes are critical for ensuring their success. This dissertation will examine the case of Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the Integrated Forest Management Project there. The role for government in Common Pool Resource management has been a central focus of scholarship; however, in the case of Ethiopia, the government is limited primarily by limited environmental capacity. Linking environmental capacity theory with research on community-based forest management yields analytical insights into the feasibility of such regimes in developing countries. The locus of governance for community forestry in Ethiopia is seen as residing primarily at the local level, but only with a strong backdrop of government support in the form of enabling legislation, formal devolution of power, and commitment to local capacity building.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

I. Context and Relevance of this Research

Throughout the developing world, effective governmental management of natural resources has too often come into conflict with the needs of rural and isolated communities. The use of forests by communities in much of Sub-Saharan Africa has been an especially challenging issue for policymakers, as villages dependent on wood for fuel and construction are understandably reluctant to engage in government preservation initiatives. Environmental degradation, however, continues to plague developing countries, and no group is more directly impacted by declining soil fertility and deforestation than rural communities. Given their stake in effective resource management, local communities have been increasingly invited to participate in conservation initiatives by both the public and NGO sectors, but environmental degradation continues to defy simple policy solutions.

Twenty-one post – independent African governments, including Ethiopia, have opted to nationalize all land; for them, the interplay between state ownership of resources and local management is an even more critical topic for study in order to better understand the prospects for sustainable development in the region. Successful cases of community management of forests are rare in these countries, and the reasons for failure are many and complex. Policy capacity weakness and lack of government support are two of the most important explanations, and each will be explored herein. Two broad strands of theory inform the inquiry undertaken here: Common Pool Resource Theory, which offers guidelines for the institutionalization of community forestry, and Environmental Policy Capacity Theory, which stresses components of a government's ability that enable

it to effectively manage environmental problems. Here I intensively examine one community forestry project, the Integrated Forest Management Project (IFMP) in Adaba – Dodola, Ethiopia, as a case study to test theory, explore criteria for success, and evaluate Ethiopia's capacity for empowering its communities.

Ethiopia is undeniably an exceptional case. While it proudly proclaims itself the only state in Africa which was never formally colonized, it also shares many entrenched problems with its more recently independent African neighbors: sharp and pervasive poverty, recurring famine, ongoing political instability, and seemingly insurmountable language divisions. Even among similarly challenged African states, Ethiopia stands at the bottom of the list for many social and quality of life indicators. When the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC) took over in the wake of the 1974 revolution, all land in the country was nationalized; with 86% of the population rural, the impacts of shifting land use and tenure security cannot be overstated (Admassie 2000). Even peasants who have lived in the same place for decades lack such land tenure security and, consequently, incentives for long-term resource planning. The universality of this theme, in which an insecure land tenure history renders present-day conservation initiatives exceedingly challenging, makes the Ethiopian case that much more critical for understanding possible institutional arrangements which may effectively reduce the impact of insecurity.

With virtually no export market in wood or forest products, Ethiopia's rural areas remain strikingly self-dependent and largely untouched by globalization. The isolated status of rural Ethiopia presents both advantages and disadvantages for conservation efforts. Certainly, the absence of market forces and external influence reduces the

complexity of pressures facing local residents; for researchers and would-be community organizers, it limits the number of variables needed to understand the dynamics of resource use. It also, however, eliminates a potential avenue for influencing behavior. In many communities in which the market for forest products is a driving force behind local resource exploitation, the establishment of price controls, cooperative production systems, or markets for alternative goods have been effective mechanisms for both creating incentives for community cohesion and reducing local reliance on certain resource sources.

The literature on community forestry links the concept of community with the challenges posed by increased human pressure on forests. The result of the intensified human presence in Ethiopia is well known: reduced availability of fuelwood and construction materials, and the consequent increase in work hours needed for small farmers to achieve self-sufficiency. The devastating famines in the 1970s and 1980s were a result, in part, of the dangerous combination of chronic resource shortage, subsequent increase in rural vulnerability, and lack of off-farm options for rural development (Admassie 2000, Tekle 1999, Pausewang 1990, Dercon 2000). Given the myriad of obstacles to achieving sustainable resource use in the face of extreme rural need, and combined with the low capacity of the Ethiopian federal state, the very existence of a large and functioning community forestry project is remarkable.

Research on community forestry has contributed several valuable case studies, but the vast majority come from states with markedly fewer embedded socio-economic challenges; this dissertation tests the limits of Common Pool Resource theory. In the process, I propose combining CPR theory with the literature on Environmental Policy

Capacity, and supplementing both with insights from the Environmental Justice literature. Together, these theories help answer the key question in this dissertation: where is the locus of governance for community based forestry? The result is a holistic and comprehensive assessment of community forestry in Ethiopia, with implications for understanding community-based resource management regimes in other developing countries.

II. Research Methods and Questions

My research is comprised of both empirical and theoretical inquiry. As a theoretical background, I conducted an extensive review of the literature. This research included an examination of the Common Pool Resource literature, the Environmental Capacity literature, and Environmental Justice work. Empirically, my research included three international trips. I undertook two separate 6-week trips to Ethiopia (December-January 2000, May-June 2001) during which I divided most of my time between Addis Ababa, the capitol, and Dodola, the site of the IFMP. In Addis, I interviewed government personnel and community leaders, observed meetings attended by policy-makers, accessed archives including the Institute for Ethiopian Studies, and developed an understanding of Ethiopian culture. In Dodola, I read my way through the project's extensive archive, traveled through the forest with a translator to interview farmers, stayed in huts built for tourism, interviewed project staff, and attended several meetings where I was able to observe interactions between IFMP participants, project staff and government leaders. While in country, I also traveled throughout the Highlands for nearly two weeks, and I visited forest nurseries, interviewed land managers, and

developed a sense of the geography and terrain of the country. See *Annex A* for a complete list of informants. Finally, I traveled to Frankfurt, Germany (December 2001) to access the archives at *Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Technical Cooperation: GTZ), the facilitators and sponsors of the IFMP and the German governmental equivalent of USAID. While there, I was able to conduct a long interview with one of the original project managers.

Research questions for this project can be grouped into two primary categories. First, I worked to test the guidelines suggested in the CPR literature and find out if the criteria still applied in the relatively extreme case of Ethiopia. This portion of the research entailed asking a great number of questions about the institutional design of the project, including mechanisms used for exclusion, enforcement, and monitoring. The answers to these questions came primarily (but not exclusively) from my research on site in Dodola, through interviews with project staff and participants, as well as project archives. I also integrated elements of environmental justice into my inquiry there. For example, my research questions included: (1) Based upon the indicators of a successful community forestry project according to CPR theory, how does the IFMP rank? (2) Who are the stakeholders, and are their varied interests protected by the Dodola project? (3) What are the institutional structures put in place to protect both forests and community needs? (4) Within the community, do all categories of individuals benefit equally? Are there disproportionate impacts felt by women, lower income residents, or other sub-group of community members?

Second, I researched the environmental capacity of the Ethiopian government. Answers to these questions came from interviews at all levels of government, as well as

the study of archival documents which offered "insider" analyses of Ethiopia's political history. Here I was interested in dimensions of governance including: (1) What is the quality of environmental governance currently provided at the national level, including the extent to which a legal structure has been established? (2)What are the goals of the young Ethiopian government with regard to forest policy? (3) How does the national government envision community involvement in resource management, and in what manner will they share control over local forest projects? (4) How well does the unusual system of federalism instituted by the most recent Ethiopian regime work to provide institutional support for community based forest management? (5) To what extent is policy capacity enhanced by the current institutional structure, rigor and flexibility of law, and personnel distribution?

I will argue here that the Common Pool Resource Literature provides helpful insights into the functioning of community-based resource management regimes, but fails to adequately account for the role of environmental capacity. The Ethiopian case profiled here illustrates the importance of the larger political context in ensuring local level success. Thus, I propose here a tighter linking of the CPR literature with the theoretical strength of the Environmental Policy Capacity literature.

The use of single case studies is an accepted technique in the field of comparative politics for just my purposes: applying an intensive international case to an existing body of literature for theory testing and comparison (Peters 1998, Lane 1997, Chilcote 1994). While my intensive focus on Ethiopia might categorize this project as one employing an area studies approach, I also offer more generalized lessons for common pool resource theory, including the inclusion of environmental capacity and environmental justice

analysis. Gary King (1994) advises researchers to be "both timeless and timebound at the same time," (43), and argues that not only is this possible but a hallmark of a rigorous research design. Other methodology scholars also stress the need for mid-level theory building, in which specific case-bound studies are applied to larger, more universal, research endeavors (Lane 1997). Ethiopia certainly qualifies as a critical case, and one that will test the bounds of existing theoretical truisms.

The inclusion of specific evidence from rural Ethiopia contributes to theory building at several levels. First, regional research will be enhanced by the inclusion of an often-neglected state. Given the history of political instability, many Eastern Africa researchers have been forced to sidestep Ethiopia and instead rely on more accessible countries, most notably Kenya, for data then said to represent the region as a whole. Anyone who has traveled to both Kenya and Ethiopia will immediately be struck by the vast differences between the two bordering states; conclusions reached in Kenya simply cannot be fairly applied directly to Ethiopia. Second, the literature on African development, land management, and community participation, a burgeoning field of study, will be enhanced by an analysis of institutional features which work against all odds in rural Ethiopia. Another level up, the body of research on developing countries around the world, will also be relevant here, as the Ethiopian case is included in the canon. Indeed, the field of comparative politics is increasingly concerned with the process of policy capacity building, and it is difficult to find a more vivid example than in the case of Ethiopia. Decentralization and participation are also strong themes in recent comparative political inquiry, and again information from Ethiopia will strengthen the empirical evidence from which theory is built.

Conducting field research at both the national and local levels, this dissertation effectively addresses the dynamic interplay between state ownership and local management. Referring to CPR theory in the difficult case of Ethiopia enables me to test the limits of its applicability; integrating capacity literature expands theoretical strength for both bodies of work, and empowers me to link national environmental capacity with local organizing challenges; drawing on work in environmental justice highlights places where CPR theory possibly overlooks critical elements of community-level forest management. This theoretical approach allows for important theory building. Both environmental capacity and environmental justice questions illuminate critical aspects of community level management which are weak in the CPR literature. Each theory will benefit from being applied in proximity to the others, and the resulting analysis of IFMP is both deeper and broader.

III. An Overview of the Dissertation

Chapter II is a theoretical exploration. I begin by discussing the elements of Common Pool Resource theory, with an emphasis on implications for community-based forest regimes and institutional criteria. Substantial case study evidence from around the world has been compiled by Elinor Ostrom and other scholars; something of a "best practices" framework can be distilled from the accumulated examples. Participatory Forest Management, similar but not identical to CPR theory, is a developing school of research in developing countries; in the chapter I describe both how to differentiate between the two and what each contributes to understanding. The second half of the chapter is devoted to Environmental Capacity literature, drawing heavily on the work of Helmut Weidner and Martin Janicke. I focus on terminology and categories for analysis as laid

out by those scholars, setting myself up to apply the framework to Ethiopia in Chapter VI.

Without context, the IFMP case study is meaningless. Therefore, Chapter III is an intensive look at Ethiopia including history, current demographics, pervasive environmental problems, government structure, and current governance issues. In particular, I focus attention on recent decentralization efforts in the country, and consider conflicting interpretations of the many impacts felt throughout Ethiopia. Ultimately, the portrait is a desperate one. Pervasive poverty has crippled prospects for the country in the near future, and despite ambitious reform proposals, declining health, environmental degradation, a lack of human capital, and a history of government corruption render the country a sea of urgencies.

The next chapter is a continuation of the picture of Ethiopia, with detailed attention to environmental policy capacity. Based on Janicke's framework as presented in Chapter II, in Chapter IV I systematically apply the categories for analysis to Ethiopia. Detailed empirical evidence, from both primary and secondary sources, reveals what Chapter III foreshadowed: capacity weakness in virtually every sector, at every level of government, and in multiple dimensions. Weak policy capacity is seen by some to be an opening for community organization; when governments fail to provide for resource sustainability, and people depend on the resource for survival, then perhaps communities have a strong incentive to create lasting arrangements on their own. In this case, however, GTZ was the key international actor to recognize the opening and provide support; the IFMP is their attempt to foster such a movement in the country. It is an uphill challenge. With such crippling capacity weaknesses, the government cannot provide consistent

enforcement, fails to support communities with binding legislation at the federal level, and undermines local empowerment by financially starving municipal governments out of necessity.

Despite these monumental challenges, the IFMP is thriving in some important ways. Chapter V describes the institutional arrangement for the project as it has been set up by GTZ, following the development of the project by tracing its progress over time. In the process, I am able to reveal the internal politics and power struggles which continue to plague the management of the project. At the same time, solid organization and consistent external support has made the IFMP the most heralded example of community forestry in Ethiopia. In this chapter, I strive to present information about how the project is structured and its institutional arrangements without assessing the relative success of these factors.

However, Chapter VI is explicitly for the purposes of tying together theory and empirics, and making analytical judgments about the efficacy of the project. I apply the tenets of CPR theory as described in the earlier theory chapter and assess the extent to which the IFMP conforms to expectations. A section on environmental justice helps to illuminate my argument that linking the two literatures strengthens them both. Finally, I recall points made in Chapter IV about environmental capacity and point out that CPR theory is weak in that dimension as well, in ways that matter in the IFMP. As a conclusion, I offer some final thoughts about the significance and likely legacy of the IFMP, and then reiterate my theme of linking theories to best understand the dynamics of forestry policy and community resource management in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

I. Introduction

This dissertation will draw primarily upon work from two broad theoretical schools. Given the overriding objective here, to dissect and evaluate the Integrated Forestry Management Project in Ethiopia, it is critical to work with theoretical tools that bring diverse analytical insights, combining to produce an enhanced understanding. Common Pool Resource (CPR) Theory has gained prominence in the scholarly disciplines of Comparative Politics and Natural Resource Management on the international scale largely because it provides standards for understanding how communities manage resources that are commonly owned. Development of the theory in recent years has included the publication of countless case studies, the majority of which describe local arrangements for allocating extractive resources and sharing management responsibilities. Since fisheries and forests are both excellent examples of commonly-owned resources, arrangements which address the management of these resources are most common. Research has been conducted with an emphasis in the developing world, where formal regulatory mechanisms tend to be less well established, government financial support less plentiful, and, as a result, local communities more willing to experiment with alternative methods to protect resources.

Within the CPR literature, several strands emerge as especially salient for my project. I will begin by describing the historical roots of the theory, and then move on to discuss the importance of resource tenure security in this context. Next, I will discuss local institutional dimensions of exclusion and enforcement. Finally, and drawing heavily on Elinor Ostrom's work in the CPR school, I will describe in some detail the criteria

which have been developed; in other words, CPR theorists have done a great deal of meta-analysis, comparing case studies across time and space, and have created something of a 'best practices' matrix. Recent CPR work has sought to ameliorate weaknesses in early CPR theory development, including new attention to intra-community power differences, pitfalls of consensus decision-making, and a better integration of local resource management into state, regional and global contexts.

Overlapping the CPR literature is work on Participatory Forest Management (**PFM**). The two theoretical schools have much in common, as they both analyze mechanisms which enable communities to generate community participation in the management of its own commonly owned resources. The two are not synonymous, however. CPR theorists look at a broader spectrum of resource use, including the heavily studied fisheries industry, and examine institutional issues beyond the creation of participatory avenues. PFM theorists differ from their CPR counterparts in that they also work with forestry arrangements where the forests are *not* commonly owned. The two schools of thought and practice, however, have come to many of the same conclusions regarding how communities may best function to effectively manage resources. It is interesting to note that there seems to be only minimal recognition within each school of the other's relevance. CPR theory is debated and developed largely within the context of academia in the Western world, even though much of the research is actually conducted in developing countries. PFM, on the other hand, seems to have become common parlance overwhelmingly in countries that, due to their lack of effective forest management administrative mechanisms at the state level, are working to devolve control of forests to the local level. Additionally, PFM is most applicable and relevant for forest-

dependent communities; as such, the terminology is most familiar in the developing world, especially Asia and Africa. The result is two sets of literature which overlap a great deal, which don't consistently speak to one another, and which are practiced on different scales and in different arenas. In this dissertation I will use insights from each school, linking them together and treating the body of literature as one. As a starting point for this theoretical merging, however, this chapter will summarily identify where the two schools overlap and where they diverge. This analysis will also provide an opportunity to examine the concept of participation more closely than CPR theorists have.

Both CPR and PFM prescribe very specific roles for government. Communities, when they seek to manage their own resources, are ultimately reliant on state structures. That is, ideally states might formally condone local governance and offer a wide variation of kinds of support for the endeavor, including enabling laws, legislation and financial assistance. Alternatively, states may be so weak that local management structures arise by default; this, too, must be seen as a response to the state. In most cases, the state will be at neither extreme, but will have the capacity to offer support in some manner while lacking resources or political will to foster other supportive structures. It is also possible for governmental structures and policies to challenge or even prohibit local resource control. Likewise, local communities and governments vary in their capacity, which in turn opens up the space for NGOs and international development agencies to take more decisive roles in managing local resources.

Formal policy capacity, therefore, must be critically evaluated. While CPR/PFM theorists have devoted some attention to the complex relationship between policy

capacity at all levels of government and the efficacy of local resource management efforts, I will argue here that this attention has been insufficient. Indeed, policy capacity in Ethiopia at local, regional and national levels will be shown to be fundamentally deterministic of ultimate success in community-based forest management. As a precursor to the extensive analysis of Ethiopia's policy capacity conducted in chapters III and IV, I will here establish the theoretical foundations of such inquiry. Drawing heavily on Martin Janicke and Helmut Weidner's model, I will outline a theoretical basis for assessing policy capacity.

This dissertation is structured around the presentation of a case study in Chapter V, the Integrated Forest Management Project (**IFMP**). The case study under investigation is a local-level community forest management scheme, facilitated and sponsored by an external bilateral actor but designed to be self-sustaining at the community level once the initial period of support expires. CPR & PFM theories will help to illuminate whether or not the regime has been structured in accordance with the lessons learned throughout the world. Policy capacity theories will both fill a gap in CPR work and help to answer a fundamental research question herein: where is the locus of governance for community forestry? Chapter VI of this dissertation will evoke the theoretical foundations established here and apply them to the case study. Thus, throughout this chapter emphasis will be placed on aspects of each theory that will prove particularly salient for evaluating the IFMP case as an example of PFM in Ethiopia.

II. Common Pool Resource Theory

A. Background and Context

When Garrett Hardin published his now infamous "Tragedy of the Commons" piece in 1968 (Hardin 1968), the scientific world was shaken. Not only was his narrative writing style, elaborating on a classic grazing parable, compelling, but his argument also seemed scientifically rigorous and his point inescapable. Hardin argued that incentives for the individual rational man to overuse resources will necessarily lead to a systematic degradation of the commons. As such, resource managers should be wary of commonly held resources. The paper was an argument for the promotion of private property rights and strict government management of public resources.

Common Pool Resource (CPR) theorists have taken Hardin's initial argument, dissected its assumptions, and expanded its implications. By refining the differences between land ownership regimes, CPR theorists have contributed both specificity in terminology and depth in understanding for practitioners of community-based resource management. In particular, Elinor Ostrom and her expanding school of CPR scholars note that Hardin's conclusion only holds true for resources which are truly open access; they have identified several examples of carefully bounded communities effectively managing common resources, establishing local level institutions to do so, and ensuring the long term viability of livelihoods which are dependent on a sustained supply of goods from the resource (Ostrom 1990, Baden 1998, Burger 1998, Gibson 2000).

Despite widespread recognition of the need to include communities in local resource management, the practice of such endeavors has been challenging in many developing, and developed, countries. The myriad of variables present in each case study are complex, nested, and inconsistent, leading even the most experienced practitioners to conclude that there are no universal rules (Arnold, 1998; Ascher, 1995; Gibson, 2000;

Haase, 2001; International Programs, 1998). This doesn't mean, however, that pervasive patterns and recurrent themes aren't identifiable. To the contrary, several specific challenges as well as harbingers of success can be found. This section will systematically review the CPR literature to highlight consistent lessons about community organization. One caveat: there has been much research on local level vulnerability to shifting price structures, and how community resource management projects might maximize profits within a market system; however, given the absence of an export market for forest products in rural Ethiopia, this literature will not be evaluated here. Likewise, given the importance of recent decentralization in Ethiopia, emphasis will be given to the role of government in the CPR matrix. Organization for this section will include a brief summary of CPR research findings by topic area, followed by comments on the context of Ethiopia as it relates to those findings. The Ethiopian context and actors are developed much more fully in subsequent chapters; they are included here to signal the challenges Ethiopia presents for CPR theory. Where appropriate, I will conclude each section with a research question or theoretical inquiry which helps set the stage for the forthcoming analysis. The categories for analysis presented in sub-sections *II.B-E* here are described in the literature as necessary precursors for effective organizing; section *II. F* then addresses more specific institutional and structural conditions for CPR management.

B. Local Organization

Before any CPR scheme can be established, some preliminary conditions exist in almost all cases of effective local resource management. First, communities have to have at least some semblance of an institution with which to build. Rural areas in many states

retain traditional structures of community organization, such as a church, tribal council, or other body that has historical legitimacy within the region. A common blunder for external forces, such as NGOs or government officials, who arrive in an area with the intention of jump-starting community organization, is to disregard these existing institutions and instead essentially re-invent the wheel. Time and again, the evidence suggests that CPR schemes benefit from being rooted in established and locally respected institutions (Admassie, 2000; Arnold 1998). Not only does the reliance on such bodies increase local involvement and control from the beginning, but when community members overwhelmingly perceive the institution as legitimate, governed by familiar faces, and long respected, compliance is more likely.

In Ethiopia, the issue is a bit complicated. The obvious local level institution is the Peasant Association, established in 1974 by the military government specifically to create a forum for rural participation. However, years of misuse by corrupt government have led to a tainted reputation for many of these bodies. While this doesn't mean that PAs should be disregarded as a possible workable institution for community forestry, practitioners must treat the inclusion of the body on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the case of Ethiopia raises an interesting question: should local-level organizational frameworks be used automatically, without regard for their current role and function? Clearly, when presented this way, CPR theorists would have to agree that a compromised local body might not present any organizing advantage over the creation of a new administrative structure designed specifically for the new community resource management regime.

C. Resource Tenure Security

Second, the community must begin tackling organization problems within a context of secure tenure. While security of tenure is important for community management of any resource, it gains particular salience in the case of forests. In many developing countries, rural land rights are frequently based only on customary claims and thereby subject to government seizure at any time (Beck, 2001; Wollenberg, 1998), making this a particularly difficult condition. Likewise, governments that have instituted frequent land reform legislation in recent years have engendered a population that might expect their land to be re-allocated to somebody else at any time.

When farmers don't believe they will still be using the same land in the long term, they have scant incentive to protect it in the short term in order to reap benefits in the cloudy far-off future. Indeed, this phenomenon is well known in the literature: no rational person living on the edge of subsistence would pay the costs now for benefits later if they have no assurance that it will, in fact, be they who reap those benefits (Admassie, 2000; Ascher, 1995; Ostrom, 1999; Wollenberg, 1998). The question for the Ethiopia case, then, is whether a workable community management scheme can flourish *despite* a long history of weak land tenure security. In Ethiopia, the history is even worse: large-scale resettlement and villagization schemes instituted by the Derg in the 1980s moved many families off land they had held for generations (Pausewang, 1990).

D. Exclusion

Limiting access to a given resource is, without question, the most critical condition for success of CPR management; that is, only when a clearly delimited user

community has been established can institutional and management schemes develop. It is particularly important in this context to note that CPR theory begins only once a bounded community has been defined. Ostrom (1999) notes that one key feature of CPR is subtractability; that is, the use by one person of the resource necessarily reduces the ability of another person to use that same resource. External benefits of forests, for example, such as watershed protection and carbon sink provision, are more difficult to measure but also clearly impacted by overuse of the resource, making exclusion a central feature of sustainable management.

Nested within this problem is a set of related concerns. First, the rules of exclusion must not be perceived as arbitrary by the community as a whole, and so those rules must be clear, consistent, and accessible. Second, spillover effects of exclusion can be many, as users who have been denied access to a resource such as timber or fish that they are accustomed to using will, out of necessity, find other sources to replace what they need. If resource sustainability is the overarching goal of any CPR regime, then a spillover effect can undermine even the most successful community management program. Third, enforcement of the exclusion rules needs to be proportional (Arnold, 1998; Ascher, 1995), consistent, and perceived as coming from an internal source. Local resource management can only retain its title when the membership is responsible for both crafting the rules and enforcing them. Finally, and perhaps most thorny, are issues of customary access claims. Successful community resource management as a rule tends to recognize and legitimize traditional use rights (Agrawal, 1999; Arnold, 1998; Ascher, 1995); organizers therefore must untangle often conflicting rights, claims, and access privileges.

Ethiopia is indeed a place where customary claims to land often overlap with current land use arrangements. Locals clearly fear and reify the government, which seems to take on the visage of an external superpower; one farmer I interviewed said the government was "like God" (2001). History has taught Ethiopians that this government can and will arbitrarily make land use changes, restricting access without notice or explanation. Establishing workable exclusion rules will therefore be both critical and challenging for any community-based forest management regime in Ethiopia.

E. Enforcement

Once access has been satisfactorily controlled, and exclusion rules established, the formation of dispute resolution mechanisms must be a priority. Part of dispute resolution includes enforcement mechanisms which can counter the three primary sources of threats to sustainable local resource use: government takeovers, encroachment by outsiders, and overuse by community members (Ascher, 1995). If takeover by government is a pressing threat, it is counter-intuitive to have those same actors charged with enforcement. Still, many effective democracies have "check and balance" systems in place designed to address exactly those concerns. The role of government becomes key in all three threatening scenarios, as an overly present enforcement arm connected to a central state undermines the tentative control established by the community (Arnold, 1998). Ascher (1995) stresses this point, and argues that social norms and pressure within communities should drive both enforcement and the perception of legitimate authority. This doesn't mean that government has no role in common pool resource management; even a well-organized and respected enforcement arm generated at the local level is likely to benefit

from financial, technical, and legal support from the state (Agrawal, 1999; Arnold, 1998; Gibson, 2000). It is by all accounts a balancing act for governments, which must strive to walk the line between withdrawing entirely from the local level and dominating community institutions that might otherwise develop the capacity to undertake enforcement and management activities on their own terms.

Dispute resolution does not, however, consist solely of guards and mechanisms for punishment, although these are critical elements. Many CPR regimes have established a local justice system specifically for adjudicating resource disputes (Ostrom 1999). When this is not possible, usually due to lack of resources, knowledge, or capacity, the government may have an important niche in the process.

The Ethiopian case, again, provides notable challenges here. Ongoing human rights abuses and widespread justice violations through the history of the country have created a population without much faith in the rule of law. Only rarely has an Ethiopian seen legal recourse be fair and just. Thus, it seems likely that governments still lack the capacity to sufficiently provide enforcement support to community based organizations. De facto, local regimes will be forced to create their own enforcement schemes and work to minimize their reliance on the government. Is it workable to entrust a locality for the entirety of its enforcement?

F. Criteria: The Resource, The Users, and The Institutions

Within the CPR school, case studies provide enough information to allow researchers to identify patterns and themes consistent across boundaries and over time. Equally valuable, analysts have been able to differentiate between resources likely to be

manageable in a CPR regime (most notably, fisheries and forests), and those which do not fit as well (most notably, non-bounded resources such as air and water). Here I will condense the lessons from what has been a very prolific research program, focusing on specific institutional and community dimensions of local forest management.

1. The Resource

Elinor Ostrom et.al. (2000) lists four attributes of the forest resource which come out of her extensive study of the CPR literature as being fundamental for a successful community-based management scheme. First, the forest must not have deteriorated to a point that improvement is unlikely or impossible. The determination of forest condition in this instance is less a matter for scientific experts than it is a question of local perception. Forests that can benefit from a strong community management regime are ones which community members believe organization can improve overall. Second, there need to be both reliable and valid sources of information about forest condition which can serve as key indicators for community management leaders. Changes in forest quantity and quality need to be measurable. Third, natural variation and predictability within the forest should be somewhat predictable if meaningful planning is to take place. For example, some communities that begin an intensive organization process suddenly discover an international timber company has rights to the resource, thereby creating new conditions in the forest. These variables must be clearly established so that realistic predictions can be formed as a basis for management organization. Finally, the forest must be relatively small with clearly defined boundaries to render it feasible for local

management; the users must have access to basic transportation, monitoring and communication devices for organizing the forest.

2. Group Size and User Attributes

The optimal size of the community to increase the likelihood of success has been a topic of interest for some time. Mancur Olson (1965) argued, somewhat common-sensically, that smaller groups would be better able to manage consensus organization of resource management. His concern was primarily the classic free-rider problem, in which larger groups may be host to members who enjoy the benefits of the resource without fairly shouldering their share of the costs. While this rule may function as a general truism in social settings, it has proven insufficient for capturing the complexity of CPR regime formation. More recent scholars argue that what is more important than a small number of members is that any such number, large or small, remain constant over time (McKean, 2000). Stability in group size, matched with solid criteria for membership is more indicative of successful CPR regimes. Likewise, other authors have stressed the power of community loyalty, arguing that regardless of the size of the group, social norms embedded in a community can minimize free rider problems (McCay, 1998).

If there is general agreement, then, that size is not in itself deterministic, the focus shifts to the characteristics of the users themselves. Six user attributes, in particular, stand out for CPR theorists as the most salient (Ostrom 2000). First, the members must be dependent on the forest or products from the forest for the majority of their livelihood. When effective management of the resource is literally a matter of life and death, community members will be bound by their mutual commitment to local organization.

Second, they must have a shared perception of the forest, including a shared understanding of how their own actions affect other users and the resource itself. Some discrepancies in perception are unavoidable, surely, but vast disagreements in the condition of the forest or the role of individual land users will make local organization difficult to establish. Third, users must be operating with a relatively low discount rate regarding future forest benefits. This condition is often difficult to establish in communities with insecure land tenure. When future forest benefits might enrich the lives of people who aren't involved in doing the organizational work in the present, community members understandably waver. A low discount rate implies security with a long-term planning horizon. Fourth, there must be a high degree of reciprocal trust among group members. This condition is both common sense and relatively easy to achieve in tight-knit communities who share a past. Some communities, divided by socio-economic rifts or religious and ethnic differences, find reciprocal trust an elusive goal. See section *II.G.2.* below for a more detailed discussion of how such intra-community power variations impact community-based resource management. Fifth, external authority must be minimally present, granting the group a strong degree of autonomy in determining rules and access guidelines. The balancing act for state actors means they must offer and provide at least implicit support, and occasionally explicit enforcement assistance; however, they should not be an unduly strong presence lest they undermine local authority structures. Lastly, the group should have some experience organizing themselves; this usually involves a measure of proven local leadership (Gibson et.al., 2000). For example, elders within a community are oftentimes widely respected or educated and literate community members looked up to as leaders. These

community members should be actively recruited for leadership roles within a new organizational scheme.

3. Institutional Design

The development of existing rural institutions, possibly with few forest – related responsibilities, into robust organizations capable of managing the complex task of forest access, use and enforcement is another element to consider here. Institutional structures are a key component to any CPR system and will be carefully deconstructed here. CPR theorists have identified several specific design characteristics for institutions shown to be effective at the local level in developing countries (Ascher, 1995; Gibson, 2000; Ostrom, 1999). First, the institution must be working within clearly defined boundaries. Who has access rights, what specifically the rights entail, and the boundaries of the resource itself must all be clear. Second, the distribution of benefits must be proportional to the costs, and these benefits must be crafted to be appropriate to local conditions. In other words, the individuals or groups paying the costs of organizing and managing should also reap benefits; consistent with this mantra, local residents who are denied access to a resource which was previously open access should be compensated. Certainly the measurement of costs and benefits needs to be done at the local level with local economic needs and supply taken into account.

Third, choices made in the regime must made collectively. Many well-meaning external agents like NGOs have entered rural areas with a fully formed plan for community control, and then attempted to garner local participation for the implementation phase. These initiatives have been met with overwhelming failure, and

drive home the point that for participation to amount to more than mere consultation, communities must be on board from the planning stage, with those who will be affected by decisions also being the ones making those decisions (Admassie, 2000; Agrawal, 1999; Beck, 2001; Wollenberg, 1998). See section *II.G.*, below, in which the concept of participation is carefully explored.

Fourth, monitors and enforcement personnel, such as forest guards, must be both accountable to the users and practicing proportional sanction schemes. Abwoli Banana emphasizes this point in his case study of forest management regimes in Uganda: "Regardless of the *de jure* property regime, all forests can be *de facto* open-access regimes if there are no effective institutions and mechanisms to enforce the rules," (2000: 96). Fifth, conflict resolution mechanisms, ranging from forest guards to more formal judicial intervention, must be accessible to all users. Accessibility, as discussed above, means such services need to be low-cost and available in many languages. Many traditional communities have high rates of illiteracy; to make services truly available means an expensive and time consuming outreach effort, especially in remote or dispersed rural areas. Sixth, government must, at the very least, grant recognition to the group of its right to organize. Constant governmental authority challenges will undermine local efforts. See section *II.F.4.*, below, for a more detailed discussion of the role of government. Finally, Ostrom (1999) recommends nested enterprises for community management organizations operating as part of larger systems. Many developing states are in some stage of decentralization; nested levels of authority, then, are being crafted for governance in all issue areas.

4. Role of Government

The stress on autonomous collectivities suggests that centralized government, be it local, regional, or national, has no place in CPR regime formation. Indeed, theorists recognize the harm that has been done, especially in the Third World, when governments conclude that "an external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons," (Ostrom 2000: 9). While some argue that the power of taxation and subsequent revenue allocation is a positive use of government bureaucracy to manage the commons (Baden 1998), others support a less intrusive role. Three specific ways in which government might be most helpful are as follows. First, the government can act as a clearinghouse for information. By filtering scientific and policy data to relevant actors, the government can work to ensure that all parties are working with full information. Second, the government can provide sites for conflict resolution and mediation should groups need such services. Having the government remain a neutral third party as much as possible will serve all participants well. Third, the government can assist in compliance enforcement, offering mechanisms to support local monitoring and sanctioning efforts. Ostrom's research team concludes that forest collectivities who had the good fortune of working beneath a facilitative "macropolitical regime" were more likely to develop effective local CPR regimes (Gibson et.al, 2000). As a whole, these constitute very limited roles for governments, and this dissertation will argue that the government cannot be reduced to them without a comprehensive assessment of environmental policy capacity at all levels.

Researchers from both within and outside the CPR school agree that state policy and legal framework is critically important for understanding and ultimately changing land use practices (Lindsay, 1999; Mengisteab, 1997; Orie, 1995; Tohá, 1997).

Community-based initiatives rely heavily on the existence of what J.M. Lindsay calls "enabling laws" (1999: 31). While the content of such laws varies across time and space, some basic principles are reliable. First among these principles is security of land rights, and the law should make rights clear, certain for a specified period of time, enforceable, specific, exclusive, and governed by a legitimate authority. As Banana (2000) puts it, "Insecurity of land and tree tenure discourage local participation in forest-management and forest-protection activities," (96). Second, the law should provide some flexibility to allow for local adaptation and application. This is where the centralized state needs to walk that thin line, offering foundational legal support, but with substantial room for interpretation. Third, the law should specifically recognize local institutions and the role of the community. Many developing states are moving toward a decentralized system of forest management and are revising their statutes to reflect a commitment to local level organization and power. Finally, the law should carefully define governmental jurisdiction, specifying which agency or management group has responsibility for which tasks. The mere existence of a strong and enabling legal structure, however, is insufficient to ensure that communities will seize the opportunity to manage and control their forests; for law to be empowering, it must be understood. Again, given the language and illiteracy challenges, special effort needs to be made to ensure accessibility of the law for everybody.

While CPR theorists have not directly addressed the impact of decentralization on local level resource management, it is logical to note that the government responsibilities listed above might be carried out by a centralized state or a sub-state unit in a more decentralized system. There are advantages and disadvantages to each arrangement, and

the intricacies of effective administrative jurisdiction remain an important matter for research. These questions represent a notable gap in the CPR literature, and are a central focus of this dissertation.

TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY OF COMMON POOL RESOURCE THEORY CRITERIA

I.	**Attributes of the Resource**
	A. Feasible improvement
	B. Indicators available
	C. High predictability of availability of resource
	D. Relatively small spatial extent
II.	Attributes of the Users
	A. High Salience
	B. Common understanding of the resource
	C. Low discount rate
	D. All community members similarly affected by current resource use
	E. Mutual trust
	F. Autonomy
	G. Prior organizational experience
III.	Design Principles for Community Institutions
	A. Clearly defined boundaries – exclusion
	B. Congruence of costs / benefits
	C. Consistent collective – choice arrangements
	D. Monitoring accountable to users
	E. Graduated sanctions
	F. Conflict resolution mechanisms low cost and accessible
	G. At least minimal recognition of rights to organize by national government
	H. Nested enterprises for large operations
IV.	Role of Government
	A. Clearinghouse of information
	B. Provision of sites for conflict resolution
	C. Enforcement assistance

(Baden, 1998; Burger, 1998; FAO 1992; Gibson, et. al., 2000; McCay, 1998, McKean, 2000; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1999;)

G. Debates Within the Literature: Participation & Equity

In recent years, theorists within the CPR literature have become increasingly sensitized to the plight of marginalized groups. These scholars have written about the myth of a homogenous community which seems to underlie much of the early CPR literature, the social fabric which makes female participation an anomaly, and underlying norms of inequity which are too often reinforced instead of transformed by new community resource management regimes (Guijit 1998, Agarwal 2001, Wapner 1997).

Central to each of these emerging debates is the issue of cultural relativism v absolutism. Some insist that definitions of justice transcend culture making it appropriate for western researchers to comment unfavorably on the social conditions encountered in a village far from home. Others find this kind of judgment to be arrogant and elitist. Cultural norms, in the view of this latter group, cannot be deemed right or wrong by members of an outside and often dominant culture; rather, gender roles and patterns of participation can be observed, taken into account and considered a variable in research results, but not condemned.

Most important within this schism is the degree to which researchers consider the alteration of such norms within their legitimate jurisdiction. An outside group comprised largely of westerners, then, coming into a developing country to establish a community-based organization, must consider whether or not their structure should include any (subtle or overt) efforts to alter social norms. Justifications for doing so include pragmatic concerns for efficacy. If, for example, 50% of the population is excluded from planning by virtue of gender expectations, and those same 50% are responsible for a sizeable proportion of the resource extraction, then exclusion will likely equal failure. For these reasons among others, some organizers craft programs specifically designed to offer avenues of participation for women, community members who otherwise remain largely silent at public meetings.

1. The Concept of Community

The recent shift toward a central focus on the community level in natural resource management has not been manifested only in scholarly analysis; a strong conviction that

the inclusion of communities is essential for success has appeared in virtually every relevant sector: public, private, and non-profit (Admassie, 2000; Agrawal, 1999; Arnold, 1998; Ascher, 1995; Gibson, 2000; Niewenhuis, 2000; Ostrom 1999; Pausewang 1990; Perrings, 1999; Turner, 1999; Wily, 2000; Wollenberg, 1998). Dozens of governments, including Ethiopia's, have recently rewritten their broad policy objectives to more specifically account for the role of community. How can we account for this vocal unanimity of opinion about the importance of a realm which until quite recently was essentially ignored?

In part, several spectacular failures of state-driven resource management schemes are seen as the result of insufficient community buy-in. That is, as governments around the world have traditionally sought to regulate resource use by heavy-handed command-and-control type mechanisms, the effect was visible in communities. Localities began to resent the very presence of state officials, which contributed to an erosion of state legitimacy within the community and thereby foreclosed the likelihood of success of future, perhaps with better structured, government-sponsored approaches to resource management (Admassie, 2000; Peluso 1993). This poor relationship between the state and local level has led community members to resist compliance in a variety of ways, both confrontational and less direct (Admassie, 2000). The overall outcome has been inconsistent implementation, coupled with tremendous financial loss and continued resource degradation. At a recent Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture policy meeting (observed on 29/5/01), there was near unanimous agreement that centralized approaches to forest management have flatly "failed" (Lipp, 2001) to achieve sustainability. As experts witness the inability of state actors to effectively implement management policies

at the local level, it quickly becomes obvious that only by including the community can long-term success be achieved.

This surge of interest in the community has fostered a burst of research and writing which seeks to explore and analyze the best role to be played by communities in the sector of resource management. However, it is notable that few authors have bothered to define the term "community", instead relying on several rather loose assumptions. Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson (1999) argue that most uses of the term suggest one of three implicit definitions. A geographical definition has many scholars seeing a community as bounded by a small territorial area. In this category are uses of the term that rely on administrative boundaries (i.e. a township or village), geographical localities (i.e. the highlands South of the mountains), or access to the resource of interest (i.e. people who live adjacent to the forest). Some scholars, however, are more interested in the internal makeup of the community itself, defining it, for example, in terms of ethnicity, religion, or other characteristic usually portrayed as homogenous and constant. Third, community is frequently seen as a collection of people who share common interests and shared norms. These, too, are portrayed as homogenous and unchanging.

Each of these conceptions of community is problematic, as each rests on untested assumptions. Idealizing the community as a homogenous group obscures intra-group power relationships and skewed balances of control over resources. Focusing solely on the immediate community which resides near the resource of interest ignores the effects of that resource on those who live farther away; for example, downstream villages may have a great deal at stake in the effective management of a forest (i.e. water quality,

fuelwood availability, etc.) but under most community management matrices will be excluded from decision-making and planning.

Not only does the reality of a heterogeneous community risk exclusion of certain groups, but it potentially threatens the viability of an organizing project that assumes homogeneity. Some researchers have found that groups with socio-cultural variability are less likely to share norms and perceptions, making it more difficult to coordinate the organization of a shared resource. However, these results are not consistent. There seems to be consensus in the literature that some differences within groups matter more than others, and that ultimately "heterogeneity does not have a uniform effect on the likelihood of organizing collective action and little, if any, effect on the sustainability of such collective action," (Varughese and Ostrom 2001: 750). Thus, the impact of intra-community differentiation must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.

2. Participatory Exclusion

As discussed above, the tendency to generally treat communities as homogenous units is troubling. Irene Guijit, whose work focuses on gender inequality, notes that "[p]articipation, a loose term to describe a wide variety of practices that aim for more inclusive development, does not automatically include those who were previously left out of such processes," (Guijit, 1998: 19). Indeed, this problem has not gone unnoticed in CPR circles, but until recently most concluded that combating deep-seated inequities and traditionally defined gender roles was simply beyond the more immediate mission of creating sustainable community resource management systems. Within the last year or

two, however, CPR theorists have begun to tackle the issue of what Agarwal terms "participatory exclusions" (2001) as central to the effectiveness of a given regime.

Environmental justice theorists have long argued that throughout the world people who are poor, minorities and/or women tend to be disproportionately dependent upon degraded resources, thereby paying heavy costs of environmental scarcity. These same groups tend to be politically invisible and voiceless in policy and decision-making processes (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Dankelman 1988). A larger point can then be argued: when costs and benefits of a resource are unequally distributed among relevant actors, these forces serve to reinforce (or, ideally, reduce) existing social and economic inequalities. Recall that a central feature of successful institutional design for a CPR regime is a balanced allocation of costs and benefits within the community (see section *II.F.3.* above). Paul Wapner (1997) argues that the history of environmental management clearly demonstrates that those with decision-making power too often choose to displace environmental harm across time (to the next generation, for example) and space (to the next village, for example). Resource use and access absolutely always raise issues of power, and to that end, many theorists have called for greater inclusion of ethics into the policy-making process (Wapner, 1997).

Recurrent patterns of inequity based upon gender, income level, race and ethnicity are now widely acknowledged to both stem from and result in power asymmetries. The failure of certain groups to participate in what are otherwise considered participatory processes "stem from systemic factors and can, in turn, unfavorably affect both equity and institutional efficiency," (Agarwal 2001: 1623). GTZ takes it a step further, noting that "the discrimination against women entails costs for society which act as a brake on

social and economic development," (Osterhaus 2000: 2). Thus, directly addressing gender inequities within a CPR regime becomes not an optional addition to a complete community-management scheme, but in fact a precondition of success.

Despite the wealth of research and scholarly writing on socio-economic and gender inequality in resource availability and use, aid organizations all too often disregard these variables when formulating community-level projects. GTZ, for example, has published several pamphlets and articles dealing with these topics; editors of a macro-analysis of GTZ project reports note that at the village level "socio-economic differentiation in communities did not receive much attention in the articles. Gender difference in accessing resources and public debate are addressed more often, but not in great detail," (GTZ 1999: 14).

The challenge, then, is twofold. Issues of gender and socio-economic inequalities within communities must be recognized; scholars working on theory building need to integrate these issues, and planners need to take them into account. Second, in the field, aid workers, development planners and community facilitators can be more tuned into differences within the community, including their observations in reports and articles and thus creating a feedback loop to the scholarly literature. The case study in this dissertation asks critical questions about equity within community forest management. Do marginalized groups, especially women, have a just role to play in the current IFMP regime? If not, does this threaten the legitimacy and effectiveness of the management scheme?

III. Participatory Forest Management

There is significant overlap between CPR and PFM theory. Indeed, CPR might best be seen as an umbrella under which PFM resides, dealing, as it does, specifically with forest resources. Notably, however, there is an area of PFM which addresses private land managed in cooperation with public entities; this type of scenario is not discussed herein but does mean that the relationship between CPR and PFM is somewhat less than that of a larger category and a sub-category. A venn diagram is the best representation of the theoretical relationship between CPR and PFM. See figure x.



Figure 2.1: CPR and PFM Theoretical Nexus

A. Participation

Naïve politicians perhaps believe that inviting public participation will ensure broad involvement and civic service by the populace. To the contrary, it is widely recognized that there are multiple levels at which the public may be invited to participate, and each level naturally favors input by dominant groups. Bina Agarwal (2001) offers a typology of participation, reproduced here in Table 2.2. (reproduced from Agarwal 2001: 1624).

Form / Level of Participation	Characteristic Features
Nominal participation	Membership in the group.
Passive participation	Being informed of decisions *ex post facto*; or attending meetings and listening in on decision-making without speaking up.
Consultative participation	Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee of influencing decisions.
Activity-specific participation	Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake specific tasks.
Active participation	Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or taking initiatives of other sorts.
Interactive (empowering) participation	Having voice and influence in the group's decisions

While it may seem that the last category, interactive participation, is the most desirable if the goal is to create a process that is genuinely participatory, there are significant costs associated with such a decision-making process. First, equity and efficiency are almost always trade-offs in this context (Haas 2001). As more and more people are invited to offer input, decisions are delayed and administrative costs incurred. Democratic states regularly struggle to find an acceptable balance between inclusive participation and time-sensitive decision-making. Second, researchers across cultural and time lines consistently agree that participative processes rarely result in proportional involvement by ethnic, socioeconomic and gender groups. Educated, politically active, outspoken citizens tend to participate more than the underprivileged and uninformed. This latter category includes those for whom social norms discourage outspokenness; women and minorities are the most obvious members of this group. Despite these difficulties with both defining and encouraging equitable participation, it remains a key concept in PFM.

B. Local Forest Management: Terminology

Many definitions of Participatory Forest Management (**PFM**) exist, but all stress common elements: it is based on comprehensive community participation and control, involves interaction between forest agencies and local institutions, ensures equitable benefit sharing, and has both resource and community development objectives. There is a nest of terminology in the literature. For example, PFM is often used as a synonym for Community Forestry; in fact, while both embrace the concept of local inclusion, shades of meaning exist between the two. Community Forestry suggests a community-generated effort, with perhaps some external support in the form of technical assistance or financial aid; Participatory Forest Management, on the other hand, suggests an effort organized at the government level and then extended to include the input of communities. However, given the scarcity of examples from the developing world in which sustainable forest management schemes were wholly initiated at the local level, any participatory cooperation of government with communities must be seen as a manifestation of the broad concept. For the purposes of this paper, separating the two would be immaterial and PFM terminology will be used.

Co-management is another term found in the literature. One definition for this approach to natural resource management, offered by GTZ and IUCN, is "a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources," (Borrini-Feyerabend, et.al. 2000: 1). The authors of the above-quoted definition state that co-management is just another word for participatory, collaborative, joint, mixed, multi-party or round-table management. We

can assume, then, that co-management is a different term for the same practice described herein.

Use of the term Social Forestry in much of the literature further complicates the language. Social forestry is the phrase which probably came first in the field; it was first seen in India in the mid-1970s and was used to suggest benefits reaped by forest dependent groups as part of a structural arrangement (FAO 1992). The term quickly became mired in difficulty, however, as it implied an "exclusive focus on meeting subsistence needs of the poor. . . [the term] has contributed in no small part to the misconceptions and misunderstandings which surrounded the early years of community forestry – notably the failure to recognize the overriding economic criterion in farmer decisions," (FAO 1992: 5). The concept of PFM now includes a fundamental respect and appreciation for the choices made by forest dependent groups; instead of seeking to provide 'welfare' support through forestry programs, PFM regimes now work to integrate local needs and perceptions into a functioning participatory program which benefits as many stakeholders as possible.

Aside from social forestry, then, the other terms I have profiled here have much in common as all are ways of discussing what Eva Wollenberg (1998) calls *local* forest management. She argues that the fundamental difference between local and conventional forestry is that locals receive substantially more benefits from the resource, including predictable access to the forest, equitable distribution of forest products, and cost-sharing among all resource users. She notes that the traditional practice of local forest management has rested on four assumptions: local people are the best managers of forests, forest management objectives of local people and others are compatible, local

people manage forests sustainably, and the forest has a high capacity for regeneration. Overall, she concludes that conditions can be managed so as to increase the odds of a favorable outcome, and as a rule community members see far more benefits from the forest resource under local management than they would under a centralized forestry regime. Whether or not this holds true in the Ethiopian case is a research question in this dissertation, but it suggests from important criteria for judging the IFMP a success or failure.

Amid the matrix of terminology and conceptual semantics it is clear that most theoreticians believe PFM to be a fundamentally different approach to management. Practitioners putting PFM into action, however, may not agree. For instance, Zelalem Temesgen, the Participatory Forest Management Advisor for FARM Africa, one of the largest NGOs practicing PFM in Ethiopia, said that PFM is really just management along a continuum, in which the roles and responsibilities of the community are higher (2001). According to Temesgen, then, the difference is one of degree and not kind.

Readers of this dissertation will note that while none of my interviewees seem to be aware of the CPR terminology, all are quite comfortable discussing PFM. Likewise, training workshops and policy discussions focus on PFM as a guiding toolbox for better integrating community control into forest management. PFM, then, is a hands-on, action oriented approach to managing forests. It tends to be more useful in a field setting. CPR theory, however, clearly underlies many of PFM's recommendations, and it is for that reason that I have discussed each school separately while intending to use them together for analytical purposes. I am not seeking here to refine these two streams of theory in

relation to one another; rather, I will draw upon insights from each set of literatures as I evaluate the effectiveness of community forestry management in Ethiopia.

IV. Policy Capacity

While political scientists regularly evaluate a state's capacity for solving a range of policy problems, the extension of this inquiry into the sub-field of environmental policy is relatively new theoretical development. Capacity in this context has been defined as "society's ability to identify and solve environmental problems" (Janicke 1997: 1). Examination of capacity usually includes, in part, an analysis of institutional structures in place, legislation on the books, enforcement mechanisms and judicial strength. Extending the study of policy capacity to environmental concerns has three main advantages, according to Martin Janicke (1997). First, the concept emphasizes the importance of "structural characteristics" (3) for policy success. Without looking at capacity, environmental policy failure might be misinterpreted to indicate a weakness in the specific instrument in play; taking capacity into account allows for "objective limitations" (3) to be considered as well. Second, capacity-building, by definition, is tightly connected to development; thus, a study of environmental capacity necessarily raises broader issues connected to sustainable development. This, in turn, empowers researchers to identify tangible changes in government structure which will affect the inclusion of environmental issues into overall development planning. Finally, Janicke argues that analyzing environmental capacity systematically makes inter-state comparison possible. Capacity measurements enable scholars to rank the ability of states

to deal effectively with environmental problems; as such, the concept is primarily a heuristic tool for analysis.

In this section, I will begin by arguing that an assessment of Ethiopia's environmental capacity is critical for understanding the case study presented in this dissertation. Policy capacity is an underdeveloped piece in both the CPR and PFM canons, and I will discuss the many reasons why it ought to be more fully integrated into the study of any community-based resource management scheme. Next, I will go on to discuss Martin Janicke's model for assessing national environmental capacity. Decentralization in environmental decision-making adds analytical dimensions to Janicke's national model, and I will conclude the section by describing a possible framework for the inclusion of sub-state environmental capacity evaluation.

A. Policy Capacity as a Prerequisite for Common Pool Resource Management and Participatory Forest Management

Scholars agree that even in countries with a large and remote rural population, such as Ethiopia, state policy and legal frameworks are critical for understanding and ultimately changing land use practices (Lindsay 1999, Orie 1995, Mengisteab 1997, Tohá 1997). Environmental degradation occurs either within a policy framework that enables or encourages such trends, or as a result of incentive structures with roots in that policy. Comparative forest policy research suggests a strong trend of decentralization, visible in the form of an increased focus on environmental considerations at the subnational level, the incorporation of science into the policy process, the inclusion of social aspects in planning, and the firm link between environment and development policy planning (Wily

2000, Tohá 1997). Kenneth Orie (1995) argues that any investigation into the impact of policy structure on environmental degradation must begin with an analysis of the national constitution. The main issues, he says, are how well the constitution creates conditions for judicial challenges of environmental laws and allows for clear institutional jurisdiction over environmental issues. In Ethiopia, where the judicial framework remains quite weak, the questions are broader and must include both the constitutional document itself and the systemic support available to put constitutional ideology into action.

Case studies in the CPR/PFM schools tend to be overwhelmingly site-specific. Institutional dimensions of the locally-managed regime are analyzed in great detail. Study of the role of government tends to be limited to the extent to which the state effectively facilitates and supports local control (see section *II.F.4*). More recently, CPR scholars have begun to recognize the importance of national government structures on the success of a local management plan; however, despite this theoretical expansion, there has not been a systematic integration of the policy capacity literature. In this dissertation, I will draw upon both theoretical schools as analytical tools and in the process will demonstrate their deep interconnectedness.

A recent meeting (5/29/01) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to discuss the emerging forest policy there and the role of PFM within it is instructive. At the table were a number of senior government officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as representatives from GTZ, the primary international advisory body for forest policy. One Ethiopian government official noted that the assumption within the Ethiopian government was that the "central government *can't* manage forests; it has to be done by the community." Widespread agreement around the table confirmed the impression that the

Ethiopian government lacks capacity to effectively manage its diverse forest resources, and has failed to do so in the past. However, and this was strongly emphasized, a lack of capacity in the past does not mean the government doesn't have a role to play in the future. Gunter Haase, the Forest Policy Advisor for GTZ reminded participants that "PFM doesn't mean to hand over forests to communities and let them do as they like. There has to be monitoring and law enforcement!" (2001). The conclusion is obvious, timeless and instructive. Even in states with strong community management systems in place (which is not the situation in Ethiopia), the central government must have the capacity to provide some support and supervision. Otherwise, agreed everyone at that table in Addis Ababa, short-term benefits will trump any long-term sustainability goals.

CPR theory can only partially explain success or failure in efforts to manage forests locally. Without studying policy capacity at all its levels, theorists will be unable to differentiate between institutional or instrumental weakness and capacity limitations. As Janicke explains, even with well trained, highly motivated staff, environmental policymaking can fail when national abilities lag. In a state like Ethiopia, the problem is nothing short of crippling. To evaluate the success of the case study presented here is to assess the extent to which policy capacity at the national and sub-national levels is deterministic of local forest management organization. Recall one of the research questions posed here: where is the locus of governance for community forestry?

B. National Policy Capacity: Janicke's Model

The discussion of national policy capacity in this dissertation will be based on the prolific work done and edited by Martin Janicke and Helmut Weidner (1997, 2002).

These scholars identify a number of key variables and describe features that promote strong capacity in any state. They do not look at Ethiopia specifically, and indeed the theory was initially developed to assess OECD countries; I will, however, apply the model described in this chapter to Ethiopia in Chapter IV.

Martin Janicke's model (1997) employs five broad topic areas for evaluating outcomes of a state's capacity specifically for environmental policy-making. He begins by framing environmental policy in terms of outcomes, arguing that outcomes are influenced by actors, strategies, so-called framework conditions, situative contexts, and the environmental problems themselves. Policy capacity is more than outcomes, however, and Janicke includes the importance of procedure and process in his discussion. I will discuss each of these elements in turn, and offer some initial expectations for Ethiopia.

1. Actors

Actors involved in environmental policy making clearly have an important impact on outcomes. Analysis of actors is a means for uncovering both structural and individual dimensions of staffing. Do personnel in a given ministry or department possess the skills, knowledge and motivation to enact strong environmental management? How is the system of staffing arranged (i.e. horizontally or hierarchically)? Does staff have ongoing access to information? Are there incentive systems in place which will influence how decisions are made? Are there opportunities for advancement & on-the-job training? Who are the individuals charged with solving a given environmental problem? In a place like Ethiopia, the lack of human capital is a fundamental capacity weakness. Poor educational

opportunities combined with a lack of technology and the spectrum of poverty-related limitations creates an incredibly under-skilled workforce. We can expect environmental policy makers at all levels to be poorly educated, disconnected from global environmental information flows, and working without clear incentives for personal advancement or reward.

2. Strategy

In his analysis of OECD environmental planning (1998), Janicke concludes that strategic environmental planning can best be evaluated based on 3 categories: the accuracy and relevance of the environmental goals, the degree of participation in and integration of environmental issues in the planning process, and the extent to which the plan is institutionalized. This last category is the one Janicke deems is most important since "the question of institutionalization becomes important as the time frames for planning for sustainable development extend beyond terms of office and legislative periods," (1998: 44). Institutionalization, then, requires permanence in the form of a legal framework, long-term financial scheme, and regular systems for monitoring.

Strategy assessment therefore requires attention both to outcomes and to process. In Ethiopia, we might expect some measure of success in the first of these categories, as the state seems to have a clear understanding of its many environmental needs. Without a doubt, however, a lack of scientific data will severely limit the degree to which Ethiopia is able to set accurate targets. Baseline data rarely exists, and setting strategic priorities thus becomes either overly vague or nothing more than a guessing game. Janicke notes that there is an important difference between formal and substantive institutionalization;

where Ethiopia may possess moderate strength in the former, it is exceedingly weak in the latter. Likewise, Ethiopia's unstable government and political upheaval have fostered an administrative tangle wherein ministries and agencies don't know the extent of their jurisdiction and avenues of cooperation are not manifest. Finally, and related, institutionalization is a function of permanence, something which Ethiopia has not enjoyed since the days of Haile Selassie, over 30 years ago. Ethiopia's capacity for environmental strategic planning, therefore, is likely to be weak.

3. Systemic Framework Conditions

This category of Janicke's model contains four sub-sections for analysis. First, the structural framework conditions are those features of government which frame environmental action and opportunity structures for relevant actors (1997). These conditions are invariably political and dynamic. Second, cognitive-informational framework conditions describe the mechanisms in place for facilitating the production, interpretation, distribution and application of environmental information. Third, political-institutional framework conditions are the whole of a state's legislative, legal, and constitutional structure, including institutionalized avenues for participation. Last, economic-technological framework conditions refer to the general availability of raw materials and financial strength. As a whole, the systemic framework conditions describe the structure and functioning of a state's bureaucracy and administration, its resources, and its relative openness in terms of fostering participation and information sharing. These are conditions which exist prior and concurrent to any individual environmental problem.

Ethiopia, a profoundly poor country, is likely to be quite weak in all four dimensions of systemic framework conditions. The most visible and paralyzing feature of Ethiopian life is poverty; unlike some African countries where obscene wealth resides with powerful government leaders, even Ethiopia's political elite do not possess economic means. Certainly an elite exists within Ethiopian culture, but an overall lack of resources, both financial and in terms of raw materials, cripples the state. Combined with a turbulent political history and very nascent democracy, Ethiopia's poverty is the defining characteristic of its framework conditions.

4. Situative Contexts

Janicke argues that the immediate circumstances surrounding an environmental problem are also worth examining. That is, even with framework conditions embedded, as discussed above, short-term contexts can create unusual opportunity spaces or urgent needs for action. He describes cases of visible environmental disaster (i.e. Chernobyl) as opening political space for proponents of environmental activism.

In Ethiopia, deforestation is ongoing and largely silent. However, there have been prominent environmental tragedies which have spurred action. Famine, so visible on international television in the 1980s and again in the news as I write, is an excellent example of this phenomenon. Public outcry over starving children on the news led to an influx of aid dollars, the long-term presence of aid agencies, and a government pressured to take action to prevent another catastrophe. Deforestation is clearly implicated in food security and agricultural planning, and suddenly forestry gained prominence in a besieged

and poor state. More recently, widespread wildfires in the highlands of Ethiopia received local and national attention, again funneling resources into the problem.

5. Problems

The character of the environmental problem itself will impact a country's ability to tackle it. If the problem is easy to solve, urgent, and backed by politically strong groups, then we might expect positive outcomes; with less viable conditions, a state's capacity will be more easily taxed. Common sensical, but important to keep in mind, is that even countries with very strong environmental capacity in the many indicators described thus far, will still be challenged to solve especially perplexing or controversial issues. The most powerful and environmentally strong countries in the world have yet to make significant progress on global warming, for example.

Ethiopia is overwhelmed with the provision of basic survival requirements for its people; therefore, almost any environmental problem is a difficult one to manage financially and administratively. We can expect that environmental problems which are tightly linked with poverty reduction, development, and national security are likely to see better outcomes than others. Indeed, tying deforestation to food security and agriculture has granted the issue some salience in Ethiopia.

6. A Summary

Table 2.3 outlines each of Janicke's indicators and summarizes possible research sub-questions that stem from each.

Categories of Policy Capacity	Questions
I. Actors	• Who is involved in policy making? • Personnel structure? • Motivations of relevant actors?
II. Strategies	• Gov. goals? • Choice of instruments? • Efforts to develop capacities?
III. Framework Conditions	
A. Structural Framework	• Long-term opportunity structure available to each relevant actor?
B. Cognitive – Informational Framework	• Conditions under which information is produced / disseminated / applied?
C. Political – Institutional Framework	• Constitutional / legal structures? • Extent to which these structures encourage participation?
D. Economic Framework	• Base economic health? • Resource availability?
IV. Situative Contexts	• Short – term opportunity structures?
V. Specific Situation	• Is problem perceived as urgent / simple / complex?

Table 2.3

C. Decentralization

Ethiopia's ongoing decentralization process continues to directly and indirectly impact its policy capacity at every level. The specific case of Ethiopia will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters III and IV; here, I will review the literature on decentralization, summarize the arguments for decentralizing, and profile critical perspectives which have gained prominence in the literature.

1. Terminology

The decision to grant responsibilities and resources to sub-state units can take many forms. De Muro (1998) suggests we consider two sets of variables: the extent to which local governments are autonomous, and the direction in which they are accountable. By combining these dimensions of decentralization, he creates this model (Table 2.4):

	Low Autonomy	**High Autonomy**
Centralized Accountability	Deconcentration	Delegation
Local Accountability	De-Responsibility	Devolution

Table 2.4

Deconcentration is characterized by administrative decentralization, where decisions are still made at the center and regional offices are in a position of implementation. Delegation, with high autonomy and centralized accountability, may be a workable system in theory but few examples are evident. De-responsibility is a term for what many Sub-Saharan states currently have: both political and administrative decentralization, but a lack of funds to support the mandate at the local level. That is, the central state has abdicated its governance responsibilities, either because of lack of capacity or funds, or because of a commitment to decentralization without the requisite backing in the form of resources. Devolution is probably the most ideal scenario, in which local governments are granted substantial authority and the central government pairs this with sufficient resources: "local governments are given legally recognized boundaries in which they enforce an independent authority to plan and implement programs," (Egziabher, 1997: 693). In this last category, decentralization is political, administrative *and* fiscal. Successful examples of devolution in developing countries are rare; however, the ideal is one which can be helpful in policy planning or assessment.

Decentralization, in whatever form it takes, must be analyzed both from a macro and a sectoral perspective. At the macro level, decentralization can be measured according to the extent to which political, administrative and fiscal dimensions have been effectively

moved away from the center. Individual sectors can also be studied, and health care, education, and natural resource management are common foci for analysis.

2. Why Decentralize?

Many factors have contributed to what is now unarguably an international trend toward decentralization. Dele Olowu (2001) identifies five such factors which underlie this recent wave. First, widespread failure of centralized public sector management has been visible in the form of economic, fiscal and political crises in authoritarian states. Many post-colonial African states, reacting to decades of corrupt dictatorships, are now embracing both democratic ideals and decentralized administrative systems. Second, the international aid community almost unanimously supports decentralization. Pressure from donors can be persuasive, as offers of funding and expertise create strong incentives. Third, growing urbanization has left many centralized governments inadequately prepared to manage multi-sectoral needs. Decentralization appears as a viable option for generating human resources and increasing overall influence. Fourth, some ruling groups have found that decentralization is a useful political mechanism to "neutralize, contain and seek compromises with regional or local elites," (Oluwu 2001: 47) The ruling party can effectively solidify its control by strategically placing allies in positions of local power. Finally, globalization and the competition of international markets has led many governments to consider restructuring.

The collection of these factors has created what might be considered a political opportunity for decentralization. Decentralization tends to be seen as compatible with three other ideals: democratization, poverty alleviation and economic efficiency. The

United Nations Capital Development Foundation adds that decentralization may be a path toward greater perceived legitimacy for government, as households become more "willing to pay" for public services when they see that local government officials are gearing these services more tightly to what they need. International aid organizations have embraced decentralization as a way for them to better reach remote and peripheral areas, obtain more equitable distribution of resources, and increase public participation in the policy process (Brosio 2000). Central governments, naturally, appreciate decentralization when it allows them to "offload service responsibilities to subnational governments," (Brosio 2000: 109).

Thus, decentralization seems to have something that nearly every actor can accept and even champion. Of 35 Sub-Saharan states, 33 have introduced some form of decentralization, most of those taking steps toward public sector reorganization in the 1980s and 1990s. The process and pace have been chaotic: "The decentralization occurring in most Sub-Saharan countries is not a carefully designed sequence of reforms aimed at improving efficiency. Rather, it appears to be a reluctant and disorderly series of concessions by central governments attempting to maintain political stability," (De Muro 1998: 7).

3. Critical Perspectives

It is no surprise that the ideals of decentralization are hard won. Even those who have been proponents of the format now issue cautionary warnings. Three categories of concerns, each of which echoes concerns raised in the theoretical summary here, dominate this literature: weak local capacity, the possibility of elite capture, and the

likelihood of magnifying existing inequalities. First, and prominent throughout this dissertation, are concerns about expecting local governments and communities to shoulder vast new responsibilities when those localities lack resources, human capital, and experience. There is "growing appreciation that what needs to be developed is not only local government but local governance," (Olowu 2001: 59). Instead of empowering localities to manage new responsibilities, too many of the new laws "being written in the name of participation and decentralization administer rather than enfranchise," (Ribot 1999: 3). Without financial strength, communities are impotent. Money comes generally from one of two sources: transfers from the center, and/or the creation or realization of a local tax base. Both of these avenues are problematic. Central governments may or may not have the financial strength to divert its own funds; when budgets do require fiscal decentralization, too often the amounts are left to the discretion of government personnel (Brosio 2000). Local tax bases, especially in rural and poor areas, are notoriously asymmetrical or nonexistent.

Elite capture and corruption are potentially worse in a decentralized system. Local governments can be captured by elites, making a mockery of the pluralist ideal. These elites may be the non-poor, effectively diverting funds and policies away from poverty alleviation. The poor, then, lose their voice to local vested interests, and yet local governance may remain intact. Giorgio Brosio (2000) notes that measuring rates of corruption is difficult, but if the rate is determined based upon the number of "tainted contracts," then decentralization will worsen corruption simply because so many more people are dealing with money and contracts.

Finally, inequalities between regions may be intensified, not alleviated, by decentralization schemes. Urban governments are likely to be more successful at managing governance responsibilities for several reasons: a longer history of formal government institutions in urban centers, the existence of a broader revenue base, greater access to sources of credit, and an urban bias for public expenditures (De Muro 1998). Localities, especially rural and remote areas, tend to have dramatic disparities in human capital, financial planning capacity, and tax bases (Prud'homme 2001, De Muro 1998).

In the case of Ethiopia, each of these concerns raises critical questions about the viability of decentralization as a governance structure and, by extension, of community-based forestry as an enterprise. While PFM schemes are not by any means reliant on a decentralized government, the process of decentralizing seems likely to produce the negative outcomes described above and those circumstances, in turn, create negative conditions for community forestry. Recall again the key research question posed here: where is the locus of governance for community based forestry? Decentralization adds new dimensions to this inquiry.

D. Local Policy Capacity

Janicke's research focuses almost entirely on national level capacity. Despite this analytical approach, he notes that sustainable development and environmental planning "requires enormous societal effort which will not be feasible within the traditional technocratic, instrumentalist, top-down pattern of public policy," (1998: 30). While stopping short of advocating for a decentralized structure for environmental policymaking, he clearly finds a strict state-centric model inadequate for the task.

National capacity assessment must be paired with an analysis of local capacity. Until recently, the term "policy capacity" by default indicated a national level inquiry. Given recent interest in community participation and local involvement, policy makers and implementers have had to confront the reality of abilities at the local level. William Ascher and Robert Healy (1990) note this disturbing pattern: "Project planning and implementation in developing countries typically bypass local governments, which are assumed to have no skills and little ability to implement effectively. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy," (191). Objective assessment of local capacity is a critical first step in both developing environmental policy structures and in planning resource allocation for capacity-building. Scholars, researchers and field workers are increasingly on board with the local capacity mantra.

By the end of the 1980s, when the first round of international aid projects that specifically targeted communities in developing countries were reaching maturity, aid workers recognized that the ideal did not match the reality. Many such projects now are paired with regional rural development support. Kurt Rockman, a Supervisory Agricultural Development Officer for USAID stationed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, stressed the importance of local capacity building for the success of any locally-based management scheme. Farmers need basic business skills and peasants need to learn the fundamental patterns of ecological health; it is a matter of "training, training, training" (Rockman 2001). GTZ, the German aid organization, notes that such approaches must target multiple levels and diverse sectors. The agency has several projects currently underway which specifically aim to strengthen local planning capacity, project development and organizing skills (GTZ 1999).

Some are optimistic about the new emphasis on local level capacity building. Tom McShane, who works in Ethiopia with the World Wildlife Fund, says that capacity building is fundamental to what WWF does. Building capacity at the local level is much easier than at the state level for the simple reason that it is smaller. Building institutions, educating locals and developing capacity have to happen simultaneously. He has seen too many organizations spend *too* much time building capacity before beginning management regimes and worries that "by the time you get your institutions all in place, you may not have any forests left!" (McShane 2001).

Evidence presented here supports my contention that local level capacity must be included in the forthcoming evaluation of environmental capacity in Ethiopia. Janicke's national model does not translate perfectly to the local level, but many of its elements can be used as a basis for analysis. Of the five categories described above, all are relevant to the local level with a little adjustment. Capacity outcomes are more easily analyzed at the local level than are sources of weakness; for example, if cognitive-informational framework conditions are seen to be weak at the local level, it will be complex to accurately ascertain whether this is the result of local activities or national policies. Therefore, the analysis of local capacity in this dissertation will be seen as a nested enterprise. In chapter IV, I will begin with national and then regional capacity analysis, drawing on the Janicke model, and then discuss local concerns within that frame.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has established a theoretical foundation for the forthcoming empirical information. I began by describing three theoretical schools and the relationship

among them. Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, a prominent and vibrant scholarly stream in the political science and resource management literature, has contributed both theoretical paradigms and prolific empirical examples on the subject of common property management. Meta-analyses reveal powerful lessons in effective community organization for resource management. Ideally, communities that seek to manage their own forests will have pre-existing local organizations which can be retrofitted to take on new administrative responsibilities for the forest regime. They will have secure land tenure and will be able to protect the "common" resource from an open-access disaster by creating clear exclusion rules which are seen as both fair and enforceable. Dispute resolution mechanisms should be available and trusted. In the forthcoming chapters, I will evaluate the degree to which these conditions in Ethiopia are conducive to community forestry regime formation.

Once these preliminary conditions have been met, criteria for the resource, the users, and the institutions need to be evaluated. For the purposes of this dissertation, what is most important among these details is information about institutional design and the best role for government. Indeed, governments have a difficult line to walk between complete withdrawal and powerful domination. The provision of meaningful support is the most important objective for governments who want to encourage local forest management. The Integrated Forestry Management Program (IFMP) presented in Chapter V will be assessed based upon these criteria in Chapter VI.

Within the CPR literature, several issues remain controversial. The concepts of community and participatory exclusion generate ongoing disagreement and raise questions about inclusion and equity. As is true at virtually every scale ever studied,

power relationships within communities are defining. Community based regimes, then, easily fall victim to capture by elite groups while marginalized and undervalued segments of society find their positions reinforced instead of challenged. For the IFMP in Ethiopia, these issues are striking and will be discussed at some length in the forthcoming chapters.

Participatory Forest Management (PFM) has a great deal in common with CPR theory, but the two literatures exist in almost complete isolation from one another. Where CPR springs largely from Western academic circles, PFM comes from practitioners and managers in the developing world. Despite some jurisdiction differences, the two approaches have a great deal in common. Here I deconstructed the concept of participation not only because this is a critical element of PFM, but because it clearly links to CPR issues of equity and exclusion. Throughout this paper, I use PFM and CPR terminology interchangeably until Chapter VI where I subject the IFMP to a comprehensive analysis based primarily on the criteria laid out in the CPR literature. Describing the differences and similarities between the two fields is valuable and, indeed, essential for this project. Many of the documents and interviews featured in my analysis here use these terms, and readers of this dissertation should be alerted both to subtleties in semantic nuance and similarities in ideology.

It is surprising, given the attention paid to the role of government in CPR theory, that the policy capacity literature has not been more effectively integrated. This dissertation will work to remedy this theoretical weakness by pairing the two bodies of thought. Martin Janicke's national capacity model provides the foundation for study here. The model focuses both on outcomes and process by examining five categories: actors, strategies, systematic framework conditions, situative contexts, and the character

of the environmental problem. For each of these variables, I have here indicated early expectations for Ethiopia.

The decentralization literature adds layers of complexity to the policy capacity model. Scholars are inconclusive about decentralization's ultimate impact on policy capacity, but there seems to be at least preliminary agreement that the process of transition in itself tends to be disruptive for a state. Ethiopia only very recently began its own process of decentralization, and the country remains very much preoccupied with its development. How the process and the early outcomes of decentralization impact emerging community based resource management schemes will be explored in greater detail in Chapter IV.

Janicke's national model provides a starting point for analyzing local level environmental capacity, and I have argued here that the study of a community resource management scheme requires that multi-level capacity analysis be conducted. Indeed, widespread agreement on the ground in Ethiopia supports my contention that local level capacity is critical for ensuring the success of any community-based management regime. Local capacity is in many ways a function of national capacity, so Janicke's model will be a helpful guide to examining these nested layers of ability.

The next chapter (III) will be a step away from theory and into empirics, as I conduct a thorough overview of Ethiopia. In particular, I will describe the unique Ethiopian history and how it impacts the current Ethiopian way of life, and then place Ethiopia in the contexts of the international arena, regional politics, and national environmental problems. I will next return to the theoretical framework outlined here in

Chapter VI, when I will apply these criteria to the Integrated Forest Management Project (IFMP) as a case study of community forestry in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER III: ETHIOPIA

I. Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the least-studied African states in the canon of Western Political Science. The reasons for excluding Ethiopia are many and include decades of political instability, international economic irrelevance, and lack of a colonial history which render it difficult to use for comparative purposes. Despite or maybe due to these anomalies, Ethiopia is a unique and fascinating case study. The country merits superlative language, both positive and negative, in many dimensions. It is the only state in Sub-Saharan Africa to have successfully resisted colonization. It is, therefore, home to a proud and tribally diverse culture. It also ranks near the bottom of almost every measurement of development and wealth, meaning that Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest and most desperately needy countries.

This chapter will offer some insight into the Ethiopian experience, beginning with a portrait of life in the country based on current demographic information and indicators of potential. The picture offers scant rays of hope; the issues facing Ethiopia are politically and financially overwhelming. With over three-quarters of the population dependant on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods, transformation in the state will require massive upheaval at every level. Rural livelihoods are hampered by an insufficient road and transportation system which effectively renders millions of farmers immobile. Health and education systems are woefully inadequate, further limiting opportunity.

I then move into an analysis of the current political climate in Ethiopia, starting with a tour through recent history. Turbulent events in the 1970s and again in the 1990s have set the stage for current political issues, and will be explored here. Throughout this section, I will focus closely on land tenure and the impact of land use policy on the current political structure in Ethiopia. Additional attention will be paid in this section to the role of international action on Ethiopian development. Although Ethiopia remains marginal in international affairs overall, it is on the receiving end of vast amounts of aid; although a full analysis of the politics of aid is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the impact of Ethiopia's position in the international community does carry over into environmental politics and will be discussed accordingly.

Decentralization in Ethiopia takes the genuinely unique form of Ethnic Federalism, and this fledgling system has gained a great deal of interest in the political science literature. Combining the democratic ideals which tend to drive decentralization in developing countries with the tribal politics which have led to Ethiopia's own version has created fascinating conditions in the country. I will present critical reviews of the structure, and explore likely impacts of this system on environmental conditions and community resource management.

Environmental problems in Ethiopia are many, although accurate data is lacking in every relevant field. Rural environmental problems, more directly relevant to the case study of interest in this dissertation, will be thoroughly discussed and include deforestation, soil erosion, wildlife habitat fragmentation, and watershed integrity. Chapter IV will describe institutional and legislative tools in place in Ethiopia to deal with these many problems; here, I will outline the scope of environmental degradation as

a means of more fully fleshing out the picture of the country as a whole. I will conclude that section with an overview of Ethiopia's participation in international environmental politics.

Throughout this chapter, formal politics in Ethiopia is seen to differ vastly from informal politics; that is, what researchers see on paper and in government documents bears little resemblance to what actually happens in the country. Before I close this chapter, I will review the scope of this gap and discuss, again, implications for the forthcoming case study. As a whole, this chapter is designed to leave the reader with a full picture of Ethiopia as a state in East Africa and in the world. Chapter IV will delve more deeply into environmental politics in the state and explore capacity in particular.

II. A Portrait of Ethiopian Life

A. National Demographics

Ethiopia is the third most populous country in Africa, with 54.9 million people and a growth rate that hovers at nearly 3% per annum (CountryWatch 2000). Birth rates remain high, and life expectancy is only 46; these demographics have created a population in which nearly half of the citizens are 14 years old and younger. With over 85% of the population rural, and over 75% of the population dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, Ethiopians are overwhelmingly engaged in small subsistence farming. Exports are few, and coffee accounts for more than half of the total export earnings, followed by grains and livestock products. The industrial sector is miniscule, and off-farm rural job opportunities practically non-existent. Given the extreme dependence on agricultural production, it is alarming to note that only 13% of the land is even arable,

and of that a mere 1% is irrigated. Despite sophisticated and complex farming strategies developed over the centuries, farmers remain quite vulnerable to seasonal changes and climate variability (Dercon 2000, Tekle 1999, Shiferaw 1999). Per capita income is US$468 (Country Watch 2000); with purchasing power parity, the per capita income is US$600. Analysts note mixed signals for future growth: Ethiopia's fiscal deficit increased from 6.9% in 1999 to 10% in 2000, but GDP grew by 6.3% during the same period (World Bank 2000). Development progress remains erratic. Of 114 countries analyzed, Ethiopia ranked 107th in a Development Policy Index (Englebert 2000). Poverty is a fact of life for the vast majority of Ethiopians.

B. Farming & Rural Life

Given the rural character of Ethiopian society, it is critical for researchers to understand the constraints and, indeed, opportunities, these circumstances place on potential development and change. The smallholder sector in Ethiopia provides 90% of crop and 98% of livestock outputs (Shiferaw 1999); large commercial farms are the exception. Smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia is characterized by low technology, small or fragmented plot sizes, and significant soil and water erosion on the land. Many researchers, however, argue that smallholders are uniquely motivated to care for their own plot, utilize a rich tradition of indigenous knowledge for cropping and diversification, and have developed a complex system of survival strategies (Pausewang 1990). Despite these mechanisms, the lack of social support systems is a backdrop for all other events in Ethiopia. Dercon (1999) emphasizes this as a defining factor in the lives of rural farmers, noting that even food aid and other governmental systems of support

have "relatively small marginal effect on these vulnerable households," (47). Transportation, education and health care are useful sectors to the extent to which rural Ethiopians have access to modern services and products.

1. Transportation & Mobility

By all accounts, rural Ethiopia is highly dispersed and remote. Ethiopia has one of the lowest road densities per capita in the entire African continent, and even those roads which are counted as part of the network remain notoriously unpaved and unmaintained. The implications of this weak transportation infrastructure are many. First, with approximately 75% of farms more than a half a day's walk to the nearest all-weather road (Zegahegn 1999), mobility is practically non-existent. Of the farmers this author interviewed in 2000 and 2001, the overwhelming majority had never visited Addis Ababa and most had never been out of the immediate region. Second, not only are villagers themselves immobilized, but those who might desire to extend social or governmental services to remote areas find the task intensely challenging.

Ethnic Federalism (discussed in greater detail below in section *V*), in which Ethiopian citizens live in only the region associated with their ethnicity, is also blamed for contributing to a limited mobility. Many argue that mobility of people, goods and ideas is foundational for effective development: "For capitalism to succeed resources must be mobile. There must be free and unfettered movement of people, goods and ideas among and within regions," (Getahun 1999: 79). While the federal system does not explicitly forbid Ethiopians from moving to a different region, in practice there is a strong sense that "outsiders" have a deleterious effect on the environment and scarce resources. Many

have stories of recent arrivals thrown out unceremoniously by locals with a long history in the area. Indeed, ethnicity is often defined in terms of longevity of residence (Amera 2001).

This state of affairs serves primarily to reinforce the subsistence agriculture base of the Ethiopian economy, and underlines the degree to which farmers are at the mercy of weather conditions and terrain. Seasonality plays an important role in this sense, and "the fact that household consumption is sensitive to [seasonal] shocks means that a much larger number of households are actually vulnerable to poverty than typically recorded," (Dercon 2000: 46). Were Ethiopians more mobile, as some insist they were before Ethnic Federalism was instituted, seasonal unemployment might be again combated by temporary migrations.

2. Education

Consistent with this picture of a remote and disconnected Ethiopian citizenry, the system of education in the country is both a cause and an outcome of the dispersed residential rural character. The government clearly recognizes the importance of providing educational opportunities for its citizenry, and public expenditures on education have continuously grown since 1991; as of 1995/1996, 13.3% of overall government expenditures went to education (Zewdie 2001: 496). Despite this commitment, the results are discouraging. Administration of education is beset with inefficiencies. Zewdie's (2001) research lists both internal and external problems, including high unit costs, under-utilization of facilities, high dropout rates, a shortage of

equipment at all levels, and the failure of higher education to prepare students for participation in the labor market.

Overall, less than 30% of Ethiopian children are currently enrolled in primary school; this number, however, doesn't tell the whole story, since urban areas offer far more extensive educational opportunities for all ages. The rural/urban inequality is highlighted by the fact that full primary and secondary school facilities are only available to an estimated 33% of the population (Zegahegn 1999). Addis Ababa, for example, boasts 80% primary school enrollment, and a nearly even male/female ratio. By contrast, rural Afar region has only 8.4% enrolled, and a three point differential between male and female participation (Zewdie 2001). Local level differences also exist. In Dodola, for example, Abdurrahiman Kubsa estimates that a mere 5% of local villagers are literate (2001). Schools and teachers exist in the region, but there is a chronic shortage of instructional materials. Most children, says Kubsa, attend school between the ages of seven and twelve.

Language differences continue to divide the country and contribute to the difficulty in establishing a more consistent system of education. English is taught at all secondary schools, but although Amharic is formally considered the national language, most primary schools now teach in the local language (such as Oromifa or Tigrigna). Ethnic federalism is seen as contributing to the strengthening of local language instruction at the direct expense of national language cohesion; many support this set of priorities. Earlier policies of teaching only Amharic in primary schools followed by English-only instruction were condemned as "using language as a tool of national integration," (Abraham 1994: 223). Kubsa argues that the Amharic language harmed the Oromo

people politically through the devaluation of the tribal tongue. Dodola schools are now taught in Oromifa, a choice which enjoys wide support. Students begin learning English in the 3rd grade, and Amharic in the 5th grade. No secondary school exists in Dodola, and this is typical.

Analysis of the education system and its implementation failures is consistent with development observations in other sectors. Mulugeta Abebe (2001) notes that fundamental communication deficiencies between policy-making centers and the location of intended implementation "cause conflict," (515). He advises a more decentralized structure in which democratic norms guide policymaking, and a policy unit that remains separate from political turbulence is established.

3. Health Care

Even compared with other poor nations, Ethiopia's lack of effective health care services is striking. A 1999 UNDP survey reports that only 55% of Ethiopians have access to health services, 25% have access to fresh water, 19% have access to sanitation. Per capita daily caloric intake is estimated to be 1,845; the minimum requirement for basic health is generally considered to be 2,100 for a relatively sedentary individual (Getahun 1999). As recently as 1997, fully 48% of children under five years of age suffered from malnutrition in Ethiopia. The health ramifications of such widespread malnutrition are many; for example, 1% of the population is blind and this high rate can be attributed at least in part to a lack of vitamin A in the diet of the average Ethiopian (Getahun 1999).

Consistent with the rural/urban disparity seen in education, most villages do not have a clinic, although many have been the recipients of immunization outreach efforts. When villagers were approached by the GTZ team and asked for some feedback on their most pressing needs, a medical clinic topped the list with regularity. The number of hospital beds overall has actually been declining, from 12,106 in 1990 to 11,371 in 1998 (Moen 2001), at the same time as population has exploded and health care needs for a skyrocketing HIV/AIDS population place intense pressure on services. Forty percent (40%) of hospital beds at any given time are occupied by AIDS patients (Moen 2001).

AIDS is on the rise. While there is no disagreement that this is a truism in Ethiopia, the statistics vary considerably, ranging from an estimated 200,000 HIV-positive Ethiopians up to 6,000,000 (Getahun 1999, Zegahegn 1999, Vogel 2001). Methods for measuring prevalence vary widely, as do definitions of HIV infection. One interesting study conducted in 2000 on visa applicants in Addis Ababa found that 10.45% of men and 11% of women were affected with HIV (Tegbaru, et.al. 2001). Outcomes of a growing AIDS epidemic are well known from international experience. They include an increased number of orphans and a health care system under so much pressure that it cannot respond to even basic health needs.

Tuburculosis, malaria, diarrheal diseases and sexually transmitted diseases are also widespread. Laboratories available for testing of these common ailments are insufficient; those that do exist are chronically understaffed and lacking in equipment and supplies. Indeed, the lack of basic facilities directly contributes to low life expectancy, high child mortality and other quality of life indicators. As one expert summarizes, "adequate lab

services at the health centers would have reduced mortality and morbidity to a great extent," (Kassu 2001: 455).

Most agree that health care is both central to effective development and in Ethiopia is desperately in need of fundamental structural change. Ahmed Moen puts it this way: "I am concerned that unless we, as health professionals and educators, recognize and accept that balanced development will require shifting the paradigm from central, public and urban based health care system to delivering manageable health care where people live and work we will live in a vicious circle of underdevelopment," (417).

III. National Politics

A. Political History

Ethiopia proudly declares itself the only African country that was never formally colonized. Apart from a 5-year Italian occupation (1936-1941), European influence has indeed been minimal in the state. However, this exceptional status seems to have been of only mild consequence in sparing Ethiopia from sharing the chronic political problems suffered by most post-Colonial African states: persistent governmental instability, tribal conflict which undermines even well-crafted policy, pervasive corruption at all levels of government, and stagnant growth which maintains crippling poverty. However, Ethiopia, while struggling mightily with a fledgling democracy, weak policy capacity, staggering poverty and erratic development, remains exceptional in a continent beset by states suffering from similar challenges. The lack of a colonial influence has left Ethiopian culture, and the sub-cultures of its many ethnic and tribal groups, nearly intact. National and sub-national pride is strong and defining. Successes and failures in development

efforts are rooted in a uniquely Ethiopian approach to state building. For better or worse, "Ethiopia is the only state in sub-Saharan Africa where state formation has truly been continuously endogenous," (Englebert 2000: 80).

While there has been much interest and research into the ancient roots of Ethiopia's society, most agree that the modern state as we know it today began in the mid-20th century (Mengisteab 1997). Haile Selassie was the last emperor from a dynastic lineage claiming ancestry back to Biblical Solomon, and he ruled Ethiopia as an absolute monarch for 44 years. In 1974, the military overthrew Selassie, murdered 59 members of the royal family and government, and ultimately killed Selassie himself. They then established a Marxist state known as "The Derg" with Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam as its leader. The subsequent years spent in socialism / communism were marked by substantial Russian support at the international level, massive land reform at the domestic level, and widespread massacre of perceived opponents. The "red terror" of 1977-78 led to thousands of killings of mostly students and urban professionals, who were seen as threats to the regime. Internal unrest was high and conflict with neighboring Somalia boiled over. Mengistu's government routed up to 50% of its total expenditures to the expanding military, heavily supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba (Mengisteab 1999).

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the military government in May, 1991 and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), which ruled from 1991-1995. During this time, the TGE drafted a constitution reflecting democratic ideals and began to institute policies stressing openness, including freedom of political organization, liberalization of the media, and the

establishment of a legislature required to reserve 20 of its 550 seats for ethnic minorities. By all accounts, many of these steps have resulted in profound change in Ethiopia, and as of 1996, there were 63 registered political parties and countless newspapers and magazines, although it is important to note that these are still operating with varying degrees of government interference. Perhaps most significantly, ongoing tensions with the successionist Eritrean nation were settled with a relatively peaceful, albeit ultimately contentious, separation into two states. However, despite the veneer of emerging democracy, most scholars agree that the transitional government failed to put many critical democratic ideals into practice, kept a tight grip on power, and committed a series of blatant human rights abuses. See section *VI* below for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

In August 1995, the state was officially renamed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), and open elections were held. While it is true that Ethiopia is moving forward with at least this hallmark of democratization, election observers report a system in which only the ruling party stands a chance of election. The most recent elections occurred in May 2000, and, to nobody's surprise, the ruling EPRDF party was re-elected. Despite some outward appearances of democracy, Ethiopia continues to exhibit a troubling pattern of corruption and unwillingness to risk true openness. See section *VI* below for more information on the flawed recent elections.

B. Land Reform

Throughout many parts of Africa, except possibly the Western portion of the continent, forest management policy structures are increasingly decentralized (Wily

2000). Ethiopia is no exception, but the trend is such a recent one that state-level institutions remain ill-equipped to implement the very ideals found within its current legal and policy documents. Thus, the dance between nearly universal norms of local control and the reality of national-level planning is a complicated one, with roots in Ethiopia's unstable political history. While certainly early history in Ethiopia contributed to later developments, the last quarter of the 20th century marks the beginning of the modern era of land management and for my purposes here, I will begin my analysis with the 1975 Land Reform. Three features associated with the land reform undertaken by The Derg government have been especially defining for later developments: the nationalization of land, resettlement and villagization schemes, and Food-For-Work (FFW) conservation programs.

1. Nationalization of Land

The nationalization of land, in part an immediate response to the devastating 1973 famine in Wello (Shiferaw 1999) was intended (1) to free peasants from their bondage to often cruel landlords and (2) to allow every able Ethiopian to farm a smaller plot of land, thereby increasing food security and yield. The program had immediate effects on both ecological systems and human behavior. Admassie (2000) argues that land tenure regimes must be conceptualized as rule regimes that fundamentally structure individual and group motivation. The shift in land rights away from a semi-private system with reliable usufruct rights meant more than simply an end to titling needs; rather, the state seizure of land had implications for the flow of benefits from the land, the role of

peasants in the state economy, and the ability of peasants to plan for their own needs based on predictions of resource security in the future.

CPR theory suggests contradictory impacts of land nationalization for CPR regime formation. On one hand, nationalizing land creates opportunities for management of now-common resources. When land is held privately, adjacent land owners rarely have incentives to cooperate on the management of their property and degradation might (or might not) occur more rapidly. Once land has been converted to the public realm, however, adjacent users of the resource will find powerful incentives to cooperate and set up rules for management. On the other hand, the process of nationalizing land led to a much weaker sense of land tenure security for farmers, difficulty in establishing exclusionary use rights, and a perverse incentive structure which actually encourages users to exploit resources without paying costs. Thus, the premises of CPR theory seem somewhat strange, since so-called "necessary pre-conditions" for effective community regime formation seem mutually exclusive, at least in the case of Ethiopia.

2. Land Reform

The 1975 Land Reform was committed both to preventing another famine and to making more land accessible to the many landless. Reform began with the institution of a large-scale villagization and resettlement scheme in an effort to unify remote rural areas and bring farmers together for better social and economic infrastructure. Additionally, soil loss and overgrazing were seen as critical problems. Resettlement schemes were designed to move farmers away from the most highly degraded areas. Highly dispersed and rural populations are also a drain on state-building, and the creation of villages is thus

a common development move throughout the world. The program was incredibly expensive for the impoverished government, and early trials with it were considered an overall failure; however, following the next famine in the early 1980s, the program was revived, and by the mid-1980s fully 12% of the rural population (4.6 million people) were re-housed in 4500 newly created villages (Brune 1990). Resettlement itself led to massive disease and death, and the outcry against it eventually resulted in a cessation of further plans in 1986.

The lasting impact of these measures, however, can still be felt in rural Ethiopia, as mistrust for government officials is epidemic, and the sense of land tenure security has been deeply shaken. While land redistribution is frequently touted as a positive step toward much-needed reform in 3rd world countries with large income inequality, Admassie (2000) suggests that the literature has yet to fully explore the ramifications of the insecurities that result. Equitable access, then, is only part of the issue; more important, perhaps, is security of holding, for one truism shines through much of the research in this area: when people do not know for certain that their land will still belong to them in the long-term future, their motivation and incentives for commencing conservation projects declines (Admassie 2000, Pausewang 1995, Agrawal 1999). In other words, unless there are immediate and short-term gains to be had, any farmer will be unwilling to institute conservation initiatives; when s/he is uncertain with regard to future land rights, the odds of voluntary participation are even worse (Shiferaw 1999).

3. Food for Work

The third piece of land reform in Ethiopia was a massive conservation program called Food For Work (FFW) instituted in cooperation with the United Nations World Food Program, crafted in the mid-1970s and put into place in the early 1980s. Recognition of food insecurity, the threat of famine, and widespread soil loss were instigating factors for the development of the policy, which was based on two key strategies: the construction of on-farm soil conservation measures, and afforestation. Peasants were required by Ministry of Agriculture personnel, working through local Peasant Associations, to work in exchange for food benefits. However, neither the opportunities nor the benefits were equitably distributed (Wood 1990, Admassie 2000), and compliance with the goals of the program quickly became a key challenge for its progress. Estimates suggest that 10% of the productive highland areas were treated with the construction of soil bunds to mitigate soil loss and afforestation (Shiferaw 1999). The ultimate failure of the program can be attributed to many complex factors; most notable for my purposes here include the lack of extension services available for remote rural areas, an entirely top-down planning process, lack of any short-term resource benefits, and insufficient trained field staff to educate and monitor farmers. From an ecological standpoint, the program lacked scientific rigor and wasn't well integrated with the overall land use system. For example, while soil bunds do succeed in reducing soil erosion, they also compete for productive land space; some research suggests that the practice has a net negative effect on yields (Shiferaw 1999). Rural farmers almost unanimously viewed the conservation measures as imposed by the government (Admassie 2000) and resisted any sense of ownership for the goals of the program (Wood 1990). One forestry researcher in

Addis who lived through land reforms in the 1970s, put it this way: "First of all, the people labored, . . . provided their land, be it grazing or agriculture land, and at the same time lost their commitment to the government. . . and that is why community forest development, although by name, I can say that it is a fiction." (Deribe 2001). Faith in government officials was further weakened by these efforts, interest in conservation failed to appear, and noncompliance was rampant (Admassie 2000, Shiferaw 1999).

It is safe to conclude that the three prongs of the 1975 Land Reform package all failed. Preliminary lessons from these expensive and ultimately wasteful programs are consistent. First, top-down land use policies tend to disenfranchise community members, engender distrust toward the government, fail to spark an interest in self-determination, and even encourage noncompliance. Second, for conservation measures to be effective, participants need to understand why they are being asked to behave in certain ways. For a highly uneducated and illiterate population, this requires extensive technical and extension services. Third, immediate benefits must at minimum match immediate costs, and ideally exceed them. No farmer on the edge of subsistence will feel good about donating time and work to an effort he doesn't understand and which doesn't benefit him. Thus, some timeless lessons seem to be reinforced here and will be more systematically tested in my research: successful programs are characterized by bottom-up planning, government support in the form of extension and technical education, a focus on equitable availability and distribution of benefits, and a positive incentive system for participation. CPR and PFM theories include strong provisions for each of these lessons. The Integrated Forest Management Project presented in Chapter V illustrates how these ideals can be put into action.

C. Political Structure in Ethiopia

Ethnic federalism, the structure of the Ethiopian administration as established by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), is remarkable. Eleven "nations", demarcated largely along ethnic lines, each enjoy a measure of autonomy from the central state. Each nation is represented in a Federal Council by one member, plus an additional member for each million people it contains. The Council then manages ethnic and regional relations, leaving other national-level affairs to the national legislature, the Council of People's Representatives. The system is parliamentary, with both a Prime Minister, currently Meles Zenawi, and a President, currently Girma Woldegiorgis. Federal states are comprised of regions, which are in turn usually made up of zones (but not always; regions have the administrative power to designate zones as an intermediate layer before weredas, and most have done so), which then break down into weredas, which are smaller territorial areas. Within each wereda, a Peasant Association (PA) or kebele provides local level representation (see Figure 3.1) The system is undeniably tricky and administering such a complex system doesn't come cheap (Brosio 2000).



Regions are empowered to tax their residents, but given the disparity in productive tax base among the regions, most ultimately rely on federal funding for the majority of their revenue. Regions rely upon the federal government for an average of 62% of their funding (Egziabher, 1997); autonomy is, of course, compromised when a sub-state unit depends so much on the state for its funding. The result is what Brosio calls "a huge vertical fiscal imbalance," (2000). Transparency might alleviate some of the dependency, but until 1995, the transfer of funds from the center to regions was left entirely to the discretion of government officials. In 1995, a formula was finally introduced, but that formula has since changed every year since, leaving regions powerless to anticipate or understand their funding flow (Brosio 2000).

Likewise, the concept of decentralized power is so new to Ethiopians that most government officials remain unclear about the extent to which a sub-state unit can or should make legislative decisions (Mengesha, 2001). Kurt Rockman with USAID put it this way, "The Ethiopian government is very much ingrained with a top-down directive. They are really used to hierarchies," (2001). Decentralization has not been combined with support from the federal level, leaving many regions with a new set of responsibilities and inadequate capacity to perform them.

Furthermore, regions vary a great deal in terms of human capital, and in this sense decentralization has served primarily to reinforce inequities between areas within Ethiopia (Egziabher, 1997; Mengisteab, 1997). The system of ethnic federalism, then, works to varying degrees, depending in large part on the existing strengths within a given region. For example, the Amhara region, due to years of favoritism in government, is now what one diplomat calls "very capable". In this case, then, the federal system works.

Amhara is able to manage its own region and retain some measure of autonomy from the central state, ruled by the Tigrayans. Other regions, however, are markedly different and continue to rely on the input of the TPLF. Thus, the TPLF, the powerful core of the EPRDF, is able to extend its power in virtually every corner where space exists.

Ethiopia seems to have achieved structural decentralization, but devolution of power beyond the regional level is not yet evident (Haase, 2001; Mengesha, 2001, Chanie 2001). Many feel that further devolution to the grassroots level not only lacks feasibility, but may in fact be undesirable due to the weak capacity of farmers in a policy-making setting (Bekele, 2001, Mengesha, 2001). Legislation at the local level within a regionally administered policy environment is more likely.

D. Ethiopia in the International Arena: Development & Aid

From an international perspective, Ethiopia has been visible mostly in terms of its desperate poverty, recurring famine, and need for aid in virtually every development sector. Imagines of starving Ethiopians blanketed the airwaves in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and for many Westerners this remains their primary impression of the state. Food aid and humanitarian assistance organizations flocked to Ethiopia, and many set up permanent offices there. Most of these groups eventually realized that famine was not the direct result of climactic changes, but instead was quite simply a "war crime" (deWaal 1997: 117). Indeed, many organizations which sought to affect change during that time found themselves quite literally outgunned by the complexity of the Ethiopian government's internal politics, resettlement programs, grain price manipulation, and lack of transparency in policy-making (deWaal 1997).

In the years that followed, groups refocused their Ethiopian mission on more general development assistance. Given the importance of food security and agriculture to basic subsistence in Ethiopia, most of the aid organizations have focused at least some of their attention on natural resource issues, including forestry.

The arguments for combining relief with development aid are persuasive. Capacities for effectively dealing with disasters such as famine remain weak in Ethiopia; naturally, strategies for improving response abilities will include both the provision of aid and an investment in general development. The UNDP's Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia explains that "the sharp division between development and relief has become unsustainable, as the experience of living with high risk becomes ever more central to poor people themselves," (UNDP 1996: 9).

Many international (both bilateral and NGO) aid groups remain quite visible and important in Ethiopia. Those whose focus also includes attention to natural resource issues and land management include the prominent Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), several organizations under the United Nations umbrella, and, most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, Germany's *Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ). All of these organizations agree that reducing vulnerability to drought and other inevitable variations will improve Ethiopia's overall condition. Agro-forestry as a tool for integrating forest management with subsistent lifestyles is a strategy for many.

Bilateral support remains critical for the daily functioning of Ethiopia's government services. During Mengistu's reign, the state was heavily funded and backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Remnants of communism's influence are ubiquitous, not only in

political ideology and legislation, but also in the layout of Addis Ababa with its enormous central Meskal Square, used at one time for mass displays of military might and nationalist rallies. Now, Ethiopia receives "significant" bilateral assistance from Germany, Sweden, the European Union, Italy and the United States. The United Nations is heavily involved, especially in the education sector, and a great number of NGOs keep an active presence in the country. Until border conflict with Eritrea erupted into full-scale war again in 1998, Ethiopia was the International Development Association's largest beneficiary in Africa (WorldBank 2001: 2). Most lending institutions have now re-placed Ethiopia on their recipient list, and projects to assist the country target education, health care, infrastructure development, energy, agroforestry, and capacity building. Without question, Ethiopia is still overwhelmingly a recipient of aid, a 'cause' in need of international support.

IV. Decentralization & Ethnic Federalism: An Analysis

While decentralization and federalism are both common and consistent with trends in the international community, a federal system based entirely on ethnicity is unprecedented in the modern political world. The intricate system of decentralization has had a mixed review thus far, seemingly creating as many problems as it solves (Mengisteab 1999, Yeraswork 1995). Passionate opinions on the matter are vivid. Has decentralizing legislation led to any actual change in way politics happens in Ethiopia? Will the system will foster peace and stability, or will ethnic divisions be fortified? What is the impact of ethnic federalism on nationalism and identity?

Many policy and forestry experts in Ethiopia, a remarkable number of whom specifically asked not to be quoted on this issue, insist that the decentralization structure is only significant on paper. They said that in practice, decentralization has served primarily to lengthen the chain of command from the top, but has not succeeded in opening the political space for bottom-up decision – making. To the contrary, the new structure may have increased the opportunity for nepotism and corruption at the local level, strengthened the hold of the current ruling party, and thereby reinforced existing power relationships at all levels. The failure of decentralization to achieve genuine grass-roots participation is attributable to both the policy structure from above, and the psychological reality from below.

Supporters of the system argue that only this style of honoring tribal identities has kept Ethiopia from full-scale civil war. They acknowledge implementation difficulties but insist that "the present formula of ethnic federalism represents the first serious attempt by a government in power to address the complex problem of nationalities squarely and realistically," (Abraham 1994: 29). Abraham goes on to argue that the only alternatives to ethnic federalism are "autocratic coercion or forced subjugation," (29). Amanuel Gebru notes that "in the past, the attempt was to emphasize the ideal of Ethiopianness at the expense of ethnic identity which led to costly conflicts for nearly two decades," (2001: 48). The alternative, it seems, is one in which Ethiopians are encouraged to identify themselves first by their tribal ancestry, speaking their native tongue, and living among their own.

Skeptics insist that the system is having a dangerous result for Ethiopia's state building prospects: citizens identify themselves primarily as Tigrayans or Amharas and

not as Ethiopians, and these strong sub-national affiliations actually weaken state-building prospects. Some even assert that Ethnic Federalism is nothing more than a ruse by the ruling TPLF to maintain control by using the politics of "divide and rule" (Getahun 2001: 77). In this rendition, ethnic regionalism is blamed for pervasive poverty in Ethiopia and the apparent inability of the country to develop in a consistent and integrated fashion. Opponents do not mince words: ethnic federalism "is becoming a new word for apartheid and Ethiopia should not be used as a breeding ground for this extremely dangerous scheme," (Getahun 2001: 78).

Everybody seems to agree that the lines between ethnic groups remain strong and defining; there is also a wide body of evidence to support the claim that certain groups consistently boast greater wealth and political power. The link between these two truisms is harder to ascertain. Those who see a clear cause-and-effect relationship argue, for example, that "these days, ethnic background and political affiliation, not ability, play a key role in recruiting manpower and promotion in the government jobs. . . the official policy of ethnic bias prompts leaders to allocate disproportionate amount of resources to favored regions while denying others [SIC]," (Zegahegn 1999). Others look at the system and conclude that "it is not real federalism,"; when pressed, this usually accessible informant who said this refused to discuss the matter further, suggesting a pervasive context of fear of speaking openly about this issue.

The impact of political decentralization in Ethiopia merits additional research, but there is a growing body of literature on this general trend in Africa with similar early conclusions. Challenges for meaningful decentralization include an inadequate tax base and weak local capacity for carrying out additional responsibilities. In practice, then,

decentralization commonly amounts to nothing more than the addition of another administrative layer (Campbell, et.al., 2001). Despite this rather discouraging conclusion, it is important to remember that the preliminary analysis may well reflect a current snapshot in time, but not capture the trajectory of progress effectively. Chapter IV offers a more concrete application of decentralization to forest policy and will clearly show that at least in the environmental sector decentralization has failed to ensure local level participation or control.

V. Environmental Problems in Ethiopia

A. National Environmental Issues

National level environmental problems are many and range from wildlife protection to basic provision of environmental health. Certainly those needs which directly and measurably influence the government's commitment to poverty reduction are higher on the priority list, and concerns which reflect broader ecosystem values and environmental integrity rank lower. Among the most pressing problems in Ethiopia are erosion and soil loss, overgrazing, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, water quality degradation, and urban trash disposal (FDRE 2002: 122). The Ethiopian government is well aware of the inextricable nature of the environment and development, and especially the effect of resource-dependent citizens on overall sustainability. The recent Sustainable Development report sums up the intermixing of these issues nicely:

> "Demands on natural resources often deplete those resources, and, especially when not managed well, disturb the local ecosystems, causing general land degradation. During their extraction, local transportation, processing for value addition and exportation to other countries, additional environmental degradation, and in particular pollution, occurs to varying degrees. People, in their attempt to survive, are forced to disregard the

> long-term well being of the environment and thus degrade it further. Environmental degradation and poverty are thus interactive leading into a spiral of environmental and human calamity," (FDRE 2002: 121).

This dissertation devotes a great deal of attention to the deforestation issue in Ethiopia and current limitations for potential solutions. However, for the sake of contextual perspective, it is helpful to examine Ethiopia's other environmental woes and the state's participation in environmental politics overall. I will organize this section into three units: Ethiopia's participation in regional (i.e. East Africa) environmental issues, urban environmental issues within the country, and rural land use issues.

B. Regional Environmental Issues

Within the East Africa region, Ethiopia is critically involved in a number of environmental issues. While Nairobi, Kenya continues to function as the de facto hub for many environmental groups who share an interest in the issues of the region, Addis Ababa is also an international city. For example, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) keeps large sprawling office compounds in both cities, each one housing and providing office space for hundreds of international researchers working on diverse Natural Resource problems in the region. Larry Andre, the U.S. State Department's Regional Environmental Officer for East Africa, is based in Addis. He is charged with conducting "observe & report" activities for the Embassy, with a jurisdiction covering 14 countries in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. Most of his time is spent on water allocation from the Nile River and, interestingly, HIV/AIDS (Andre 2000). Andre's

assistant, Moges Worku, reported a broader work agenda including desertification and land degradation in general, coastal area management, and biodiversity (Worku 2001).

Worku was careful to point out that many of the environmental issues at this regional international level are also, and fundamentally, security issues, and this is an underlying theme that runs throughout Ethiopia's position in the regional international community. Surrounded by unfriendly and unstable neighbors including Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, Ethiopia's government has consistently devoted substantial resources to security and military readiness. From 1999-2000, Ethiopia spent 13.2% of GDP on defense, as compared with only 4.5% earmarked for "poverty targeted expenditure" including education, health care agriculture and roads. Current and future budgets seek to remedy this gap, by shrinking military spending to 5.4-6.7%, while simultaneously (albeit not dramatically) increasing poverty spending to 5.2-6.7% (FDRE 2002: 199). Given the history of national insecurity, international environmental concerns become critical only and especially when they threaten security.

C. Rural Land Use: Deforestation and Grazing

Until recently, Ethiopia was considered "under-urbanized, even by African standards" (lcweb urbanization: 1). In the late 1980s, only about 11% of Ethiopians lived in areas with concentrated populations of at least 2,000 residents. By the late 1990s, the numbers were clearly changing although accurate data is difficult to find. Since the population is still overwhelmingly rural by any measure, I focus on rural environmental problems here.

One hundred years ago, estimates suggest that 40% of Ethiopia's land mass was forested (ForestWorld 2000:1). By the time Selassie's regime came to an end, which is

when data becomes available, about half of the land was claimed as private and the rest was held by the government. Deforestation was a visible problem, and the government retained strict control over harvesting. This practice backfired in a forest-dependent country, and by all accounts it contributed to widespread illegal logging (lcweb – Ethiopia forestry section 1). As forests began to be depleted, reforestation activities were undertaken, many in concert with Food for Work initiatives in the 1980s, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection and Development (MoAEPD). Millions of seedlings were planted. Officially, Peasant Associations were in charge of the reforestation effort; however, NGOs stepped in to improve local capacity and assist in the project. Despite the massive effort, results were disappointing. Only 5-20% of the seedlings survived (lcweb forestry section: 1), largely due to improper care after planting. At the same time, villagers continued to harvest trees from the natural forest with alarming speed. Analysts conclude that the rush to secure timber was a result of the faltering of the Derg regime and perceived urgency to obtain wood. This period was so drastically mismanaged by the government that some have concluded that "there is good reason to assume that the natural forest could have been spared altogether had it not been taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection and Development," (Admassie 2000: 73).

Current estimates suggest only 2% remains covered (ForestWorld 2000: 1). Of these remaining forest lands, 99% are natural forest, meaning that only 1% represent plantation forest cover. 71% of existing forest is categorized as "tropical"; the remainder is listed as "sparsely forested", suggesting mixed land use (ForestLand 2000: 1). Only 2.5% of the

remaining forest is officially protected, and this designation means little in terms of enforcement.

Livestock is another critical use of land in Ethiopia's rural areas. In 1988, data suggests that Ethiopia held 78.4 million animals (lcweb Ethiopia livestock: 1): cattle, sheep, goats, horses, camels, poultry. These animals are used for draft power, food, trade, transportation and, critically, social standing. As with forestland, livestock are concentrated in the highlands, and nearly all are range-fed. Farmers rotate their herds based on seasonality, usually keeping their animals in one place during the rainy season, and moving them for the dry months. Again, forests are directly implicated in this practice, as millions of animals rely on a healthy vegetation supply for survival. Some parts of the country are still settled by pastoralists who move based almost entirely on the availability of forage for their herds. Dodola, the site of the case study in this dissertation, is not pastoral but the impact of livestock is enormous as will be discussed in Chapter V.

E. International Treaty Participation

Ethiopia joined the United Nations in 1945, and has remained at least a superficial participant in much international policymaking. In the environmental arena, Ethiopia is party to several international environmental agreements. See table 3.1 for a partial list of these agreements. What is most notable about the list is the date of ratification which follows each treaty. Most of these dates are years, even decades, later than when the treaty was initially negotiated, and the vast majority were ratified only by the post-1991 revolution regime. It would seem that Ethiopia has only recently begun to take an interest in international environmental agreements and taken steps to participate.

Name of Treaty	Date of Ratification
Convention on Biological Diversity	1994
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety	2000
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage	1977
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora	1989
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification	1997
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea	signed but not yet ratified
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change	1994
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer	1994
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	1994
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal	2000
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water	signed but not yet ratified

Table 3.1

However, despite Ethiopia's formal participation in these many international environmental agreements, very few have been implemented in any meaningful way. This lack of translation is primarily an outcome of poor institutional development and lack of capacity. In some cases, such as the Biodiversity Convention, Ethiopia has followed up with the development of a national action plan, which includes forestry projects. However, since the implementation of any measures beyond centralized planning involves the participation of multiple levels of government in a newly decentralized structure, few if any international initiatives have translated into on-the-

ground changes without international guidance and financial support. Without funding from international aid and development organizations, Ethiopia lacks even the most basic resources to implement its obligations as per international agreements. The World Bank has provided assistance for some of these projects, including the creation of the Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan in conjunction with the mandates of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (Hailu 2001).

Indeed, while the government officially works toward being free of dire need for international aid, many natural resource managers within Ethiopia see the presence of biodiversity in their country as both a lure to attract international support for preservation, and a source of obligation for them to do so. Ato Tibebe, the Head of the Forestry and Wildlife Conservation Department of the Oromia regional Bureau of Agriculture, noted that "the outside world I think will have an interest in this conservation because there are a lot of even unidentified species which are the concern of research. If we lost them, we are not the only ones who lose them. The world will also lose. So we expect that in the outside world, those who are interested in this area might join us in the conservation," (Tibebe 2001).

Ethiopia has also been recognized as the host of a World Heritage site: Simien National Park. The park, added to the list in 1978 for its unusual ecological features as well as its rare wildlife species (i.e. Gelada baboon, Simien fox, and Walia ibex), was subsequently placed on the World Heritage List of Danger. Population growth, road construction, and decreasing wildlife numbers were listed as the primary matters of concern for that list (UNESCO 2000).

Despite this apparent involvement at the international scale, there is little indication that any of these activities have impacted environmental regulations or conditions in the country. Likewise, while participation in international agreements has fostered the creation of sound legal and political structures for managing environmental concerns in many parts of the world, Ethiopia is like much of the developing world in which the sheer magnitude of obstacles conspire to prevent the translation of international norms into national practice.

VI. Formal & Informal Politics in Ethiopia

On paper, Ethiopia is a democracy, bound by rule of law, actively pursuing principles of good governance, and striving to reduce corruption in its many forms. Fundamental tenets of freedom, including freedom of association and freedom of the press, are championed throughout Ethiopia's recent legislation. Local level governance is critical for development strategies, and grassroots participation is encouraged at both the macro and micro scales.

In practice, however, Ethiopia remains an oppressive state, offering few opportunities for its citizens, regularly flaunting democratic ideals and operating in a political system which is rife with corruption. In the spring of 2001, riots broke out in Addis Ababa when students at the University protested what they saw as unfair education policies. Ethiopian police came out in force, arrested hundreds of students and non-students, and embarked on a campaign of rounding up any suspicious-looking individuals. One Western diplomat and longtime Addis resident, speaking on condition of anonymity, condemned this behavior: "They have been violating their own laws like a police state" (2001),

arresting people at home without a warrant, detaining political opponents with the claim that they were involved in recent riots and failing to obey laws requiring a judge to hear preliminary charges within 48 hours of any arrest. The University was shut down for months, and fear of the police rekindled throughout the city. This recent incident serves to remind Ethiopians that the police are a powerful and unaccountable force in the country, and "it is quite common to witness the police force playing a political role and not civil protection in some troubling political cases," (Zegahegn 1999: 3).

Ethiopia's constitution guarantees governmental respect for freedom of association, due process of law, and rights of citizens more broadly, but most agree that these promises don't have much impact on life in the country. Theodore Vestal explains, "it has been the bitter experience of many Ethiopians to learn that enumerating constitutional principles does not guarantee their implementation," (1997: 172). In fact, the constitution itself allows for discretionary interpretation. For example, despite a constitutional principle to assure the right of free association, Article 31 notes that "associations which undertake acts that lawlessly subvert the rule of law and constitutional rule are prohibited," (Vestal 1999: 175). Historically, the government of Ethiopia has not protected freedom of speech, press or assembly, and arbitrary detentions are the norm. During 1998, for example, from 13-22 journalists were detained or imprisoned on any given day (Zegahegn 1999). The state grip on media outlets remains vise-like, with all electronic sources controlled by the government. Only the stations owned by the ruling party are widely available (to the minority of people with radios or television sets, that is), and "these media are restricted to uncritical coverage of official government activities," (Chanie 2001: 88).

Corruption and abuse of power are rampant throughout the Ethiopian government (Vestal 1999, Mulatu 2001, Haile-Marium 2001). Legal remedies are insufficient as even formal law in Ethiopia fails to protect the public interest (Mulatu 2001). Nepotism is the rule for so-called 'elected' officials, as "individuals [use] their public offices for personal enrichment and the enrichment of their friends and family members," (Haile-Marium 2001: 77).

Elections in Ethiopia have been a case in point. The first national elections under the current ruling party were held in May, 1995, and a second round held in May, 2000. Suspiciously, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the current ruling party, claimed to win 90% of the seats in parliament, leaving only 7 members out of 546 that were not EPRDF members. Indeed, says a Western diplomat, an "election is a ritual of subservience to the leading party," (2001). Ethiopian nationals echo this impression, insisting that "only parties affiliated to the ruling party can freely participate in local and regional elections," (Zahagegn 1999: 9). Reports are common of opposition parties being "persecuted, forced into hiding, falsely accused of saying they did not renounce violence, and declared illegal," (Chanie 2001: 87).

Human rights violations, some of which are illustrated in the examples in this section, are rampant despite a constitution that offers detailed protections. Domestic and international groups consistently express their concern, but a pervasive lack of information interferes with action. One author refers to a "private press" report in which the EPRDF is blamed for heinous violations during its first 8 years in power: 281 individuals killed, 8590 imprisoned, 183 disappeared, 72 injured and 513 dispossessed (Chanie 2001).

The situation in Ethiopia is felt as hopeless by many who live and work there. As one national author put it, "taking off our researchers' hats, it is our subjective wish that John Stuart Mill's observations will grace the Ethiopian people and their government sooner rather than later," (Mengistu 2001: 101).

VII. Conclusion

Ethiopia is both typical of Sub-Saharan Africa, and strikingly atypical. Its demographics, rural and dispersed populations, poor and uneducated populace, for example, are all dimensions of many post-colonial African states. Indeed, having never been colonized seems to have done nothing to spare Ethiopia from sharing in these deeply engrained challenges. Here I have used demographic data and analysis to illustrate the desperation felt by many Ethiopians. The problems are manifest in weak infrastructure, insufficient human services, a lack of opportunity, poor health, and an overall lack of human capital.

Frequent land tenure changes and reallocation are also quite typical, and the subsequent agricultural challenges are to be expected based on the experience of Ethiopia's neighbors. Many African countries have experienced dramatic villagization processes, often when colonizers sought to establish "civilized" centers as part of a larger nationalization objective. Ongoing ethnic conflict and language divisions, too, are standard in tribal Africa. As colonized states were assigned a new nationality based upon their geographic location, Africans were forced to live with others from outside their native tribe and/or be divided from their tribal families. Questions of identity in colonial

systems, and what happens to those identities when states regain independence, are rife in the colonization literature.

Decentralization is also by all accounts a popular political choice, and again Ethiopia is both timely and typical. The African states which gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s are, in many cases, still reeling from political upheaval and are seeking to delegate responsibility. Ethiopia's experience thus far with the restructuring is quite common: good intentions backed by international pressure and limited by administrative capacity weakness.

Like too many Sub-Saharan African states, Ethiopia exists in the international arena primarily as a recipient of aid. Donor countries and NGOs populate the country providing technical assistance, development advice and raw materials. As a result, Ethiopia is saddled with what has become the classic paradox of development aid: the country is deeply in debt and still breathtakingly poor. Environmental problems are pervasive and complex, and many development agencies have integrated these issues into their in-country strategies.

But Ethiopia is also unique. Its culture remains almost entirely endogenous, and in some places remains untouched by European invasion. Tribal identities are as strong and cohesive as they were a century ago, although this fact may be interpreted to have positive or negative implications for future development potential. Ethiopia has embraced Ethnic Federalism as a way of proceeding with decentralization while simultaneously honoring and empowering tribal language, custom and lifestyle. Ethnic Federalism is an unprecedented political system, making it an experiment which is being closely watched by scholars and politicians.

Ethiopia is also experimenting with some powerful community resource management regimes. As this dissertation now moves toward its case study, I will devote the next chapter to a more detailed investigation of forest policy and environmental policy capacity. The information from this chapter will help to frame the forthcoming analysis, as readers now have a sense for life in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER IV: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CAPACITY IN ETHIOPIA

I. Introduction

Given the profile of Ethiopia in Chapter III, it is perhaps not surprising that policy capacity in the country is weak in virtually every sector. As discussed in Chapter II, an evaluation of capacity with particular reference to the environmental arena and an even more focused study of forest management is critical for assessing the practice of community forestry in the country as well as its prospects for the future. One of the primary research questions in this dissertation involves the identification of the locus of governance for community forestry. In order to comprehensively situate the forthcoming case study of the Integrated Forest Management Project, forest politics at every level of government must be explored. This chapter will employ Martin Janicke's model as presented in Chapter II, applying it specifically to forest policy and politics in Ethiopia.

I have divided my analysis here based on key features of Janicke's capacity model. I begin by assessing the state of Ethiopia's structural framework conditions. Given the interest here in forest policy, I start with a summary of existing legislation and then describe the emerging forest policy. Next in the structural framework are economic framework conditions, which I deal with here by breaking down my analysis into national, regional and local units. In this way, I am able to highlight dimensions of the economic institutional structure at each level of governance, and highlight common themes which run throughout the economic framework of Ethiopia. Finally, I explore the cognitive-informational framework by noting the many roadblocks placed on an open exchange of information in Ethiopian society. At the end of this first major section, then,

I will have described the structural framework in political, economic and technological terms, noting systemic sources of capacity weaknesses.

The next section in this analysis is devoted to the actors in Ethiopian environmental politics. I will describe both governmental and non-governmental actors, again dividing my analysis into national, regional and local levels. Attention to actors also provides an opportunity to discuss agencies and decentralized governmental structures as they relate to environmental policy-making and public participation.

Strategy is the next category in Janicke's model, and I will explore the foundations and implications of Ethiopia's Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) on its national capacity and potential for development. Situative contexts is Janicke's category for evaluating current circumstances. In the case of Ethiopia, nothing is more important for national capacity and environmental policymaking than the ongoing effort to decentralize. In that section, I will discuss the successes and failures of the process, and analyze the relevance for forest policy and participatory forest management. Finally, I will delve into the specific problem of deforestation and argue that the nature of the issue is so incredibly complex as to effectively link it to every development sector in Ethiopia's vast poverty-fighting plan. As a result, capacity weakness will continue to freeze progress in the forestry sector.

The purpose of this chapter is to portray the multi-layered structure of policy making in Ethiopia as it relates to forest policy and politics. I will be exploring the extent to which bureaucratic, financial, communicative and legislative inadequacies have crippled actors who seek to implement strong forest policy on the ground. This inquiry will also take into account the ways forest policy is framed and understood within the

levels of government. I am working here to answer a key theoretical question posed in Chapter II: does weak policy capacity at the national level signify failure for local level success in participatory forest management regimes? The question is one which gets at the locus of governance question for community forestry; that is, to what degree do effective community management schemes rely on the backdrop of a strong central regime? While the broad focus of this chapter is forestry policy and the politics which influence policy-making in that sector, I will also systematically consider the extent to which participatory norms have been integrated into policy and law.

II. Structural Framework Conditions

A. Political-Institutional Framework

Janicke's vision of the political-institutional framework analysis includes special attention to "the conditions for participation, integration and long-term action" (Janicke 2002: 6). Indeed, in the absence of a comprehensive forest policy, deforestation is managed in Ethiopia as just one of an avalanche of environmental problems. It is seen as another symptom of poverty and underdevelopment, and is therefore addressed through the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy for overall national development. Supplemental documents which build upon the groundwork laid out by the ADLI round out Ethiopia's development planning and include the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. I will begin my analysis in this section with an overview of development policy in Ethiopia, and then move on to discuss the Constitution of Ethiopia, all of which serve as umbrella guiding documents for the governance of the state. Next, I will consider the institutionalized rules and frameworks

for action which currently drive the forestry sector and finally, I will describe the ongoing process of policy formation for forestry.

1. ADLI & Development Planning

When the Transitional Government took over in Ethiopia in 1991, it issued a new economic policy statement. With substantial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Ethiopia promised to foster an export-led economic organization, deregulate the socialist economy, and begin the process of privatization in virtually every sector. Price controls would be lifted and private investment would be encouraged. In 1992, this economic path was officially adopted with the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy. The foundation of this plan is the conviction that "agricultural development is the springboard for the country's overall development," (Getahun 2001: 72). Enhancing the productivity of small farmers is the primary goal of development in ADLI Ethiopia, and is seen as the best tool for improving food security in both urban and rural areas.[1]

The World Bank supports ADLI in cases like Ethiopia's, where poverty is especially prevalent in rural areas. China has implemented a similar development strategy and lessons from Asia help the Bank to aid Ethiopia as it formulates its own version. Quite simply, the World Bank concludes "when the main productive sector in the economy is agriculture, productive growth will not occur unless agricultural productivity increases,".[2] The World Bank has identified factors affecting agricultural growth and then, in turn, traced the impact of agricultural growth on rural poverty. Most

[1] http://www.ethiospokes.net/Backgrnd/b0209981.htm
[2] http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/attackingpoverty/events/Ethiopia_1002/ferrer.pdf

importantly, agricultural growth can only succeed with fundamental reforms in property rights, availability of rural finance, and education, to name just a few. Thus, even at a fundamental level, capacity is seen to breed capacity. ADLI success for Ethiopia will mean transformative changes in every sector of governance and socio-economic structure. Girma Hailu summarizes economic transformation in Ethiopia as consisting of "gradually minimizing the role of the state, on the one hand, and encouraging and expanding private investment in economic and social sector development on the other, has become the guiding principle in the new economic policy of the country," (2000: 24).

In Ethiopia, two policies were introduced as complementary planning programs which deserve mention in this section on framework structures. First, a five-year Agricultural Development Program was adopted with the ADLI framework in place, designed to translate the broad goals of ADLI into applicable development steps. Fertilizer and seeds have been distributed, small-scale irrigation developed, and agricultural extension enhanced. Independent verification of the success of this program, and its Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System, is impossible to measure. The Ethiopian government, however, says: "Three-years after its launching in 1995/96, the programme has today become an integral part of the country's agricultural activities, as it covers all regions of Ethiopia. The programme, which embraced only 35,000 farmers three years ago, has now, with the latest inclusion of the Afar region, incorporated some 2.8 million farmers as direct beneficiaries of the programme." (same website).

Second, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was submitted to the International Monetary Fund and the International Development

Association; an interim plan was presented in March 2001 and the final version presented in July 2002 (See section *II.B.1* for more on how the ADLI drives strategic planning in Ethiopia). The IMF and IDA assessed the paper in August 2002 and concluded that it had both strengths and weaknesses. Strengths included its attention to participatory processes, the emphasis placed on agriculture and rural development, and "a welcome stress on investing in human capacity, as demonstrated by the reorientation of expenditures from military outlays toward social spending," (IDA/IMF 2002: 1). Indeed, defense spending in Ethiopia has steadily dropped, from 13.2% of GDP in 1992 to 4.2% in 1997 (SDPRSP 2002: 199). Simultaneously, "poverty-targeted expenditures" which include education, health, agriculture and roads, increased from 4.5% to 6.7% over the same period. Weaknesses include financial vagueness, and poor integration of decentralization into planning.

These documents taken together give a snapshot of the Ethiopian government's national planning, priorities, and perceived weaknesses. Generating growth by investing in agriculture means paying attention to rural development, investing in human capacity building, and shrinking military budgets in favor of social expenditures (see section *II.B.* below for more on Ethiopia's finances). Participatory norms are woven into each of these three planning visions, and decentralization accounted for with varying degrees of success.

2. The Constitution of Ethiopia

The present-day constitution of Ethiopia was adopted on December 8, 1994 but is considered to be in effect as of 1995. It consists of a preamble and 11 chapters: General

Provisions, Fundamental Principles of the Constitution, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, State Structure, The Structure and Division of Powers, The Federal Houses, The Presidence (sic) of the Republic, The Executive, Structure and Powers of the Courts, National Policy Principles and Objectives, and Miscellaneous Provisions (FDRE: 1995). The document establishes the name of the new nation as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), and lays out the basic structure and rights within the Ethiopian government. Many of these rights are clearly modeled after Western ideals, including a separation of religion and state, guarantee of basic human rights, and assurances of transparent state activity.

As a framework for environmental policy, Article 92 of the constitution establishes four objectives:

1. Government shall endeavor to ensure that all Ethiopians live in a clean and healthy environment.
2. The design and implementation of programs and projects of development shall not damage or destroy the environment.
3. People have the right to full consultation and to the expression of views in the planning and implementation of environmental policy and projects that affect them directly.
4. Government and citizens shall have the duty to protect the environment. (FDRE: 1995)

Land tenure and agriculture are themes throughout the Constitution. Chapter X, Article 89 states that "Government has the duty to hold, on behalf of the People, land and other natural resources and to deploy them for their common benefit and development." The Constitution also carefully separates federal and regional responsibilities. Chapter V, Article 51 empowers the federal government to "enact laws for the utilization and conservation of land and other natural resources". Regional units are charged with administering these lands in accordance with federal laws.

As has been discussed (Chapter III), the ideals described in Ethiopia's Constitution bear little resemblance to the reality of life in the country: division of labor between regions and federal units remains unclear to staff, human rights are violated with regularity, elections are not free or transparent, and capacity weakness makes enforcement lax in every sector. However, scholars continue to stress the importance of strong guiding legal documents which enable community-based resource management; state law "is needed to help define the rules by which community-based institutions interact with outsiders, to delineate the limits of state power and to protect both individual rights and wider societal interests such as the environment," (Lindsay 1999: 28). The Constitution of Ethiopia attempts to provide both security and flexibility, hallmarks of effective legal principles; however, these aspirations have yet to be realized and certainly a strong (if recent) Constitution is a hopeful starting place.

3. Forestry Legislation

Despite the lack of a formal policy designed specifically to direct the management of forests, several existing documents currently provide guidance for foresters and environmental political actors. The fact that development and agricultural development policies form the framework within which forestry legislation must conform is disturbing for some observers. Deribe Gurmu, the head of the Forestry Research Centre, argued that the process of policy development has been done backwards; he noted that a stated economic policy which moves toward liberalization automatically threatens the protection of natural resources. Instead, he insists, they should have "had a resource

policy and then every policy would have been the subset of the natural resource policy," (2001).

Here I will conduct a brief analysis of the three most important documents in the forestry sector: Proclamation 94/1994, the Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan, written by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia's Ministry of Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection in 1994, and the 1997 Environmental Policy drafted by the current FDRE. Taken individually, each of these documents fails to account for participation of communities in the management of forests and as such is outdated. Taken as a whole, the structure provided here is long on ideas and short on implementation. Most important among the gaps is a failure to identify specific actors responsible for enacting key pieces of the management plan; decentralization, so rapidly transforming Ethiopian governance, is poorly integrated into the legislation. A comprehensive, unified and specific forest policy is sorely needed in Ethiopia. The existing documents, however, are worth describing since they are likely precursors to a more comprehensive policy package.

a. Proclamation 94/1994

Proclamation 94/1994, entitled A Proclamation to Provide for the Conservation, Development and Utilization of Forests and drafted on March 28th, 1994 by the TGE, is the most frequently cited guidepost by foresters seeking to implement Participatory Forest Management (PFM), or Community Forestry in Ethiopia. The document was the first to specifically grant a broad forestry mandate to regions, empowering them to manage protected forests within their boundaries. In the prologue, references are made to

"the participation of people and benefit sharing by the concerned communities". Definitions are offered for terms such as "ministry", "protected forest", and related policy terms. The Ministry of Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection (now the Ministry of Agriculture) is allocated broad responsibilities for forest resources, including: the designation, demarcation and registration of protected forests; the provision of technical assistance to regional governments as needed; the preparation of forest development programs; and the protection of indigenous wildlife species. In many cases, these duties are assigned to "The Ministry [NRDEP] or the appropriate regional body"; clearly, this vagueness has created lasting confusion.

Despite strong participatory language and specific emphasis on decentralizing forest management to the regional level, some of its provisos present particular challenges to would-be PFM practitioners. For example, regional ministries are called upon to "facilitate conditions and provide technical assistance toward the development of private forests" (94/1994: 375). This proviso seems to invite the development of private nurseries, and certainly indicates the federal shift toward private ownership of public lands. The Proclamation also declares it illegal to harvest or utilize four common tree species (*Hagenia abyssinica, Cordia africana, Podocarpus gracillior, and Juniperus procera*) on public land. While there seems to be an implication that privately held forests would constitute an exception to this rule, in fact this must be seen as wordplay given that "the Constitution vests the right of ownership of rural and urban land as well as all natural resources *exclusively* in the Federal State," (Tsegaw, 1997: 17). This regulation has ultimately restricted the options of communities, who might otherwise choose to grow these popular and useful species (Temesgen, 2001).

Tension continues to exist in the nexus between the government's stated move toward private forest holdings, and its long history of holding all land nationally. Fully five years after this proclamation was released, government officials remain perplexed about ownership regulation. Ato Tibebe, the Head of the Forestry and Wildlife Conservation Department for the Oromia MoA tried to explain how Proclamation 94/1994, the "guiding legislation", encourages private forestry: "When it comes to private forests. . . there are not companies which can be considered as private forest. . . during the regime of communism, privatization was not encouraged. . . it is logical that that is why. . . private companies have not been developed. . . I'm thinking that the regional government is encouraging private forest development," (2001). When pushed on the ownership inconsistencies found in the Constitution and the Proclamation, Tibebe directed me to the investment office to further explore forestry legislation; as head of a prominent forestry department, he was clearly unable to account for the conflicting directives.

b. Ethiopian Forestry Action Program 1994

The Ethiopian Forestry Action Program (EFAP) of 1994 is in part the outcome of Ethiopia's participation in the Biodiversity Convention, which urges national governments to set up a national action program which includes forest projects. The World Bank worked with a large team of Ethiopian forest experts to create the expansive document in 1994. Details within this 300 - page document are both scientific and carefully linked with national economic development plans. The document begins by stating that "in keeping with [Agricultural Development Led Industrialization] ADLI, the

challenge facing the forestry sector is to retard the destruction of forests and woodlands, promote an improvement in the quality of life through a sustained balance between utilization of forest resources and the conservation of natural assets, and harness forest resources to urgently needed socio-economic development" (iv).

Again, a commitment to the community level is visible, and there is continual recognition of the important role of the forestry sector in assuring socio-economic stability and quality of life. Analytical sections describe current barriers to effective community management and offer thoughtful suggestions for policy changes to improve conditions. The drafters of this document recommend, for example, the promotion of private sector involvement in forestry, research and provision of alternative energy sources to reduce pressure on fuelwood, mobilization of farmers to institute agroforestry changes at the local level, and increased funding for livestock research and grazing impacts. Again, the document suggests a government that is aware of the challenges it faces and open to a myriad of solutions, including capitalist and democratic ones. Thus, again we see the predictable gap between formal policy and implementation, enforcement and practice on the ground.

Part of this disconnect comes from a lack of available information. One member of the team who worked on the EFAP notes that "perhaps we are missing some of the socio-economic data" (Tibebe 2001). Perhaps most critically, this same informant noted that all of the forestry legislation to date critically undercuts participatory progress. All such documents "emphasize protection by laws, rather than protection by involvement or participation. In that circumstance, . . . how are you conceptually capturing the problem?.

. . Policing everything." (Tibebe 2001). Sighing deeply, Tibebe commented wryly that "In some respects, you know, I feel that sometimes modernization is a curse," (2001).

c. Environmental Policy 1997

The Environmental Policy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1997) was extracted from the larger Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE), written by the Environmental Protection Authority in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation. The CSE document is quite comprehensive and was drafted in part as an outcome of collaboration with the World Conservation Union (IUCN). The final version of the Environmental Policy was approved by the Council of Ministers in April, 1997. The "result of seven years of consultation and data collection and analysis" (FDRE 2002: 121), the policy is divided into five subsections.

In section one, the resource base and need for policy are enumerated. High levels of smallholder subsistence are noted, and economic impacts of environmental degradation carefully described in quantitative terms. The authors of this section note that Ethiopia still lacks a comprehensive formulation of cross-sectoral issues into a policy framework for natural resources. Section two consists of policy goals are organized by topic area and elaborated into objectives for each one. The guiding principle is explicitly decentralized and participatory: "Sustainable environmental conditions and economic production systems are impossible in the absence of peace and personal security. This shall be assured through the acquisition of power by communities to make their own decisions on matters that effect their life and environment," (1997: 4). The third section delves into specific sectoral environmental policies, with separate sub-sections for soil

husbandry, forests, ecosystem biodiversity, water, energy, minerals, urban issues, pollution, climate change, and cultural resources. In section 3.2, entitled Forest, Woodland and Tree Resource, the policy continues to stress the participation of "individuals and communities". Section 4 is devoted to "Cross-sectoral Environmental Policies" and includes 4.2 "Community Participation and the Environment", which lays out policy objectives for encouraging participatory development, empowering local communities, strengthening capacity, and ensuring information flows between the central government and its sub-state units. The final section of the policy is devoted to Policy Implementation, and offers a relatively short (3 pages) summary of the institutional framework, legislative framework, and systems for monitoring and evaluation. The goals are broad and emphasize smooth coordination among levels of government and agencies within it.

Without exception, each section makes specific reference to the importance of communities and plans for further decentralization of environmental management. Acknowledging widespread environmental degradation, the report makes particular reference to soil erosion data and the resulting loss in agricultural productivity. It is clear that improving agricultural yield is one of the most important objectives for the policy, and the language in the policy document suggest a heavy borrowing from the mainstream sustainability literature. At various points in the document, effort is made to specifically mention elements of equity, including gender issues and rural participation. The drafters of the policy emphasize their intention to create "legislation, training, and financial support to empower local communities," (19). Indeed, the policy is quite impressive and reflects a depth and breadth of good intentions for the future of environmental

management. However, as may be expected for a summary document such as this, each broad goal remains somewhat vague, and specific timelines, budgets, or institutional dimensions are absent.

4. The Emerging Forest Policy

The creation of a formal forestry policy and the integration of participatory forest management within it are the two most pressing concerns relevant to this research undertaking and, indeed, to the success of forest management in Ethiopia overall. Glenn Haas, GTZ's Forest Policy Advisor, began his review of the draft policy by noting that "an enabling Forest Policy Framework is a fundamental necessity for PFM to be established on the ground," (Haas 2001: 1). Without a forest policy, many insist that successful community level planning cannot proceed. Virtually every informant, from farmers to government officials, commented on the lack of "government commitment" (Bekele 2001) as a primary stumbling block for the realization of PFM (Temesgen 2001, Kubsa 2001, Nune 2001, Bekele 2001, Tibebe 2001).

The process of policy formation has been participatory, with NGOs and forestry leaders approached for feedback as the policy develops. Most agree that the final policy will reflect strong decentralization norms, urging regions to develop their own approaches within federal guidelines (Bekele 2001). Early drafts of the policy emphasized sustainable utilization, food security, agricultural productivity, and community involvement (Bekele 2001, Haas 2001); many of those who had reviewed it by May, 2001 agreed that the provisions for community-based participatory forest management were too vague (Haas 2001, Berhanu 2001, Tibebe 2001). Without specific

and tight guidelines for participation, "implementation will be tough" (Berhanu 2001). However, as Ato Tibebe suggested, "policies are tools. They shouldn't be considered absolute solutions to a problem in any case. Perhaps policies are no more than an intention of the government," (2001). Without supporting legislation, even a strong and defining forest policy might not be sufficient to guarantee effective community empowerment and participatory management of forests. Equally true, "without policy whatever you do at the community level means nothing," (McShane 2001).

B. Economic Framework

1. National level

Ethiopia, the third most populous country in Africa, covering 1.2 million square kilometers, has tremendous potential both in terms of human capital and agricultural productivity. Gold, platinum, tantalum and soda ash are known to exist within the country but remain largely unexploited (Abraham 1994:173). Oil and gas reserves have also been discovered but only preliminary exploration has yet occurred. Overall, the rate of production has remained constant in Ethiopia, while population has continued to grow, currently estimated at a rate of 2.9% (Abraham 1994: 174). GNP per capita in 1990 was estimated at $120 (Abraham 1994: 174), with more than half of the population living in "absolute" poverty. See table 4.1 for a comparative table of economic indicators in Ethiopia, based on IMF data from 1999.

Table 4.1. Basic economic indicators, 1992–93 to 1998–99

	1992–93	1993–94	1994–95	1995–96	1996–97	1997–98	1998–9
Annual percent change							
Real GDP	12.0	1.6	6.2	10.6	5.2	−0.5	6.7
Real per capita GDP	9.8	−0.6	4.0	8.4	3.0	−2.7	4.5
Consumer prices	10.0	1.2	13.4	0.9	−6.4	3.7	3.6
Percentage of GDP							
Agriculture	53.8	51.0	49.7	51.5	50.7	45.7	45.6
Industry	10.4	11.0	11.2	10.6	10.8	11.6	12.1
Distribution and other services	27.1	28.5	28.6	27.9	28.4	30.1	30.6
Public administration and defence	8.7	9.4	10.5	9.9	10.1	12.6	10.7
Consumption	97.9	94.6	92.0	95.3	91.4	93.7	95.5
Gross domestic investment	14.2	15.2	16.4	19.1	19.1	18.2	18.6
Gross domestic savings	2.1	5.4	8.0	4.7	8.6	6.3	4.5
Resource balance	−12.1	−9.8	−8.5	−14.4	−10.5	−11.9	−14.1
External debt	77.4	81.1	71.6	65.3	143.5	142.4	–
Government revenue	12.0	13.9	17.4	18.4	19.0	18.7	19.0
Grants	1.7	3.5	3.3	2.9	3.6	2.8	2.2
Expenditure and net lending	19.6	25.2	24.8	27.0	24.3	25.5	25.7

Source: IMF (1999).

Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), described above as the foundation of Ethiopia's approach to political development, has also formed the cornerstone of its economic policy since 1992. Based on the belief that economic growth in the country can only come with development in the agricultural sector, it seeks to enhance yields, develop markets, and ensure market access for millions of Ethiopians. However, many observers note that ADLI is simply insufficient to overcome the myriad of obstacles still in place which limit effective economic growth in Ethiopia. Haileleul Getahun explains, "There are major economic policy biases against agriculture still prevalent in Ethiopia. . . More fundamental policy stances, some outside the realm of

economics, may play a much more decisive role in shaping the fate of agriculture in Ethiopia. These include the degree of democratization in the political system, existence of the rule of law, basic human rights of expression and association, as well as property ownership," (2001: 75).

Indeed, economic policies in Ethiopia are inextricable from the politics and corruption which conspire to thwart even the most ambitious reforms. Some stated policies can be seen as little more than simple oxymorons when placed in the context of Ethiopia's political structure. For example, ADLI specifically targets open markets as a goal of its would-be capitalist economic structure. Ethnic Federalism, however, seriously and explicitly constrains mobility and thereby instantly curtails the freedom of goods and people to move freely in pursuit of open exchange.

Privatization remains a powerful theme in economic planning in Ethiopia, codified in the Economic Stabilization Programs advocated by the IMF and the WB in the early 1990s. Goals for the programs are many and would fundamentally transform the structure of ownership and production in the state. Objectives include "the introduction of more competition, achieving wider ownership, changing the public private mix, improving the performances of public enterprises, reducing the frequent political interference in the day-to-day activities of public enterprises, widening indigenous ownership, relieving budgetary strains on the government, improving allocation efficiency of investments, and relieving administrative burdens of the government," (Ayalew 2002: 114). To accomplish these objectives, the Ethiopia Privatization Agency was established in 1994 and charged with carrying out analyses of the Ethiopian economy and making recommendations to the Prime Minister's Office. Some analysts say that the program is

too new to have visible results, but that the effort has strong political support and is likely to be enhanced as capacity permits (Ayalew 2002). Others are skeptical, insisting that "the reform programs that have not been backed-up by market friendly institutional setups failed to win the sympathy of the business community in particular and the population at large," (Asfaw 2001: 240).

Agriculture, indeed, dominates the GDP and has hovered over the 50% mark for decades (Asfaw 2001). Industry accounts for approximately 15% and the service industry in its various forms rounds out the total. These numbers are largely unchanged since 1970 despite aggressive reform measures. Exports are less than 10% of GDP, and imports range between 10% and 20% of GDP (Asfaw 2001). Ethiopia has the lowest exports per capita in the world (World Bank 2000). The fiscal deficit has ballooned in recent years, from 3.6% of GDP in 1998 to 10% in 2000 (World Bank 2000).

Capacity weakness is manifest throughout the economic framework of Ethiopia, and reforms are proceeding slowly and incompletely. Infrastructure and existing institutions are not prepared to shoulder new responsibilities and growth is not accelerating at all. Privatization is not yet resulting in measurable change, and the public/private dialogue is inadequate. Tax collection processes are crippled by a lack of technology; indeed, only customs tax collection is computerized and "no computerized system is in operation in the management of income taxation," (Belew 2001: 165). Accounting systems are characterized as being in a "backlog" (Belew 2001: 167), and microfinance is poorly tracked. Again, technological weakness fosters capacity weakness in tax collection and revenue generation.

2. Regional level

Decentralization to the regional level might be a positive first step toward eventually granting local level governments more power; however, regions within Ethiopia are deeply asymmetrical in their policy capacity, financial strength, human capital and self-governing experience. Afar, Somali and Benishangul regions, for example, are remote, poor and have a scant history of involvement in Ethiopian politics. The Amhara and Tigray regions have historically been the wealthiest and most heavily represented in national level politics, with the Oromia region strong due to its size and proximity to the center. For example, statistics from a "poverty head count", used to measure the percentage of households living below the poverty level in each region, reflect vast differences among the regions (FDRE 2002: 165). See **Annex B** for details.

The gaps between various regions has not gone unnoticed by the Ethiopian government, and revenue sharing mechanisms were officially introduced in the 1990s; these are regularly reconfigured to provide regions with a means of achieving success in its policymaking. Strategies for reducing regional disparities include shifting assessment attention from inputs to results (Belew 2001) and thereby more tightly directing revenue to where it is most needed. However, most agree that these are crudely designed and unlikely to substantively transcend the weight and history of the problems. Bitterness and resentment abound, and many insist that inequality among regions is not merely maintained by force of history, but rather by design. One author even claims that he was able to trace a set of "ingenious budget transfers" from the central government, effectively routing fully half of its investment resources to the single favored region of Tigray (Zegahegn 1999: 6). Thus, environmental problems are inexorably linked with

social and economic problems, corruption and perceptions of injustice. The context of decentralization paired with insufficient support from the national government, then, is in itself a defining environmental problem at the regional level.

Regions are increasingly expected to manage their own finances, including collecting tax revenues and possessing "full autonomy in budgetary expenditures," (FDRE 2002: 40). Likewise, recent emphasis on the importance of establishing banks for microfinance and smallholder credit has put additional pressure on regional financial management capacities. The central government has asked regions to prepare Regional Conservation Strategies in consultation with the EPA; the strategies are a tool for regions to commit to allocate resources specifically for environmental management (FDRE 2002: 121). According to official government documents, EPA assistance in this effort has included training, provision of equipment, and general capacity-building (ibid).

3. Local level

In rural Ethiopia, economic activities are almost entirely subsistence and consist principally of grain crops, livestock, forestry, poultry, handicrafts, and small scale industry (Getahun 2001: 103). Agriculture is by far the most important source of revenue and food, but production has been steadily declining since 1960 (Getahun 2001), while population continues to explode. Decline in agricultural output is the result of a matrix of issues, many of which are discussed in this dissertation. One of the most critical factors in the mix is the lack of smallholder credit. Only 7% of Ethiopian smallholders rely on credit from formal moneylenders (Getahun 2001: 105); instead, informal and unofficial lending drives local economies with interest rates as high as 100% (Getahun 2001: 106).

Small farmers are high risk, and most simply cannot qualify for loans based on current standards of major institutional lenders.

Consistent with the rest of the analysis of policy capacity in Ethiopia, a shortage of funds is without a doubt the single most limiting factor at the local level. Structurally, revenue is supposed to trickle down from the center, through the regions, and ultimately down through the weredas and into the kebeles. In practice, however, "funds flows from external sources are highly unpredictable, are generally targeted toward specific capital projects, and tend to be distributed on an ad hoc basis according to arbitrary and inconsistent criteria," (Gulyani 2001: 12). Municipalities are also expected to raise their own funds through a combination of property taxes, business income taxes, market fees, and fees for basic municipal services such as the provision of water and the protection from fire. Much like the inequalities seen at the regional level, kebeles have vastly different tax bases, low capacity for enforcement, and shifting mechanisms for collecting fees. The vast majority of municipal staff is uneducated and lack even basic accounting experience; the prospect, then, of the personnel taking on responsibility for a complex budget with multi-source revenue and layers of expenditures is not realistic.

The recent Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan drives home this point. The IMF/IDA review of the document notes that new efforts to extend the reach of decentralization to the local level create new problems even as they attempt to solve old ones. In the new system, they comment, "550 weredas are responsible for setting priorities, delivering services, and determining budget allocations at the local level, within the framework of broad national policies. This opens up tremendous opportunities

to increase the responsiveness of services to the poor, but it will stretch the limited capacity at the local level," (IMF/IDA 2002: 7).

Extension workers bemoan the lack of available money, and speak of a "shortage of resources at all levels, from needing a car to petty cash," (Dukale 2001). Goa Genemo, an extension agent whose job it is to educate farmers in the Bekoji wereda, describes conditions where there are no manuals available for training, one car available for the entire wereda, and forest guards who are paid 105 birr/month (=$12.26). Without due compensation, he notes that motivation flags (Genemo 2000). The government of Ethiopia has simply failed to establish workable financial arrangements for financing local level forestry implementation.

Community forestry proponents, in response, have made the provision of funds to communities a central part of their schemes. Benefit sharing, indeed, is a defining feature of what PFM means for the local level everywhere. In India, for example, a country which has had tremendous success with PFM schemes, many of the most successful plans are based around a revenue sharing mechanism (Ostrom 2000) However, despite a stated commitment to benefit sharing and revenue generation seen in most PFM project documents, in practice there are administrative and bureaucratic obstacles which prevent direct transfer of funds to communities or PAs. For example, the Menagesha Forest project, facilitated by GTZ, promises 20-25% of revenue from tourism and forestry products will be funneled back into the community (Berhanu 2000). Practical details of how to distribute this money fairly among community members has confused project organizers for decades; a common solution is for the money to be put into a general fund and used for broad community development projects, at the discretion of the PA with

oversight by regional officials (Berhanu 2001). Community members are hard pressed to link the presence of a new grain mill to the afforestation measures they have undertaken in years past.

C. Cognitive-Informational Framework

This category in Janicke's model is designed to direct analysts' attention to two aspects of communicative processes. First, the supply side is examined. Under what conditions is knowledge produced, disseminated, and applied? Is there a role for scientists in policy making? How are environmental agendas established, and how do these agendas drive the quest for knowledge? Second, we may turn to the demand side. How is knowledge understood and interpreted? How do people see environmental issues in the country? Is there an "environmental consciousness" (Janicke 2002: 6)? The production and consumption of information is seen as fundamental in setting the scene for analyzing actors in environmental capacity. That is, without adequate access to information, how can even well-equipped actors tackle complicated environmental problems?

Scientists in Ethiopia are few and far between. See section *III.A.1* below for a breakdown of the education levels within the civil service, and the weakness in capacity is evident. The Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO) is the most visible and prominent research institution in the country in the environmental sector; the Forestry Research Centre is a sectoral division within EARO. Funds and staffing in these institutions are, not surprisingly, chronically inadequate. In a recent Forum for Environment based on Agenda 21 of the Earth Summit process, gaps in research and

scientific knowledge were recognized and "the way forward" included an effort to "establish/strengthen dry land research division in EARO" (2001: 8). There is one forestry college in Ethiopia: the WondoGenet College of Forestry. The school was founded in 1970 and offers "diplomas" (i.e. certificates) and undergraduate degrees. No graduate program is available at the school.

The generation of scientific knowledge proceeds slowly and haltingly. Ato Deribe Gurmu, the Head of the Forestry Research Centre, works in a small research complex on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. His office is sparsely furnished and does not include a computer. His secretary sits outside his office and although an outdated computer does sit on her desk, I watched as she provided information using pens, paper and carbon paper. No copy machine existed in the office, scant filing cabinets, no books, and the phone line worked only sporadically. When asked about the linkages between the research sector and policymakers, his answer was clear: "we are not coordinated, we don't know what to do," (Gurmu 2001). Agenda formation does not seem to be under the purview of scientists and researchers in Ethiopia.

Like many developing countries with a large and remote population, Ethiopia has a cripplingly weak system for the exchange of information. People overwhelmingly live in remote rural areas, without technology, and far from all-weather roads. In 1998, there were only 0.27 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (Assefa 2001: 178), and Ethiopia had the lowest annual growth rate in all of Sub-Saharan Africa in the telecommunication sector (Assefa 2001). The wait list for phone lines currently exceeds the number of people currently with lines! The internet didn't reach Ethiopia until 1997, and still there is only one internet provider in the country. When I was in the country in 2001, I found

the only place to get reliable internet service was in Addis Ababa at either the Hilton Hotel or the British Council library, both of which charge prices for access which far exceed the budget of the average Ethiopian. These venues were entirely populated by tourists; still, the service was painstakingly slow and erratic by Western standards.

Institutions charged with improving telecommunications include the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, which works to educate merchants and foster Information Technology(IT) awareness, the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission (ESTC), which strives to promote IT nation-wide but "has insufficient experience to build e-commerce" (Asseffa 2001: 180), Addis Ababa University, ostensibly the best hope for e-training but again lacking in experience and materials, and a handful of private computer centers and suppliers.

Communication failure is widely recognized as a major stumbling block in larger development objectives, but clearly "the strategic use of communication for development requires substantial government support" (Getahun 2001: 159). Again, the self-reinforcing nature of capacity weakness is evident. Communication needs in Ethiopia run the gamut from improved education opportunities to expanded media freedoms, and a vastly improved extension program for rural farmers.

Haileleul Getahun advocates strong reforms in this sector, and outlines a process of integration for "Development Support Communication" (2001: 159). His plan is expansive and he cautions that for DSC to be successful it "requires a critical mass of resources, communication staff, and equipment below which little or no impact can be expected," (159). As shown here, this critical mass does not currently exist. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to overstate the extent to which rural Ethiopians remain out of touch

with scientists and researchers. Science is not linked systematically with policy, and communication systems suffer dramatically from capacity weakness in every dimension.

III. Actors

A. National Level

1. Governmental Actors

Three agencies currently share the bulk of the responsibility for environmental administration and policy development in Ethiopia. The Ministry of Agriculture is the primary institution responsible for environmental management, national policy development and implementation. Large and rambling, the Ministry has been around since the Derg regime, but it suffers a constantly changing institutional structure, with a complex flowchart of sub-departments and decentralized office structure. See **Annex C** for a chart detailing the current structure of the Ministry. At the national level, the Ministry's responsibilities for forest management specifically include demarcating Forest Priority Areas (FPA) and national heritage sites. The process of demarcating and designating FPAs often involves complex community politicking, advanced cartography and geographic technicalities, and teams of land management experts; the MoA clearly lacks effective technological and human capacity in these areas and as a result the process gets frequently bogged down in disputes over the validity of newly labeled borders. Designating certain forest areas as being of special importance and granting them protection is in line with Western practices of land management; however, very few if any of Ethiopia's FPAs see any change in management as a result of new designation. In other words, simply being designated as a priority area in an office at the regional or

national level changes little or nothing on the ground. There is no money for enforcement. There is no money for wildlife or vegetation surveys. There is neither organization nor political will for relocating people who live within the designated area. They are "paper parks" in every sense.

The Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organization (EWCO) has responsibility for managing wildlife resources and monitoring biodiversity in the country. It is organized under the Ministry of Agriculture, but operates with significant autonomy. As would be expected, it is underfunded and poorly staffed. Current figures are unavailable, but in 1992/1993 the organization had 77 total staff, including seasonal forest guards as well as professional researchers. They were responsible for the management of 32,403 km^2 and had a total annual budget of $145,857 (UNEP 1993). The agency had no foreign assistance during that time, although certainly it has a history of partnering with international groups (such as WWF; see section *III.A.2.a.* below) on issues related to wildlife and habitat conservation.

Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) retains control over regulatory policy, including monitoring and enforcement. This agency was established in 1995 and charged with "the implementation of international treaties on environmental protection to which the country is a party" (Proclamation 9/1995: 1). An autonomous government agency, the EPA is specifically responsible for "harmonizing environmental protection and economic activities so that both economic and environmental improvements become sustainable," (FDRE 2002: 121). Thus, the EPA serves regulatory, policy and implementation roles within the state, is responsible for implementing international agreements into national programs, delegates environmental powers to the

regional level while orchestrating a complex balance of environment and development prioritizing. However, if such participation is left to the underfunded, undertrained and understaffed EPA, then Ethiopia cannot even begin to meet these objectives. Indeed, strengthening the capacity of the EPA among other national and international level institutional structures is a consistent goal of the Ethiopian government. There is little visibility of the EPA in forest management, as its activities are restricted primarily to pollution regulation, urban environmental issues and corporate compliance monitoring.

As is the case in many developing countries which seek to integrate environmental issues more cohesively within a shifting governmental structure, Ethiopia has rewritten its institutional organization several times. Each time, the process of adjustment has overpowered substantive change, as job descriptions are rewritten and lines of communication re-forged. More recent efforts to decentralize have further complicated the maze of acronyms and authority. Some of the most notable and dramatic changes include:

Year	**Institutional Change**	**Reason for Change**
Mid-1970s	Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection and Development begins conservation and afforestation efforts in the highlands of Ethiopia	Response to drought. Several programs had external aid.
1977	State Forest Development Authority and Wildlife Conservation Organization merged to form the Forestry Authority and Wildlife Development Authority	Outcome of 1975 Agrarian Reform.
1980	Forestry and Wildlife Conservation and Development Authority created as an autonomous agency under the new Ministry of Agriculture	Effort to improve delivery of services to rural areas, as previous organizations lacked capacity (Dejene 1990).

1985	Ministry of Agriculture reorganized, and the Forestry and Wildlife Conservation and Development Authority was moved under the Natural Resource Development Department. Additionally, new Community Forestry and Soil Conservation and Development Department formed, as well as State Forestry Conservation and Development Department.	Entire MoA reorganized. Effort to strengthen forestry institutions.
1989	Ministry of Forestry created	Growing attention to deforestation and interest in addressing forest issues.
1996	Ministry of Forestry & Ministry of Agriculture combined	Ethiopian government recently restructured (1995) and many institutions underwent reorganization.

Institutional chaos is but one of the problems facing environmental actors in Ethiopia. Chronically underfunded, under-equipped and undertrained, the civil service faces crisis conditions. Only 22% of civil employees have any high school education, and nearly 40% hold some type of "certificate" instead. In a 1998/1999 workforce of 336,427 individuals, less than 4% had a college degree, less than 1% had a Masters' degree, and less than 200 individuals (0.06%) held a Ph.D. (Mengistu 2001: 97). There are far more illiterates in the civil service (2,572) than doctorate degree holders (199) (ibid). Salary numbers are not readily available, but pay is certainly "poor", and conditions include "a substandard training system, and the lack of trust, respect and confidence in career civil service employees by politicians," (Chanie 2001: 89). Capacity weakness in the civil sector, then, is deep and complex.

2. International Actors

As discussed above, several bi- and multi- lateral organizations which initially came to Ethiopia for famine relief have since transformed into development agencies, and many have focused their energies on environmental issues and agricultural reform. Much of this work has taken on a local, project-oriented approach, and the organizations are very carefully tracked by the Ethiopian government (Amera 2001). Major international environmental groups with a presence in Ethiopia are many, but those whose focus is most principally on forestry and community participation include the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation, or GTZ), both of which were specifically analyzed in my research and will be discussed in detail here. Additionally, the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations have continued to be involved in afforestation programs as a step toward increased food security. Two British-based Non-Governmental Organizations, SOS Sahel and FARM Africa, have had significant impact on the development of community forestry programs and are visible participants in the emerging debate over the role of Participatory Forest Management in the country. At the time of this writing, FARM Africa had 6 active programs in Ethiopia, each one resting on two thematic features: first, each project adopts a participatory approach to establishing sustainability in agriculture and/or forestry use; second, each one contains a significant capacity-building element.

a. World Wildlife Fund

World Wildlife Fund International is headquartered in Gland, Switzerland but maintains international offices in several developed and developing countries. WWF

frequently partners with governments to provide in-country services. In the case of Ethiopia, the Dutch Government had earmarked substantial funds for tropical conservation work. WWF-Netherlands partnered with the government in a joint arrangement known as the Directorate General of International Cooperation, a Dutch-based project which was ultimately folded into the WWF Tropical Forest portfolio. The portfolio focuses on both development and conservation, and contains seven total projects in different countries, one of them Ethiopia.

In 1998, WWF-Ethiopia was established after a process of negotiation with the Ethiopian government. An Ethiopian national (Ermias Bekele) was hired as its director and two clear objectives were established for the project. First, WWF would seek to improve the capacity of Ethiopia's primary Natural Resource management arm at the national level: Ethiopian Wildlife and Conservation Organization (EWCO). By offering training opportunities and partnering with EWCO wherever possible, WWF integrates itself through existing channels of policymaking at the national level. Bekele currently uses EWCO office space in Addis for his WWF work. Second, WWF-Ethiopia identified the Bale Mountains area as a test case for implementation of a community-focused approach to resource management. The Bale Mountains, located just West of Dodola (the site of IFMP, my case study explored in detail in Chapter V), is home to Bale Mountain National Park, unparalleled biodiversity, heavy user pressure and limited monitoring or enforcement capacity. As of late 2001, the Bale Mountain project was still in the early stages of forest assessment and community identification. Project organizers are optimistic about their work in Ethiopia, but have had to struggle with the institutional disarray resulting from poorly planned decentralization (McShane 2001).

For the purposes of this chapter, what is most interesting about WWF's approach to forestry and conservation in Ethiopia is that it is so tightly linked with capacity-building. McShane repeatedly stressed the importance of capacity building, of local control, and of WWF's role as an external facilitator in a wholly Ethiopian project. While certainly the very presence of an international NGO raises questions about long-term dependency (explored in greater detail in Chapter VI), the approach WWF takes to its work is indicative of the larger tendency toward participatory forest management in the international community.

b. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) is undoubtedly the most visible international actor in Ethiopian environmental politics. Worldwide, Germany has become a leader in tropical forestry aid, providing over DM 140 million (USD $78,482,760.41) annually toward the promotion of sustainable development as per the definitions and practices established at Rio in 1992 (Bickel 2000: 160). GTZ becomes especially important for the analysis being undertaken in this dissertation, because of the German government, which "attaches great importance to policy advice and institution-building in the forestry sector. If current practices are to be transformed and the focus turned to sustainable forest management, major efforts at national level will continue to be required, with backing provided at international level, to achieve above all a participatory form of decision-making within society," (Bickel 2000: 161). Three pieces of this quote deserve to be highlighted. First, the framing of policymaking as occurring at the national level with international backing, sets up GTZ for a multi-layered presence in the state

which is indeed borne out. Second, GTZ stresses the importance of capacity building and institutional development; again, this ideology is visible in its practices in country. Finally, the emphasis placed on participatory decision-making in the forestry sector explains GTZ's ongoing support of IFMP and other community forestry work.

In Ethiopia as of 2000, GTZ has a formal office in Addis, office space in the Ministry of Agriculture headquarters also in Addis, and several on-site offices in project locations. True to the participatory approach of the organization, and their determination to "integrate in the social, political, economical and institutional processes" (GTZ 1998: 19), most of the GTZ staff in country in 2000/2001 is Ethiopian, with some notable exceptions. In Addis, Guenther Haase, a German national and GTZ employee, holds the position of Forestry Policy Advisor, and works out of an office just upstairs from Ato Million Bekele, the Team Leader for Forestry Conservation and Development (see **Annex C** for a flowchart of the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture). At the individual project level, program directors tend to be German even if the bulk of the staff is Ethiopian; for example, Hans Lipp is the current director of the Integrated Forest Management Project (IFMP), and his staff of approximately 12 are all Ethiopian.

Attitudes toward GTZ vary throughout the country. Everyone I spoke with knew of their work and had a strong opinion about their presence in the country and role within the forestry sector. Most perceived GTZ's fundamental contribution as being one of technical equipment and expertise (Bekele 2001, Gurmu 2001). Healthy skepticism and distrust was also consistent, with many Ethiopian experts refusing to pass judgment on the organization in the absence of hard data to prove effectiveness. Some felt that the provision of technical assistance was one thing, but real help was needed "on the ground"

(Bekele 2001) and GTZ was failing to provide those kinds of measurable outputs (Gurmu 2001). Technical support, while needed, amounts to an inadequate and possibly insincere investment, according to some: "I can say that the Germans are there physically, not mentally. . . they are very involved. . . superficially. . . because they are a bit tricky. . . I can't explain what they are really doing, and what the extent of their involvement is in the country." (Gurmu 2001). Others echoed this sense that GTZ is everywhere, pumping a great deal of financial and technical resources into the country, but measurable results are lacking. Moges Worku with the US Embassy commented that he "sees them everywhere" but they "haven't really made any impression" on him or his office (Worku 2001).

Resentment about GTZ's seemingly special status was also voiced by several, who noted that the sheer amount of funding brought to Ethiopia and its bilateral position seems to free it from having to demonstrate success as regularly as an NGO would (Temesgen 2001). Despite these concerns, this same informant, who is the Participatory Forest Management Advisor for FARM Africa, praised GTZ's approach to community forestry: "They have gone boldly. Personally, I appreciate and like it." (Temesgen 2001). Praise for GTZ was resounding in the USAID offices in Addis. Kurt Rockman, the Supervisory Agricultural Development Officer there, hailed GTZ as "the best organization I know around here dealing with community issues," (Rockman 2001). Technically sound, knowledgeable, and capable of adapting its approach to be available for external research (such as this dissertation), GTZ is misunderstood. Many of its best results are intangibles such as community cohesion and the introduction of democratic

values. Since these outputs can't be quantified, we can expect government officials to remain skeptical (Rockman 2001).

From what I saw both in Ethiopia and in Germany, GTZ is indeed an impressive organization. GTZ staff with whom I worked were, without exception, knowledgeable, dedicated and thoughtful. While I find some important gaps in their overall strategy to community organizing, such as the absence of alternative income creation (discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI), they are clearly making a marked difference in Ethiopia's forestry sector. Despite mixed reviews, the very fact that everyone I interviewed knew of GTZ and associated them with PFM is a signal that they are doing something right. There is no other organization in Ethiopia that even comes close.

B. Regional level

Article 9 (1) of Proclamation 7/1992 sets regional governments up to mimic the national level structure with three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. The proclamation specifically grants regions power over all affairs within their geographical area except functions otherwise claimed by the federal government. The Regional Council is the supreme decision making body, in place through allegedly democratic elections although charges of corruption and nepotism are rampant (Bell 2001, Vestal 1999). The Regional Executive Committee functions as the highest administrative and executive organ and is accountable to the Council. Regions are empowered to create "zones" as intermediary units between the regional level and local-level weredas; most regions have done so (Egziabher 2000: 696).

Managing the many and complex facets of forest management, among the other dimensions of governance now expected from regions, has illuminated capacity weaknesses in virtually every sense. Education, technical training, and human capital building are stated priorities for the central government and carefully described in the many planning documents which guide policy. Indeed, a laundry list of desperately needed reforms includes "making the judiciary transparent and accountable. . . greatly improve the enforcement of contracts and property rights. . . reduce non-commercial risks. . . reduction of transaction costs and removal of distortions of resource allocation," (FDRE 2002: 41). Without these basic tenets of the rule of law, participatory regimes for resource management will surely fail over the long term.

Finally, many note that channels of communication and jurisdiction relationships remain so fuzzy that nobody is quite sure of his job description (Temesgen 2001, Mengesha 2001). The result is a constant game of passing the buck, with each level of government acknowledging severe environmental problems, but feeling certain that the responsibility for solving the problem lies at a different level of government. As one author explains, "While the decentralization program in Ethiopia has elaborated the powers and duties of the national and regional executive bodies and ministries and bureaux (sic), there is little guidance provided outlining the functional relationship that needs to exist between regional bureaux and national sector ministries," (Egziabher 2000: 697).

C. Local level

To truly understand local politics and forest management at the community level, it is important to revisit the initial creation of Peasant Associations (PA), by the Derg as part of the drastic 1975 land reforms discussed in some detail in Chapter III. Nothing so transformed the practice of forestry at the community level as did the creation of these PAs. The Derg government charged these new local units with the "distribution of land, administration and conservation of public property, rendering judicial services, establishment of different cooperatives, building of schools, clinics and similar institutions" (Adal 2001: 106). The government also sought to create a more systematic approach to forestry, designed both to increase production and to improve training and research in the field. Indeed, the visionary strategy included the "mobilization of the peasants for local forestry, decentralization, and quantitative increase and a qualitative change in training and applied research and further cooperation with other organizations in Ethiopia as well as abroad," (Ohlsson 1978: 223). With an emphasis on seedling provision and yield, the fledgling Forestry and Wildlife Development Authority created jobs at the community level through afforestation programs and consistently used language which celebrated indigenous forestry knowledge and honored the ability of farmers to manage forestry resources for maximum gain. PAs were put in charge of these many-faceted programs.

Observers of the multi-pronged effort to transform local resource use by empowering the PAs note that the fundamental obstacle to success was the lack of capacity at the local level. Not only did PA administrators lack technical training and forestry skills, but they generally had no political experience, no understanding of how to

organize communities, and no expertise in how to allocate resources effectively (Ohlsson 1978). Quickly the PAs became simply administrative units, in place not to truly represent the needs of residents but rather to execute the whim of the Derg regime. They were not autonomous and soon became seen as merely an arm of the ruling party, not as any service to the peasants (Adal 2001). Nancy Peluso has written extensively about this phenomenon, whereby "developing states use conservation ideology to justify coercion in the name of conservation," (1993: 199). She notes that central states have clear interests in maintaining control over territories with valuable natural resources, especially when contradictory claims exist. These scenarios, she concludes, provide benefits for the state but none for the peasants; states will go to great lengths to protect their control and secure these benefits. In the case of Ethiopia, the lack of land tenure security for farmers undercut even the rare moments of success in the village. As discussed throughout this dissertation, farmers who feel insecure about their usufruct rights and residential location are unlikely to implement long-term conservation strategies including planting trees.

The 1991 reforms loudly recognized the failure of the PA system in place, and replaced that administrative unit with kebeles, organized under weredas, instead. However, many rural areas still call their associations PAs; more importantly, the kebeles were not given any substantively new power to help change their position in Ethiopian politics. More recently, however, there are signs of hope. Oromia and Amhara regions have actually issued legal proclamations which carefully define the powers and duties of their municipalities (i.e. weredas and kebeles). This progressive step is likely to pave the way for other, less able, regions to follow suit, and it directly addresses the stubborn problem consistently found in Ethiopian governmental reform. "The key issue to be

resolved in the process of enacting new municipal legislation and the guidelines for its implementation is to clarify the position of municipalities in the general framework of decentralized governance – that is, the legal, functional, and financial relationship of the municipalities to the wereda and zonal and regional governments," (Gulyani 2001: 6).

Recently the central Ethiopian government has very publicly acknowledged the failure of its decentralization structure to reach the local level, where perhaps it is needed most. The Sustainable Development report released in 2002 stresses this point throughout the 200 page document, insisting that "the democratic aspect of decentralization will also depend on strengthening the capacity of communities and civil society groups to . . . more effectively take advantage of the opportunities for voice that decentralization affords," (FDRE 2002: 40). After similar proclamations of ideology, the report goes on to promise "fiscal support" and municipal "restructuring".

In the context of local level organization in the forestry sector, decentralization was conceived as being fundamentally a yield-improvement step. Indeed, it may well be that the emphasis on increasing production effectively obscured key administrative and capacity dimensions. The PA quickly became the symbol of decentralized forestry, effectively recasting the purpose of political decentralization into one intended to devolve the mechanisms of production (Ohlsson 1978: 240). Despite recent moves to utilize a more holistic and participatory approach to forest management at the local level, success is still measured overwhelmingly in quantitative terms. When I asked Bogale Dukale, an Expert on Forest Development in the Extension Department of the Oromia Bureau of Agriculture, about the relative success of forestry extension in Ethiopia, he proudly told me that 150 million seedlings have been planted with a greater than 75% success rate

(Dukale 2001). Whether or not these new trees are available for use by locals, and whether or not PAs had any say in the location, enforcement, or utilization of the trees was not considered part of the definition of "success". Scholars consistently point to the importance of extension in the implementation of decentralizing forest management and increasing afforestation (Niewenhuis 2000). Interestingly, it has become something of a truism among practitioners that farmers tend to care poorly for free seedlings (Niewenhuis 2000, Dukale 2001); as a result, afforestation programs now routinely involve at least a token price for peasants since "we want farmers taught to have that knowledge that the seedling has got value," (Dukale 2001). Still, this step to include farmers in the process can hardly be considered participatory.

IV. Strategy for Building Capacity

The Ethiopian government is well aware of the inextricably connected nature of the environment and development, and especially the effect of resource-dependent citizens on overall sustainability. The recent Sustainable Development report sums up the intermixing of these issues nicely:

> "Demands on natural resources often deplete those resources, and, especially when not managed well, disturb the local ecosystems, causing general land degradation. During their extraction, local transportation, processing for value addition and exportation to other countries, additional environmental degradation, and in particular pollution, occurs to varying degrees. People, in their attempt to survive, are forced to disregard the long-term well being of the environment and thus degrade it further. Environmental degradation and poverty are thus interactive leading into a spiral of environmental and human calamity," (FDRE 2002: 121).

Poverty reduction, politics and economic policy thus are intermixed with environmental capacity; all rely on the fortification of capacity at every level of the

Ethiopian government. Janicke discusses capacity building as a critically conceived and comprehensive strategy. This leads to something of a tautology, as quickly analysts discover the necessity of having the "capacity for capacity development" (OECD 1995: 46). The 2002 Sustainable Development report does an excellent job of summarizing the resounding consensus on the importance of building capacity. In the report, 14 sectors are named as targets of new programs and capacity building components. For each "major activity" listed in the summary table, progress to date is noted, and plans through 2005 specified. The matrix used in the report has been reproduced here in **Annex D**.

According to the report, it seems that Ethiopia is indeed undertaking dramatic and sweeping reform designed in large part to strengthen capacity at all levels. Many of the "major activities" are so vague that monitoring and evaluation of the success of those programs would be difficult or impossible to ensure. For example, under the Civil Service reform sector, the plans are to "widely publicize the civil service program" (183); this activity is noted as having been completed. Throughout the document, however, emphasis is given to the very areas where it is most needed: education, training, information dissemination, transparency of process, and enhanced institutional structure.

Have these capacity-building ideals translated into real changes on the ground? For the most part, this is impossible to assess. For every success story (i.e. civil employee receives Masters' degree), there is a failure (i.e. brain drain continues to plague Ethiopia). Since baseline data is too recent to be used for comparative purposes, the jury is still out on the newly formed efforts to build capacity. However, interviewees noted several ironies in Ethiopian politics which insidiously belie even the best of intentions. For example, current policy in Ethiopia, while it gives lip service to participatory tools,

continues to rely heavily on legal enforcement to achieve its objectives. Deribe Gurmu, the Head of the Forestry Research Center in Addis, bemoaned this tendency as a serious obstacle to the implementation of PFM. He noted that "policing everything" as a strategy "doesn't work" (Gurmu 2001). The strategy is one of "hardening rather than softening. . . . emphasizing protection by laws, rather than protection by involvement or participation," (Gurmu 2001). The tools of enforcement seem to be at odds with the very policies they have been invoked to enforce. In other words, true participation and community involvement suggests an enforcement regime organized by public entities and accountable to locals; instead, centralized policing remains the primary tool for enforcement. All segments of the Ethiopian state are financially stretched to the limit.

V. Situative Contexts: Opportunity for PFM?

Troubles within the forestry sector are many, deep and complex. Situative context analysis, however, urges researchers to examine short-term opportunity structures and proximate events. In Ethiopia, the very public processes of decentralization, democratization and development present a triumvirate of opportunity. Participation in resource management is consistent with planning in each of those sectors and there is virtually no vocal opposition to the ideals which underlie community management regimes.

Most agree that PFM is increasingly a focus at the national level (Temesgen 2001). Despite the formal nod of approval at the national level for community based resource management, the concept is still so new that it is "like talking a foreign language" (Rockman 2001). When framed as tightly linked with democratic values, rural poverty

reduction and/or agricultural development, PFM is even more tightly integrated into policy documents. For example, this passage from the Sustainable Development report links participatory norms with democratization and development goals; the quote appears in the "Capacity Building and Governance" section: "A democratic system, which is based on the realization of people's participation in the development process, and which ensures good governance, is a vital instrument for combating poverty and backwardness. It is therefore mandatory that democratization be one of our major objectives," (FDRE 2002: 50). This language is indicative of recent efforts in the state, at least on paper, to integrate participation at every level of policymaking, to promote decentralization as a tool for enhancing democracy, and to link natural resource policy with poverty reduction and national development.

I have argued here that current decentralization efforts in Ethiopia have not led to genuine grassroots participation. Instead, administrative layers have been added to the political structure, and everyone, including representatives of the Ethiopian state, agrees that regions are now the lowest level at which significant power and control exist. Decentralization in Ethiopia, as in many African states, has meant regionalization but not decentralization in a local sense. Reasons for the lack of local input include a history of community repression, weak local capacity both in terms of resource availability and psychological incentive systems, and the current structure of governance. Researchers and practitioners agree that despite a barrage of policy efforts to convince communities to take responsibility for their forests, most still do not accept real ownership of the resource. Amera argues that the continued appearance of technocrats in remote regions clearly communicates the ongoing belief of government that farmers lack the knowledge

to effectively manage their land (2001). This conviction was echoed by Bogale Dukale, an Expert on Forest Development in the Extension Department of the Oromia Bureau of Agriculture and responsible for supervising agricultural extension in the entire region. In many cases, he said, "The community is not conscious," and the role of extension experts is to "teach them about the importance of the forest." (Dukale 2001).

Even beyond the extension of expertise for forest management, the central or regional government's presence in local land use is a manifestation of its desire to maintain control and limit the space available for communities to organize. This is why, argues Amera, the government steadfastly refuses to consider privatization of land: "So long as you control the land, you control the people," (Amera 2001).

Couple the reality of decentralization in Ethiopia with the absence of a forest policy or supporting legislation, and the development of any form of PFM in this context becomes exceedingly challenging. A recent PFM workshop (April, 2000), organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, FARM Africa and GTZ, attracted a very diverse group of experts from every sector. As each organization shared its experiences with PFM, a matrix of issues and problems emerged. The lack of a clear policy statement was the most frequently named obstacle to resolution of long-standing issues. Second, capacity weaknesses dominate the list, including the lack of trained forestry personnel at the local level, insufficient funding for the forestry sector, lack of commitment by the government for PFM, and weak accountability within the bureaucratic engine. These concerns were consistently raised by interviewees when asked about barriers to effective participatory approaches in forest management.

The third cluster of concerns center around attitudes, held both by forestry professionals and community members. Limited training and understanding of PFM methodology makes partnerships in the field between the implementing agency, the government, and the community an ongoing challenge. The trust between communities and foresters has been eroded through a history of failed cooperative efforts; reestablishing a working relationship will be a long process. An abbreviated summary of the matrix has been reproduced here in **Annex E**.

VI. Problem: Deforestation

Ethiopia is home to vast biodiversity. Estimates suggest the land contains representatives of 5,765 species of flora (between 10% and 21% endemic), 242 terrestrial mammal species (23 endemic), 847 bird species (26 endemic, the largest number in mainland Africa), and at least 6 endemic reptile and 34 endemic amphibian species (World Resources Institute: 1991). Many, if not most, of these species rely on forested landscapes for survival. The problem of deforestation, then, is at once a wildlife crisis and human disaster.

Deforestation is an ongoing problem in the country, and recent estimates suggest that 3% of the forest is being lost annually (Hailu 2000). More broadly, however, the problem of forest management raises several complex issues. For example, if rural families are going to be asked to stop cutting down trees to use for heat and energy, then alternative energy provision needs to be considered. If these families are going to be asked to stop cutting down trees to sell the wood, then off-farm income opportunities must be created. If these families are going to be asked to stop clearing the trees for

agricultural land, then the livelihood of rural communities around the country must be restructured to be less agriculturally dependent. If farmers are going to be asked to increase yield without increasing land consumption, then technology and extension services must improve its reach, and systems of credit must be available to smallholders. Land tenure practices are controversial and intricately linked to this debate, which quickly leads into the disagreement over private property rights and the commitment of the Ethiopian government to move toward a capitalist system.

Ethiopians remain critically dependent on forest resources for survival. Fuelwood needs, construction materials and energy requirements are all met by the forest. Trees serve as water filters and forests are relied on for grazing. Repeated famine crises in Ethiopia have been consistently linked to the vulnerability of forest-dependent smallholders. As trees are felled, soil erodes. Combined with heavy grazing and cultivation on steep slopes, the soil becomes unfit for future planting. Crop yields thus decline at the same time as population rates skyrocket. Kebrom Tekle offers an example of this downward spiral: "In 1984/5 about half of the Ethiopian highlands were heavily eroded and even if erosion rates stay at the current level, about 18% of the highlands will have a soil cover less than 10 cm. deep, making them incapable of sustaining cropping by the year 2010," (1999: 422). Soil erosion on croplands in the Ethiopian highlands (where the most productive land is found) is estimated to impact 50% of the lands there, with 25% of those in "serious" condition and 4% "past the point of no return"(Shiferaw 1999: 740).

Deforestation leads directly to soil erosion, which in turn negatively impacts cropping and yield. Furthermore, households in rural areas in Ethiopia are too often

surviving with no safety net; that is, they remain strikingly vulnerable to climate and crop "shocks". According to recent research on poverty in the country, poverty levels in Ethiopia may in fact be *higher* than generally reported since most families endure seasonal poverty as a manifestation of climactic variability (Dercon 2000). Deforestation places more households closer to that edge, increasing the risk of famine when crops fail.

The problem, then, is incredibly urgent. The causes of the problem, however, are nearly insurmountable in a country where 80% of the residents are subsistence farmers who rely on forest resources for survival (Shiferaw 1999: 739). Resolving this one environmental issue means tackling the core of Ethiopian politics, economic strategy, and deeply engrained poverty. Without question, the problem of deforestation is by any definition intractable and extremely difficult. Janicke notes that difficult problems require stronger institutional capacities, something Ethiopia surely lacks.

VII. Conclusion

Capacity weakness is the common denominator for understanding forest policy in Ethiopia. Lack of coordination among the layers of government, shifting structures without concomitant jurisdiction specifications, lack of human capital in every sense, and resource scarcity have effectively paralyzed forest policy makers in the state. Given this history, devolving management of resources to the community level might be considered a hopeful direction. However, current efforts to institute PFM are left with little tangible direction at the national level. As a result, the many agencies involved in crafting PFM schemes are forced into a system of trial-and-error without institutional support. This perceived lack of commitment from the state government is manifested in both financial

weakness and vague guidelines for development (Bekele, 2001; Gurmu, 2001; Nune, 2001; Temesgen, 2001).

Regional governments are primarily responsible for providing the enforcement muscle and financial strength necessary for community based forest management regimes to succeed. However, while it is true that regional staff is best positioned to provide on the ground assistance and support, they are constrained in Ethiopia by a lack of strong federal policy. J.M. Lindsay makes just this point: "State law has a necessary place in local management initiatives: it is needed to help define the rules by which community-based institutions interact with outsiders, to delineate the limits of state power and to protect both individual rights and wider societal interests such as the environment," (1999: 28). Scholars including Elinor Ostrom's renowned team of CPR researchers agree that without strong legislative support at the national level, local level efforts will be continually undermined and will ultimately fail (Ostrom 2000). Linking the CPR literature with the policy capacity literature strengthens the former and enhances the applicability of the latter. Placing PFM projects in the context of environmental capacity helps to separate program-level deficiencies from chronic structural inabilities. In Ethiopia, the lack of a final forest policy creates challenges for even well funded and carefully conceived PFM projects.

Despite the challenges of working within such a weak policy environment, NGOs and bilateral agencies are quite visible in the Ethiopian forestry sector. Each agency works more or less on its own specific projects, the vast majority of which now promote PFM in some form, and frequent workshops and information sharing have become the norm. Thus, governance is being created from the bottom up, as scholars, politicians and

community leaders work to strengthen participatory norms within a fragile policy environment. Prominent projects such as the Integrated Forest Management Project in Dodola discussed in great detail in the next chapter offer promising frameworks for future PFM development.

CHAPTER V: THE INTEGRATED FOREST MANAGEMENT PROJECT

I. Introduction

The most elaborate and prominent example of community forestry in Ethiopia is the Adaba-Dodola Integrated Forest Management Project (IFMP) in Dodola. Despite the remote location of the community, forestry professionals and policy makers in Addis Ababa know of it, have opinions on its effectiveness and watch it carefully. The idea for the project was born in the 1980s, but not until the mid-1990s did those ideas come to fruition. Several iterations later, the IFMP is now thriving by almost any standard of measurement. International researchers, mostly from Germany, have come and spent time on site, contributing a wealth of knowledge to diverse aspects of the project's functioning. GTZ has sunk millions of Deutsch Marks into its work there. The overall result is something of a mirage in the midst of poverty-stricken rural Ethiopia: modern offices with an educated staff and a project library boasting data on complex technical questions and intricate sociological patterns. In the field the lives of rural forest-dwellers remain traditional, although some see hope for the creation of opportunity and advancement.

I visited Dodola for the first time in December, 2000. At that time, I had been traveling with Abdurrahiman Kubsa, one of the project founders and leaders, in another part of the state; he suggested I visit the GTZ office in Dodola when we passed through that village. I returned to Ethiopia in May 2001 and spent over a week in the GTZ/IFMP office compound in Dodola. During that time I interviewed project staff, accessed IFMP archives, sat in on meetings, accompanied staff on field trips to visit with farmers, and

observed general project management practice. I also went into the Adaba-Dodola Forest Priority Area for two days with a translator, visiting the tourist huts and interviewing farmers we encountered along the way. Additional research on the IFMP comes from my 6 week stay in Addis Ababa in May - June 2001. My time in the capitol was devoted to contacting and interviewing environmental leaders in the country, including governmental, non-governmental and international figures, and collecting documents at Addis Ababa University and the Institute for Ethiopia Studies located on the university campus. Finally, I traveled to GTZ headquarters in Eschborn, Germany in December, 2001 both to collect project-related documents and to interview Stephan Uncovsky, one of the original IFMP project managers.

This chapter will outline the basic facets of the IFMP, starting with its genesis and development. Given the interest in Common Pool Resource Theory taken here, much emphasis is then placed on the institutional dimensions of the IFMP. Finally, the ecological dimensions of the project will be explored, to the extent that data is available. Throughout the chapter, I have taken pains to present as much factual and technical information as possible without digressing into an analysis of how well various aspects of project design are working in practice. Chapter VI will be the elaboration of just that analysis.

II. Context and Actors

A. Dodola: The Village and its Surrounds

Village life in Dodola and the forest above it is traditional. Overwhelmingly, residents are dependent upon the forest resource for their livelihood. Those who live in

the forest itself rely on it for wood and forage; those who live farther from the forest are still dependent on the fuelwood and construction materials found there. Sources of household income reflect this dependency, with 48% coming from grain, 17% from forest products directly, and 35% from animals (i.e. livestock) (GTZ 1996). Farmers explain their use of forest products and crops as complex and diversified. Most engage in extensive land clearing in order to farm effectively; some also capitalize on nearby forest land to grow additional food crops. Barley is the most common crop in the area, but farmers also grow cabbage, potatoes and onions. Most of the crop is cultivated for home consumption, with surplus only sold. Likewise, sheep are kept largely for home consumption, including milk and occasional mutton meat. Other animals are kept for trading and income, including cattle, horses and goats. Butter is the main source of income for women, who are charged with producing and then selling it. Indeed, care of all animals is largely the purview of women, although men are responsible for selling. Some Peasant Associations have a somewhat different breakdown for livelihoods, including some that earn a portion of their income through beekeeping and honey production (Kubsa 2001).

The population is uneducated, with estimated literacy rates at 5% (Kubsa 2001). Schools and teachers do exist, but a pervasive lack of materials hinders the educational system. Poverty and a lack of social services is defining for the region. For example, initial meetings were held with farmers and community leaders so that project staff could assess community needs. With 165 farmers attending the meeting (only 13 women), the top three needs were: a grain mill closer to the village, a medical clinic, and a better water supply system for potable water (GTZ 1996).

Mostly Muslim, local family structure reflects the preference for polygamy. Women tend to have a permanent residence, while the husband moves around among the homesteads of his many wives. As a mechanism for economic and food security, this system allows the men to have, for example, a homestead in the forest where he might gather wood, and a homestead in the village where he has access to the market for selling his wood. Likewise, the arrangement permits a seasonally-structured management arrangement for livestock. Many families winter their stock in town and then the summers are spent grazing stock in the mountains. By having a legitimate home assured in both locations, it theoretically benefits both the man and his wives. More discussion of the role of women in the project area is below in section *IV.H.*

B. Adaba-Dodola Forest Priority Area

The Regional Forest Priority Area (RFPA) in Adaba-Dodola covers 500 square kilometers (50,000 ha) of populated mountain slopes. The highlands rise up to 3700 meters, but the vast agricultural plain which borders the forest lies at approximately 2400 meters. Dense patches of forest still exist, but are intermingled with human settlements and agricultural land, converted from forest. Livestock is ubiquitous, as villagers from both Dodola and Adaba as well as those who live outside city limits all graze their animals in the forest. The combination of population growth and increasing livestock pressure places intense stress on the forest. Between 1993 and 1997, satellite imagery revealed a deforestation rate of 3% per year (IFMP Project Brief 1999). Project staff who are familiar with the terrain, however, are certain this number is too low. Satellite

imagery cannot detect changes in vegetation beneath the canopy, and much of the deforestation in this area is taking place in the understory.

Thirty (30) different Peasant Associations (PA) overlap at least partially with the RFPA. Human population within the RFPA, although illegal, is estimated at 20,000 (Kubsa 2001). Approximately 480,000 head of livestock seasonally graze inside the boundaries of the RFPA. Local communities rely on the forest not only for pasture but also as a primary source of wood for construction and fuel. An estimated 200,000 people "depend on earning their living from the forest of Adaba Dodola," (Kubsa 2001).

A participatory village planning workshop was conducted for 5 days in 1997, the purposes of which included the application of Participatory Rural Appraisal tools to assess the forest situation in three (3) pilot Peasant Associations targeted for integration into the IFMP: Deneba, Berisa and Burachale. Attending the workshop were IFMP staff, woreda administrators, PA members, and local government representatives. Between 30 and 250 farmers participated each day of the workshop, with women poorly represented throughout. Basic demographic data such as the population of each PA, number of households, and amount of different forest types was collected. More importantly, villagers were invited along a transect walk through their forest and asked to identify problems that existed. Several consistent themes emerged over the course of the workshop.

First, the lack of clearly defined ownership combined with frequent changes in government officials means a striking lack of control over forest resources. The result is a situation in which "no one can speak for conservation and proper utilization of the forest," (Kubsa 2000). Second, utilization of forest resources is conducted in a wasteful

and exploitative manner. Timber is collected for construction and fuelwood, but residents report a great deal of wood left scattered on the forest floor if it is not commercially viable. Bark is stripped from trees to roof houses; the process is degrading for the forest. Fires are set to chase away wild animals and to encourage growth of forage for cattle. Third, the lack of alternative employment opportunities increases pressure on the forest. Pit-sawing (a technique for turning logs into planks, which sell well in town) offers the best income around, and participants note that young men with secondary education are still reliant upon the practice for income. Fourth, forest destruction in its many forms (fire, grazing, waste) is not matched with regeneration efforts. Finally, population growth and "forest encroachment" is seen as related to several forest problems, including increasing the need for construction materials and homesteads. (Kubsa 1997).

The picture, then, is one of a forest with wide ranging and deeply engrained problems. With a total population of 14,187, the three PAs can indeed be seen as representative of the entire project area, giving project leaders a reasonable picture of the challenges they face. Each of the aforementioned forest problems are ones which the ultimate project outline seeks to address directly or indirectly. The laundry list of concerns also serves to establish criteria by which the success of the project can be measured. See chapter VI for an assessment of the extent to which the IFMP has managed to remedy them.

C. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation, or GTZ)

For a major international aid agency, GTZ is remarkably decentralized. In the case of the IFMP, the agency has one case manager, based in Germany (Wolfgang Shultz); while he is a resource on the project, he doesn't know any of the details. In Addis, Dr. Labahn is the head of the GTZ office and as such, formally oversees the IFMP project. In practice, however, even Dr. Labahn isn't kept entirely up to date on the details and is more of an administrator and funding coordinator for all of GTZ's many Ethiopian projects. Once a year, GTZ submits a report to the Ministry of Agriculture in Ethiopia, summarizing its progress; these reports are neither detailed nor specific. Likewise, GTZ submits an annual report to the German Ministry (BMZ); remarkably, this report is confined to a maximum of six (6) pages. Budgeting for projects within GTZ occurs every 3 years, so project managers are given millions of DM at a time to manage for that period of time. The process is, according to Uncovsky, very transparent (2001), but local managers clearly retain control over most of the project's details.

The experience of this researcher was somewhat telling. Given the extreme decentralization, it is nearly impossible to get information on the IFMP without going to the project site itself. A visit to GTZ headquarters in Germany yielded good information about the agency as a whole but only by finding a person who had personally worked on the IFMP (Stepan Uncovsky) was I able to get any project-level information at all. No records exist, no reports are kept on file, and no upper level manager seems to be tracking progress of local-level projects. In Addis, the experience was much the same. A couple of GTZ employees at the central GTZ office had some knowledge of the IFMP and were

able to share their thoughts with me, but only those in remote Dodola, which is oftentimes without phone or email contact for weeks at a time, have complete records of the project. Despite being occasionally frustrating for academic researchers, this system may well reflect a strength of GTZ's organizing style. By keeping project management and oversight so local, they do empower the community to be in charge and enable project leaders to make appropriate decisions in response to immediate needs. No remote centralized authority tries to dictate policy.

III. History and Origin of Project[i]

A. 1980s: The Genesis of an Idea

The first idea for the project came out of GTZ in the mid-1980s. The Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), an FAO-led international forestry agreement, was fostering the creation of National Forest Priority Areas (NFPA) in Ethiopia. At the time, it seemed to outsiders that Ethiopia was taking its TFAP responsibilities seriously (Uncovsky 2001); certainly, the donor community implicitly mandated compliance with international sustainable forestry norms. While it later became obvious that the vast majority of these NFPAs were protected solely on paper, in the 1980s GTZ was impressed enough to place a forestry advisor in Addis Ababa. One of the advisor's earliest tasks (1988-1989) was to conduct a feasibility study for the development of a management system for one NFPA. Each NFPA was evaluated according to current conditions, including accessibility and the existence of a market. By 1990, the idea had reached expensive proportions, and the town of Dodola with nearby Adaba – Dodola Forest Priority Area was selected as the most appropriate match for the early goals of the project.

B. 1990-1994: A Holding Pattern

The early 1990s were marked predominately by war and political instability in Ethiopia. While GTZ didn't abandon its idea, the control of the Dodola project was left to Ethiopian hands out of necessity. The Ethiopian government demarcated the forest in Adaba-Dodola, with the hopes of working on a commercial development operation (IFMP Project Brief 1999). Stepan Uncovsky, the soon-to-be first Dodola project manager, describes the demarcation system as technically flawed and ultimately useless (2001). The only lasting impact of the demarcation process, according to Uncovsky, was to put Dodola residents on their guard; seeing officials marking the forest led them to suspect an external agent was preparing to lay claim to land. When GTZ did finally launch the project some years later, they were met with suspicion.

C. 1995-1997: Pilot Phase

In 1995, GTZ began the contracting process with the Ethiopian government, waited out the cumbersome red tape and undertook intensive planning from headquarters in Eschborn, Germany. Initial plans for IFMP were markedly different from what ultimately came to pass. At the outset, GTZ conceived of their mission as including a strong and somewhat holistic community development piece. Road building, the creation of modernizing infrastructure, the development of a business plan and other broad management activities would complement sustainable forestry measures and create conditions for community compliance with project demands. Indeed, the community was initially seen as being "in the way" (Uncovsky 2001), and plans for resettlement were

drafted. Forestry was and would remain a state enterprise. In order to strengthen the state's ability to be an effective partner in the project, IFMP staff planned to do a great deal of capacity building at the state level as well (IFMP Project Brief 1999).

Throughout the pilot phase, The Zonal Agricultural Development Department (ZADD) for Bale zone was the Ethiopian agency working most closely with GTZ officials. Recall that zones are units of decentralized control located between regions and weredas; in this case, the Oromia region is so vast that zonal administration takes on an importance it may not have in other regions. ZADD nominated and appointed project staff to the IFMP team, but was kept under tight control of the Oromia regional government. Without approval at the regional level, GTZ staff was unable to move the locus of control any more locally than the zonal level. By design, Ethiopian project staff outnumbered German staff by a large margin.

In the spring of 1996, Stepan Uncovsky was hired as the first project manager for the Integrated Forestry Management Project (IFMP) in Dodola. Just as Uncovsky was working with Richard Baptist, the GTZ Project Advisor, to establish himself in Dodola, the Ethiopian government went through another in a seemingly ongoing series of administrative restructuring moves: the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Forestry, the latter of which was only created in 1989, were merged into one. Uncovsky labels the ensuing bureaucratic scenario "chaotic" and one in which "nobody knew their jobs" (2001). Corruption was rampant. With no reliable authority in Addis, Uncovsky and Baptist found themselves without an office in Dodola and were forced to rent a block of motel rooms to use as both residences and office space. Some months later, town

officials granted them some office space at the edge of town in the hopes that their technological requirements would lead them to finance having the entire town electrified.

The pilot phase of the project was marked by extensive if preliminary forest inventories, land use surveys and baseline studies in three (3) selected pilot PAs: Berisa, Bura-Adele, and Denaba. While 30 separate PAs are found at least partially within the boundaries of the project area, the three selected for the pilot phase cover fully ¼ of the total RFPA. At this stage, "the main focus of the forest inventory [was] on available timber resources," (Ludwig 1996: 5).

It quickly became clear to early IFMP organizers that a state-run forestry operation would fail. As Uncovsky put it, "the only power that was there was the community." In Adaba-Dodola the concept of community is based entirely on geographic location; almost without exception in Ethiopia, those who live in the Oromia region are Oromo by ethnicity and language as well. Residents live in the forest itself, in the surrounding villages, and in the foothills. At this stage of the project, the idea of community wasn't any more developed for GTZ personnel in the area. Participatory Forest Management (PFM) was a new buzzword, and there was some local enthusiasm for the idea. The concept was a new one, and interpretations of participation were many; Ministry of Agriculture officials were quoted as having commented, "Yes, we are already doing participation. We tell them what to do and they participate," (Uncovsky 2001).

Project organizers approached the regional government, the Oromia Agricultural Development Bureau (OADB), to discuss plans for instituting a participatory forestry model in the region. Oromia officials had yet another sense of what this new approach would mean for them: GTZ would cut down trees and sell them, giving the money to the

bureau. From this starting point, the two entities began to negotiate benefit sharing with the community. Initial planning workshops were held in Goba (1997) and enjoyed a strong attendance by Addis government officials. An action plan was drafted, federal officials offered their approval, and the only missing link was a formal signature from the Oromia council. Assured by federal officials that this last step was a formality, Uncovsky and Baptist were urged to go forward with the project.

After another hesitant beginning, in which IFMP leaders worked to build relationships with community leaders, IFMP leaders again realized there was something missing from their model. Despite cooperation and compliance with initial efforts to regulate access, wood was still disappearing from the forest at an unsustainable rate and forest fires were still raging. The missing link, they decided, was the creation of awareness among the community; as remedy, Uncovsky and Baptist began to craft plans for educating locals about the value of the forest and benefits to be had from protection. Regeneration was the main issue, they agreed; that is, using the wood is and should be no problem, provided there is adequate replacement of the resource.

The pilot phase ended in 1997 when the project was ready to move to the next level of action. Nine rounds of workshops were held in early 1998 to connect the many layers of Ethiopian government with the mission and goals of the project. Through these communications, IFMP staff was able to conduct a self-assessment. Seven key "lessons learned" were identified and written up in some detail. See **Annex F** for a reproduced matrix from the workshops.

D. 1998 – 2000: Implementation Phase

Consistent with the diligent planning and recording which marked the transition from pilot phase to implementation phase, a clear objective was formulated for this period of the project: "to consolidate a replicable model of participatory, integrated and sustainable forest management for RFPA," (IFMP Project Brief 1999). The mission statement was even more simple: "to develop a feasible forest conservation approach," (Kubsa 2001). These scaled-down statements reflect the lessons learned during the pilot phase. In particular, project staff were convinced that community development and infrastructure building were distractions from their main goal, and decided to focus tightly on the forest itself and the creation of community organization to support sustainable use of the forest. This decision was a difficult one, but reflected emerging GTZ policy. Organizers not only feared that trying to both tackle forest integrity and community development would stretch them too thin, but they also had concerns about the outcomes should they be successful at providing poverty relief in the area. The organization was beginning to see a disturbing recurrent pattern: "'shopping lists' presented from villagers to project staff at first meetings. Villagers often anticipate which hardware support projects have to offer. Accordingly, they present these solutions as the priority of their 'community', frequently without referring to a particular needs situation," (GTZ 1998: 17). Focusing on provision of goods and services to the community placed GTZ in a position of providing outputs as opposed to facilitating process. Finally, should the village become able to offer real opportunity and safety, mass migrations would likely result as the word spread; increasing populations would directly

undermine forest sustainability objectives. This decision by GTZ will be revisited in Chapter VI.

Once community building was removed from the equation, IFMP staff focused their energies on sustainable forest management. Specific tasks were identified which would enable staffers to evaluate their success toward the goal. In particular, outputs were named and a target year of 2000 set: the project mission would be made explicit and spread, a forest conservation concept would be developed, and this concept would be developed into a feasible model, the model would then be analysed and accepted by both the Government and target groups, and finally the model would be implemented and followed up.

In 1998, Tseguy Taddesse joined the IFMP team as Project Manager. He overlapped some with Uncovsky as they transitioned. A native Ethiopian, Tseguy was well educated, bright, and experienced. As an ex-employee of the regional government, he had strong relationships with Oromia bureau officials. The combination of Tseguy's connections and a separate coincidental administrative restructuring created conditions for the long-awaited approval of the IFMP project by the Oromia council. By all accounts, this was a major step and it allowed the IFMP to work at the regional instead of the zonal level within the country. IFMP staff initiated the process of setting up Forest Dweller Assocations (FODWAs): the key structure of the current project. Those who didn't already reside within the forest boundaries were excluded from participation, and Forest Dwellers given extensive resource management responsibilities. See section x below, for a more detailed discussion of the way in which the project was set up during this phase.

E. 2001 – Present: Third Phase

Planning for the third phase followed the pattern. A planning workshop was conducted in Nazreth in the spring of 2000 and attended by zonal, regional and federal government officials, GTZ personnel, international consultants and regional practitioners of PFM. An assessment of progress to date focused on five exceptional achievements: a highly qualified team with many government-appointed professionals, an efficient project structure with three advisory bodies (steering and coordination committees, staff assembly), involvement of stakeholders and their acceptance of the conservation strategy, institutional backing for the granting of user rights to forest dwellers, and strong orientation for community members to understand the WAJIB approach making it feasible and replicable (Mebrahtu 2000: 1).

Three concerns were identified: the viability of "social fencing" of the forest in the face of high demand, the accuracy of tree cover assessments for monitoring forest condition (see *Monitoring*, below), and a possible legal conflict related to Proclamation 94/1994 and the WAJIB system. The project strategy outlined for the coming phase contained three main pieces: regulating access to the forest, reducing pressure on the forest resource by tree planting on farm land, and generating non-wood forest income. Many of these concerns and strategy goals were evident during my research visit in the spring of 2001 and are discussed at some length below.

Currently, IFMP employs 12 full time people, 11 of whom are Ethiopian nationals. Consultants are frequently hired for short or part time work, several offices have secretaries or administrative assistants, and there are two cooks who manage the kitchen. Farmers or villagers with questions are welcome to come onto the grounds, and often do.

The office compound at the edge of Dodola town is a bustling place. Hans and Antje Lipp, the current Project Directors who have an unusual job share arrangement, came on board in 2001, taking over for Richard Baptist, who left 6 months before the Lipps' arrival. During that gap, senior staffers such as Tseguy Taddesse and Abdurrahiman Kubsa ran the project. Some saw it as an opportunity for exploring the resiliency of IFMP in the absence of a German presence (albeit, with German funding still in place). By all accounts, the experiment was a success, and the project moved along smoothly.

As a team, the dozen or so IFMP staffers function well together with tight organization. They have a weekly staff meeting which lasts for hours, oftentimes ending late in the evening, during which each person reports on the status of his forest blocks. Advice and suggestions are given and brainstorming for unusual problems occurs. The men are all living in Dodola, within a few blocks of the office compound; Hans and Antje Lipp live on the compound itself but are in the process of building a home a few kilometers away. Most of the staff have families living elsewhere and occasionally travel on the weekends. They regularly socialize after work together, going to one of the two bars/restaurants in town. Life in Dodola is slow by all accounts, but the IFMP team is dedicated and hardworking.

IV. Institutional Dimensions

A. Funding

Funding for the IFMP comes from both GTZ and its formal partner, the Ethiopian government. The Regional Forest Priority Area (RFPA) in Adaba-Dodola has its own budget provided by the regional Ethiopian government. Additionally, the District

Agricultural Development Offices have a separate source of funds specifically for what they call "community forestry": the distribution of seedlings for plantation use. Finally, the Ethiopian regional government provides staff and office space to the project in Dodola.

GTZ clearly shoulders the bulk of the funding responsibility. The German contribution includes local and international consultants, technical support, equipment, training courses and workshops, vehicles, office supplies including computers and copiers, and the salaries for experts whose requirements are beyond the funding capacity of the Ethiopian budget. Community development projects are also a funding role for GTZ. Since 1995, 9.5DM has been budgeted for the project; it is interesting to note, however, that the budget has never been fully spent (IFMP Project Brief 1999).

B. WAJIBs and FODWAs: The Structure of Exclusion in the IFMP

The fundamental principle of IFMP is the restriction of access to the forest. To accomplish this in the face of extreme need and historic open-access has been and remains the most formidable challenge facing organizers. Those who don't live in the forest are barred from using the resource for extraction or grazing. Within a given PA, forest blocks of approximately 360ha are established by IFMP staff with participation by community members and forest dwellers; each block is then managed by 30 member households which exist within it. Each homestead, then, has 12 acres of its own for agricultural use and forest protection. Membership starts with the election of 'founding members' usually respected elders within the community. These founding leaders then "select applicants according to eligibility criteria defined and weighted on their own,"

(IFMP 1999: 5). Consistent with project goals of empowering locals to make difficult institutional decisions, these elders select from among existing forest dwellers. A common criterion for inclusion in a WAJIB is the length of time a household has been in its current location. The membership of a given block is called a FODWA (Forest Dwellers Association) or a WAJIB (Oromo, the local language, for Forest Dwellers Association is *Waldayaa Jiraattota Bosonaa*).

Once formed, a WAJIB will sign a Forest Block Allocation Contract, in which the duties and rights of the forest administration (currently GTZ / IFMP staff) and the forest block dwellers are elaborated. The contract is provided in the Oromo language. It grants the WAJIB exclusive rights to settlement and utilization of forest products for both domestic and commercial purposes. In return, WAJIB members agree to limit the number of settlements in their block to 30, to utilize forest products only within the limits of maintaining tree cover, to pay a forest rent and to regulate forest use. Forest rent is a small amount, and is charged only on land not covered by forest; ideally, it functions as an additional incentive to maintain or even increase tree cover. The PA retains 40% of the forest rent as payment for its support of families which have been excluded from the forest. In this sense, the forest rent payment is also seen as a form of benefit sharing among community members. A reproduction of the Forest Block Allocation Contract is available in **Annex G**.

WAJIBs are required to meet weekly, and forest administration staff frequently attend. Philosophically and according to project documents, indigenous knowledge is valued and supported; "WAJIB members agree on internal regulations to direct themselves," (Kubsa 2002).

C. Enforcement and Conflict Mediation

From the beginning, project managers recognized that enforcement by guards would be impossible. Not only is the size of the forest no match for available trained guards, but placing forest dwellers in guard positions is a clear conflict of interest. Guards are paid so little (approximately 105 birr/mo., which is the equivalent of less than a dollar a month) that they cannot be expected to restrict even their own use of forest resources. For these reasons, IFMP staff concluded that "it would be difficult to consider protection by guards and confiscation as suitable options for forest protection," (Tadesse 1999: 7). Forest protection committees were then set up at district, zonal and regional levels, but this strategy soon fell apart as well for the same reasons. By 1999, Tseguy Tadesse gloomily reported, "During 4 years of the project period, we tried our best with communal participation, mass mobilization, legal enforcement, licensing, area closures, village development activities, etc. with no impact. The farmers are now in a *better* [italics added] position of being able to take advantage of all benefits without having to bear any responsibilities," (Tadesse 1999: 10). Granting groups use right which were dependent on the conservation of forest resources seemed like the next, and possibly, last mechanism for reducing deforestation.

The Forest Block Allocation contract now specifies sanctions for breach of contract as follows. Deforestation, defined as reduction in Tree Cover, is punishable by full cancellation of the contract. Non-payment of rent will empower the PA to confiscate livestock or other property assets. Excessive settlement, or settlement by non-members will cause each household's rent to increase 20% for each additional homestead beyond what is specified in the contract. The incentive built in to this sanction is clear, and

makes forest guards out of every legal member seeking to keep his rent payment low. If it is found that the FODWA has admitted a member who doesn't qualify based on the clear criteria outlined in the contract, then the head and deputy head of the FODWA will be removed from their positions.

Despite the relative simplicity of these sanctions as described in the contract, it comes as no surprise that a myriad of difficulties exist. At one recent staff meeting, for example, Dereje Workhere reported that one of the members has a mosque-like structure on his property for personal prayer use. Much debate ensued about whether or not this building must be considered to be a homestead and whether the farmer should be required to tear it down. At first, staff agreed that if it is not used on a permanent basis, then there should be no problem. Soon this distinction was questioned, as another project manager asked whether this then applies to *gochos*, seasonal shelters built to house cattle in the rainy season. Although these structures are constructed primarily to house animals, it is also true that people use them for temporary shelter when grazing their cattle in the forest. Project staff speculated that both the mosque shelter and the *gocho* could become year-round residences when, for example, the son in the household gets married and needs a home. The issue was debated for nearly an hour without resolution (Personal observation 2001).

Conflict mediation is a category of enforcement not addressed in the 'sanctions' section of the forest block contract. However, project documents clearly ascribe responsibility for this task to local and regional government officials. In practice, local elders are the primary resource for mediation (Kubsa 2000). Day-to-day conflicts come under what is considered "social bylaws". One forest researcher, based in Addis Ababa,

felt sure that relying on such traditional methods of conflict management was appropriate and likely to be effective. Given the strength of traditional structures for mediation, he saw no reason why any dispute would require legal intervention. He explained, "particularly the clans where the Adaba-Dodola project is located, is a unique Oromo tribe. . . the Oromos have their own means of arbitrating things," (Gurmu 2001). Concerns and questions are also brought to the local office as needed, and IFMP staff work with farmers and make notes for follow-up.

D. Forest Inventory: Tree Cover Assessments and Monitoring

Forest inventories were conducted at each planning stage of the project. Independent researchers contributed vegetation assessments and detailed breakdowns of forest composition. Several graduate students in forestry and resource management fields, mostly from universities in Germany, completed their degree requirements with a visit to the IFMP. The data is copious and scientifically rigorous on a landscape scale.

Once the first pilot PAs had been identified, a consultant was hired to conduct an inventory of indigenous forest resources in those areas specifically. The data on land use and standing volume reported in this inventory is summarized below in Table 5.1. Additionally, foresters conducted a breakdown of species abundance in the pilot PA area; this data is reported below in Table 5.2. Young trees of all species were found to be underrepresented, reinforcing the belief that regeneration was the most challenging piece of the forestry project (Trainer 1996). Researchers concluded that the combination of livestock and human impacts made regeneration nearly impossible except in inaccessible sites (Holweg 1998).

Table 5.1

Type of terrain	% of Area	Standing Volume for trees with DBH >10cm (in units of cubic meters / ha
Settlements	2%	N/A
Fields/Pastures	40%	65
Open Woodlands	20%	67
Closed Forest	31%	187
Heather Moors	6%	N/A

Table 5.2

Species	Abundance
Juniperus procera	56%
Hagenia abyssinica	13%
Hypericum	10%
Erica	6%
Podocarpus	4%

The project, then, has a good store of baseline data with which to compare progress. To simplify and streamline the process, however, organizers agreed that in the future species breakdowns and volume estimates were impractical. Instead, measures of deforestation would be consolidated into one measure: tree cover. This way, forest blocks could be held accountable for changes in tree cover and project participants could readily understand the process. Conducting this monitoring process, however, has been an ongoing problem within the project. Not wanting to rely on outside experts for such information, project organizers insist that community members should be trained and able to conduct the assessment themselves. Not only is this consistent with a basic tenet of community empowerment, making community members responsible for monitoring so that participants are accountable to themselves, but it also ensures the viability of the project once funding and expertise aren't so readily available.

By 2000, it was clear that despite WAJIB contract language requiring groups to maintain tree cover, community members weren't yet ready to take on full responsibility for this assessment. IFMP staff still felt strongly that selected participants should at least be trained in the process so that they were familiar with the methodology. In September of that year, 8 farmers were selected from each block and given a 5-day training in Tree Cover Assessment (TCA). Overall, the results of this training were considered "positive", but it was noted that the process was both time consuming and expensive (T/Mariam 2000).

The Forest Block Allocation Contract currently outlines the TCA methodology, including how sample plots are identified, the use of the "relascope" tool, how to count various plant matter encountered, and how to utilize the formula for an overall assessment. This methodology can be seen in the attached Contract **(Annex G)**. The measure of tree cover assessment has become critically important, as project managers rely on that numerical data as an indicator of the need to either reduce forest rent or impose sanctions. Thus, whether the tree cover has increased or decreased becomes the single most telling quantitative indicator of the success of the project in reducing rates of deforestation.

E. Tourism

When community development was phased out of the project mission in 1998, tourism was left as one aspect worth exploring further. If the RFPA could be marketed as a tourist destination, benefits to the community would be both direct and indirect. Locals could work in the tourist industry, and thereby generate income without relying on

extraction from the forest. A responsible eco-tourism component would increase visibility of the project and bring much needed money into the area.

A tourism consultant was brought in to the project site in 1999 to assess the potential of IFMP forest huts/camps as tourist destinations. He concluded that given the current state of the primitive huts, the journey was likely to be appealing primarily to backpackers who, for many financial and logistical reasons, were not considered "ideal clients" (Anon 1999: 13). The target tourists were identified as commercial groups organized by tour operators; to attract this clientele the consultant recommended the addition of flush toilets and hot showers to the huts (Kasparek 1999). Some of the huts were indeed upgraded in the years following Kasparek's visit, but commercial tour groups still weren't sending their groups to Dodola.

In 2001, Maarten Van ter Beek was hired by GTZ as a tourism consultant. When he arrived, the Dodola hut system was hosting 400 tourists per year and generating 55,000birr/year (=USD $6,563) directly to the community. Locals were working part-time as guides and horse-lenders. Project staff, satisfied with these results but burdened with administrating the system, were hoping to turn over the entire business to the community. Van ter Beek estimated that within 2 years, it is likely that tourist numbers and income would double as ex-patriots living in Addis learned of the huts. 80-90% of current tourists are ex-patriots, mostly Europeans. Beyond that, however, IFMP would be required to make a much more substantial investment of time and money. No tour operator is likely to take over the enterprise as it currently stands; since community members are paid directly for their services, there is no provision for IFMP overhead or profit.

Another concern was the distribution of guiding and horse permits. IFMP staff say that the process is fair and the opportunity to work with the tourism project will continue to rotate through the community. Many farmers expressed anger at the system whereby their neighbors were able to earn money as guides, but felt that no such opportunity existed for them. Participation in the tourism industry is very important for farmers and understandably so. Many of the benefits of the IFMP are long-term and largely invisible; tourism income, on the other hand, is immediate and measurable. Indeed, of the ten (10) farmers with whom I spoke, nearly half were personally benefiting from the tourism trade, either as hut-keepers, guides or lenders of horses. The remaining half, those without immediate personal benefits from tourism, without exception expressed frustration at the unfairness of the system. Van ter Beek, aware of these rising tensions, remarked, "I'm afraid that this entire tourism project might in fact backfire on the WAJIB system," (Van ter Beek 2001). A strong and accountable administrative system is necessary to manage the allocation of benefits. As it currently stands, the tourism project benefits certain individuals but not community groups or weredas as a whole.

F. Non-Wood Forest Income

Aside from tourism, IFMP organizers continue to brainstorm other options for creating opportunities for farmers to earn income without cutting down trees. Most notable include ideas for developing sport fishing in the water resources within forest boundaries. Fishing would presumably draw tourists to the area from Addis and thereby contribute to tourism profit.

Alternatively, beekeeping has a historical anchor in the area, and IFMP staff have hired consultants over the years to explore the feasibility of reintroducing and expanding the reach of that small business. Beekeeping is a traditional practice in the community, with strategies passed on from one generation to the next. It is widespread; for example, over 60% of the households in Adele PA (the study area) keep bees (Nuru-Adigba 1997). Custom dictates that men are in charge of beekeeping, with women taking a role only when "authorized" by their husband to sell honey. A beekeeper is allowed to hang his colonies on any tree; in so doing, he establishes a customary right to continue using that tree. The researchers observed that beekeeping practices had not been modified in generations, and overall honey yield continued to decline from 12-15kg/colony during Haile Selassie's reign to a meager 3-6kg/colony today (Nuru-Adigba 1997). Researchers noted that keepers were lax in key responsibilities including visiting hives, feeding bees, protecting the hives from the elements, and protecting the hives from predators. Some of these tasks would be simple to remedy. The team concluded that for the enterprise to be profitable, farmers would have to switch from honey-collection to more intensive honey-production. A 10-day training seminar was organized, and 27 farmers attended. Trainers were optimistic, noting that participants were all there out of their own volition, and seemed both impressed and convinced, ready to implement the recommended changes. In follow-up, however, one observer reported, "Unfortunately, the improved techniques were not adopted. Apparently the farmers only attended because they expected to be given the protective gear and rubber boots at the end of the course," (Anonymous 1999: 4).

G. Nurseries and the Creation of Forest Resources

For many forestry professionals in Ethiopia, community forestry simply means that communities control tree nurseries instead of the government. Of course, the meaning of PFM is far broader than that, but interest in nurseries and quantitative measures of viable seedlings remains a key tool for assessing the success of any forestry project. Additionally, impetus for creating tree nurseries in consistent with one of the fundamental goals of the IFMP: reducing demand on the Adaba-Dodola Forest Priority Area.

In the early years of the project, government-run nurseries were focused on seedling production of exotic species with high commercial potential. Organization and production of those nurseries was highly centralized. Initial studies into the efficiency of government versus private nurseries indicated that the production cost of one seedling in a private nursery was 7 cents, compared with 20 cents in the public nurseries (Uncovsky 1996). As a result of this finding, IFMP foresters decided that project nurseries would be privately run and would grow both local and exotic species. The project began to offer support in the form of equipment and seed to privately run nurseries through the "community forestry section" of the Soil and Water Development Department of the District of Agricultural Development Offices in Adaba and Dodola. By 1997/1998, approximately 50 IFMP supported nurseries had produced nearly 1 million seedlings. In fact, these private nurseries had become so proficient at producing *Eucalyptus* that public nurseries ceased producing that species on a large scale (Uncovsky 1998).

By 2000, IFMP had professionalized their approach to supporting local private nurseries. At the woreda level, soil and water conservation experts begin by identifying

available nursery sites and establishing water availability. Next, these reports are forwarded to the IFMP, which visits the site, meets with farmers interested in raising seedlings, and offers support of materials, seeds and technical advice and supervision. The weredas in the Adaba-Dodola area are divided into 4 zones, each with a task manager responsible for tracking nursery production. Water shortages are the number one reason for nurseries going out of production or producing sub-capacity. Data on the number of seedlings produced are summarized in Table 3.3. Overall achievement is measured as a percentage of seedlings planted out of the totals produced; in other words, seedlings which grew dwarfed or too fragile to be transplanted were considered failures. Overall, IFMP-supported nurseries have an achievement rate of 63.7% (Mariame 2000). True to form, the measurement of success rates was followed by recommendations for improvement: more supervision, especially of weeding and fencing, was suggested. Additionally, it was noted that some PAs within each woreda have scant incentive to plant trees since "they are closer to the natural forest where access is currently free to get wood of any type needed," (Mariame 2000: 2).

Table 3.3

	Dodola Woreda	**Adaba Woreda**	**Asasa Woreda**
Eucalyptus spp.	1,576,596	438,960	79,994
Cupressus lusitanica	120,111	16,487	1,500
Other spp. [ii]	78,312	5,907	150
TOTALS	1,775,719	461,354	81,644

Despite these impressive overall results, seedling numbers are perhaps the most closely watched figure in Addis Ababa. Ato Million Bekele, the Team Leader for Forestry Conservation and Development for the Ministry of Agriculture, a very high-ranking official in that department, said quite simply, "they are not planting enough," (Bekele 2001). His comments, to be sure, were more complex and insightful than that quip suggests; nonetheless, the importance of seedling numbers and production cannot be overstated.

H. Encouraging Participation: The Role of Women

From the beginning, IFMP organizers have been cognizant that women in Ethiopia do not have equal access to information, decision-making and resources (Popp 1997, Hassen 1999, Asfaw 1999, Uncovsky 2001). While most organizers agree that altering gender inequalities is neither appropriate nor possible for the project to aspire to, giving women a voice in planning is critical (Uncovsky 2001). Thus, gender-specific concerns are consistently included in training workshops. For example, a three-day workshop was held in 1998 specifically targeting gender issues. With 22 participants, the objectives of the training included education of planning tools designed to integrate a gendered perspective, recognition of women's knowledge and increased awareness of their role, and even "changing the beliefs of the trainees consciously and unconsciously . . . to help them examine themselves and their relationships with others," (Kubsa 8/1998 Backstopping Report: 7).

Planning meetings and workshops continue to be chronically dominated by men. For example, in 1996 IFMP held what they called an "Introductory Training Workshop"

intended to orient farmers to the development of Participatory Forest Management in the area, conduct a situation analysis using techniques from the Rapid Rural Appraisal and Participatory Rural Appraisal toolboxes, and involve local government officials in situation analysis. 165 farmers attended the meeting; only 13 were women. The women were unable to attend because they were busy; the walk to the nearest mill was so far away that it took women almost all day to do the trip (IFMP 1996). Indeed, a breakdown of a woman's average workday offers this schedule: 3 hours spent milking cows, 4 hours preparing food, 5 hours "supporting husband", 5 hours miscellaneous "labor", and 7 hours rest (Hassen 1999). Participation in governance planning simply doesn't fit. Those that do find the time to attend public meetings tend to remain largely quiet and even sit separately from the men. To generate input from women, recommends Honey Hassen, a separate meeting should be held just for them; this meeting should be after 10:00a.m. and held only on non-market days (Hassen 1999).

There seem to be many good reasons for soliciting the input of women specifically. One cartographic researcher from Germany found that women have a better developed perception of the immediate terrain than men do. The female chores, including gathering firewood and going to market, enable women to develop a sense of their immediate territory which is sounder than their male counterparts (Domnick 2001). When Dr. Domnick asked farmers to draw sketch maps for her, she found that almost without exception the women's depictions were far more accurate.

The different world views don't end there. Another researcher found that men identify PAs, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Education as being the most important institutions for them. Women, by contrast, point to traditional structures such

as *edir*, a community self-help organization to which families contribute monthly and which then steps in to assist in the event of a death or a wedding in the family, and *equb*, a rotating savings and credit association. While both genders respect elders, women in particular look to them for guidance (Popp 1997). Thus, the IFMP inclination to work through existing governmental channels is problematic (Popp 1997, Hassen 1999). As Marian Popp put it, "a community approach completely relying on the PA executives and committees fails to reach poor population groups and the majority of women," (Popp 1997: 11).

The project has sought to address the gender issue by hiring a staffer specifically to serve as a "gender backstopper". This person, who has almost always been the only female on staff, conducts outreach to women in the community, gathers information about the female perspective and needs, and submits recommendations to the project organizers. Additionally, several outside consultants and researchers have come through with a special interest in gender issues; these foreigners have provided analyses and insight to IFMP leaders. One such outsider noted that even this approach is fraught with problems. A woman interviewing a woman is likely to generate valuable information, but when the interviewer is foreign and needs a translator, that translator is almost always male. Once a male is inserted into the equation, results are less reliable as woman are likely to alter their answers and the translator, too, might interpret information differently (Domnick 2001).

Researchers into gender norms in the Dodola area are quick to remind IFMP planners that Western notions of households and divisions of labor do not apply to Muslim rural Ethiopia. For example, "husband and wife do not form a unified economic entity: women

contribute with unpaid subsistence work. . . as compensation, they receive a certain amount of grain. Apart from that, no income is pooled," (Popp 1997: 14). Program plans which identify the man as the head of household and plan his land and resource needs based on that do not adequately address the needs of women maintaining their own home in a polygamous family structure.

Popp recommended that the IFMP reach out to women more actively, seeking their input into land use decisions and benefit schemes. Working through the *idir* would be the most effective way to generate female participation; extra attention should be paid to recruiting very poor women's involvement. Several other gender back-stoppers and researchers have come to similar conclusions. Lenesil Asfaw goes as far as to recommend that IFMP organizers insist on a quorum of women as comprising 33% of any FODWA group (Asfaw 1999). Community development and off-farm income opportunities should be specially focused on women, she argues, as a tool for female empowerment (Asfaw 1999).

Despite sound and well articulated recommendations for better inclusion of women, the IFMP is still a male-dominated enterprise. The only female staffers out of 12 were one gender backstopper and one half-time German project manager (Antje Lipp, the wife of Hans Lipp with whom she shares the job). I attended a WAJIB meeting in May 2001 and counted 25 adults total present; of those, 2 women were in the circle, although they were seated somewhat to the outside and 2 other women were in the vicinity but were not participating in the meeting and instead supervised the many children. Certainly cultural and political norms dictate these realities and IFMP staff are understandably reluctant to openly challenge gender roles. Instead, they seek to include female needs by conducting

separate interviews and meetings with women. Abdurrahiman Kubsa notes, however, that the presence of gender consultants in the project does not ensure follow-through by organizers (1999).

V. Conclusion

This section has outlined the institutional, social and economic dimensions of the Adaba-Dodola Integrated Forestry Management Project. I began by describing the context within which the project is situated. The forest area is officially "protected" as a Forest Priority Area; however, in practice it is used on a daily basis by an estimated 200,000 people in the area. Human livelihoods rely on forest products, including livestock range, for survival.

German Technical Cooperation began developing the IFMP project as early as the 1980s, but the idea didn't come to fruition until the mid-1990s. The history of project development as traced here in some detail reveals patterns of bureaucratic obstruction and political upheaval. While GTZ was clearly given special dispensation as a bilateral aid agency with significant financial and technical assistance to offer, it was also the target of suspicion and resistance at all levels. The agency went through some initial growing pains as they worked to earn the trust of community members and local and regional governments. By 1998, implementation of the project was underway. Based on the principles of exclusion and indigenous empowerment, IFMP organizers set up an ingenious structure of 'membership' for forest dwellers, in which locals were arranged into groups and bound by contract to protect the forest within their territory.

Ongoing challenges for project organizers have included erratic participation by government entities, inconsistent enforcement, difficulty with tree cover monitoring, and the lack of alternative income sources for community members who are slowly being excluded from forest access. Tourism merits special attention, both because IFMP has integrated it so carefully within its overall planning, and because villagers have begun to anticipate immediate benefits in the form of participation in the local industry. Results have so far been mixed, and the prospects for tourism in the A-D forest are not especially promising. Beekeeping, too, has been problematic; despite significant potential and investments into training, little lasting development has occurred in this sector. Tree nurseries have been a tangential outcome of the project, but ultimately matter a great deal to external evaluators who seek to assess the "success" of the project. Therefore, current efforts to encourage planting are likely to be seen as insufficient. Finally, the participation of women continues to be an issue for organizers as project management is seen as a male responsibility within the community.

These challenges will be explored in depth in the forthcoming chapter. I will apply tenets of CPR theory, presented in Chapter II, to the IFMP case described here. In the process, I will identify gaps in the theory, and assess the extent to which the challenges facing GTZ might have been predicable based on theoretical insights.

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[i] My primary source for most of this history is Stephan Uncovsky. I met with Mr. Uncovsky for several hours at the GTZ headquarters in Eschborn, Germany in December, 2001. He was one of the founders of the IFMP project and thus proved to be an excellent source of information on the development of the idea.

[ii] Other species grown in IFMP-supported nurseries included *Acacia spp., Hagenia abysinica, Casuarina equistifolia, Olia africana, Schinus molle.*

CHAPTER VI : DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

I. Introduction

The opportunity to conduct an in-depth analysis and assessment of the IFMP is a rare and valuable one. Too often, time and energy is funneled into the planning and execution of participatory projects; evaluation is critically needed. Fisher (1995) notes: "There are relatively few examples of critical documentation for well-developed projects, partly perhaps because the field is relatively new. Examples of critical assessment of successes or failures are rare. . ." (11). By any measure, the IFMP is a well-developed project. Commitment for its execution is evidenced by the funding it has generated and the staff it supports, as well as the national and international attention it has received. Additionally, the project is an excellent case study because of the context in which it is being conducted. Ethiopia, by almost any measure and as described herein, ranks at the bottom of most lists for governance, development capacity and poverty. The presence of a functioning and, by many measures, thriving, community forestry project merits attention. Critical debates currently being waged within the theoretical and planning literatures are played out in the IFMP. Gender differences, participatory challenges, and transition to pure community management are examples of issues with which IFMP staff are currently wrestling; the lessons learned in Dodola, then, speak directly to timely questions in the field.

Here I will summarize both strengths and weaknesses of the IFMP as described in Chapter V. This section will explore conclusions reached by both research observations and in the literature on the project. I will subject the case of the IFMP to an analysis

based upon each of the three theories presented in chapter II: Common-Pool Resource Theory, Participatory Forest Management Theory, and Policy Capacity Theory.

Throughout this dissertation, threads have run through each chapter; this section is the place where I tie those pieces together. Theory and empirics combine here in synthesis and analysis. I have organized the chapter based upon section topics from Chapter II. In the body of each section here, I will link together empirical evidence from my case study with theoretical underpinnings from the literature. This chapter is heavy on the first person; in other words, I am working here to offer my own research conclusions and while I do quote my informants where possible, much of this discussion is my own.

II. Common Pool Resources & Participatory Forest Management: The IFMP Case Study

A. CPR & IFMP

1. Local Organization

CPR theorists use this category primarily to emphasize the importance of the utilization of existing local organizations whenever possible in the formation of new regimes at the local level. My discussion of this element of CPR theory in Chapter II focused on the existence of Peasant Associations, and noted that other traditional structures also exist in the informal sector. Later, in Chapter III, I described the controversial history and misuse of these PAs, and indicated that the bodies suffer from long-term distrust. Chapter IV gave me the opportunity to explore capacity at the local level, and I argued that PAs tend to be rife with corruption, abuse of power, and weakness in terms of funding and training. Finally, in Chapter V I described the

inconsistent behavior of the PAs in implementing the IFMP, and highlighted research which indicates that women in particular trust and depend on traditional structures such as *edir* and *equb* groups instead of the PAs. Thus, the overarching picture is one of a weak formal local organization structure, buoyed somewhat by the existence of informal structures for support. CPR schemes around the world have occasionally encountered just this problem, where long standing institutions reflect social values from an earlier period in time (Arnold 1999).

Thus, external agents seeking to foster local organization have a choice. They can either build on an existing, yet flawed, local institution or create new ones specifically designed for new needs. IFMP leaders did both. That is, they created WAJIBs and worked with both the local level organization (PA) and regional governments to garner formal support and integration. In some ways, this is the ideal solution for the circumstances. Existing structures are ostensibly strengthened through their participation in the new project; new institutions come into being to perform highly specialized tasks specific for forest management. Indeed, given the limited geographic scope of the IFMP, reforming the PA system as a whole is clearly beyond the means and intention of the project. I asked farmers whether they felt their PA represented them, and followed up with additional questions intended to gauge the extent to which people trusted and relied on PAs as a government structure. To my surprise, given the grim descriptions in Ethiopian history books, most expressed their blind faith in the institution. Many told me that what information they had about the project came primarily via the PA, and one said he feels free to "go there [to the PA offices] and talk with them about this project and society and problems," (Kabato 2001).

In the theoretical vein, in the case of the IFMP, it is nearly impossible to assess the efficacy of the existing PA structure without confronting capacity weakness and overall lack of community development in Ethiopia. While the local PA in Dodola may well be serving communicative needs of residents, the institution is beset by multiple dimensions of capacity weakness (see Chapter IV). If PAs suffer from the lack of an educated staff, lack of financial resources, and lack of strong federal backing, then WAJIBs are likely to suffer the same fate. Thus, the very first category for analysis in the CPR literature immediately points to the need for combining that theory with environmental capacity analysis. When I do so in Chapter IV and VI, my analysis is more thorough. In the case of the IFMP, combining existing institutions with new ones is an effective compromise. Ideally, GTZ will also work with local PAs to enhance their capacity in preparation for the inevitable transition when GTZ departs. Thus far, capacity building at the PA level has been minimal.

2. Resource Tenure Security

Common Pool Resource theorists insist that secure resource tenure is an essential starting point for the success of any community-based management regime. In the case of forest management, secure land tenure might be considered fundamental. Secure tenure is, however, not synonymous with private ownership and the two concepts should be discussed separately. Security suggests that users of the resource can count on having consistent access and/or use rights over time. As for privatization of property, CPR theorists emphasize that property rights are deeply complex and that forests in particular present special challenges. A full understanding of the public/private dyad means taking

into account access rights, use rights, and transfer rights. Debate rages over which particular arrangement works best. Gibson et.al. (2000) remind scholars to beware oversimplification and not "collapse goods, rights and owners into a single blur," (34).

In Ethiopia, all land is owned by the government. While government leaders have recently begun to speak more publicly about desires to encourage privatization (SDRP 2002), land still remains firmly nationalized. There are no signs that massive land reform designed to change this decades-old policy will occur in the near future. Recall the history of relocation and villagization which defined land use policy through much of the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter III, section *III.B.*); clearly, this experience has left a lasting impression on Ethiopians and many doubt their long-term land security. Some scholars argue that the legacy left by land reform programs have soured present-day government efforts to encourage conservation (Hailu 2001, Berhe 2001). Everyone agrees that "land tenure is critically important" (Hailu 2001). However, on the narrow issue of privatization of land, opinion remains mixed.

A few people with whom I spoke argued passionately that current law guaranteeing "all" Ethiopians a plot of land (Ethiopian Constitution) is the only workable system. Ownership, in this line of thinking, is irrelevant. Abdurrahiman Kubsa, an Ethiopian native, a community forestry expert and one of the top organizers with IFMP, explained to me that the current land tenure system works. Farmers are given land to cultivate, and they are satisfied. When I suggested that many in Addis had expressed dissatisfaction with nationalization of all land, he scoffed: "The Addis people are sitting in Addis. They don't know. . . the life of farmers," (Kubsa 2001). Tom McShane, the WWF Coordinator for the Ethiopia programme, agreed with Kubsa. He believes that at

least some land can and should remain in national hands. In many places, he argued, "land doesn't have to be privatized for it all to work," (2001).

Most, however, felt strongly that unless and until land tenure reform was passed, no lasting solution to environmental degradation would be possible. Stepan Uncovsky, the GTZ project manager who co-founded the IFMP, insisted that the only configuration that will work in Ethiopia is "to get as close to private property as possible," (2001). Interestingly, considering his key role in establishing a CPR regime, he remains quite skeptical of "the evils of common property", an opinion which he identifies as a vestige from his youth in socialist Czechoslovakia.

Full privatization was not advocated by anyone with whom I spoke, but skepticism about current and complete nationalization was quite common. Kahsay Berhe is a rare Ethiopian success story: he is now a research technologist at the International Livestock Research Institute in Addis studying land use in the highlands where he was born and raised. He said he remembered lush forests from his youth, and is convinced that without land tenure reform, sustainable land use is unattainable. Without specifying his position on privatization, Berhe said, "land policy and land tenure is a core issue to whatever development we do in this country. . . so the policy should change," (2001). One community forestry leader suggested that privatization would be extremely difficult to accomplish, and wondered about the fate of Forest Priority Areas in a privatized system (Temesgen 2001). This same informant noted that as a conservation tool, simply providing title to land would be insufficient; new owners "will just start to destroy it before the government changes its mind," (2001). Privatization, in his view, needs to be accompanied by individual empowerment. Presumably, empowerment includes education

and capacity building to support land reform. Temesgen concluded our discussion of land tenure by offering a compromise: perhaps a certificate of ownership would be a helpful first step. Indeed, some areas in Northern Ethiopia (Tigray region) have begun to experiment with ownership certificates, where a family will get a guarantee of use rights for 99 years (Bekele 2001). They are not allowed to sell their property, so the arrangement isn't a move toward privatization; however, they are given a formal promise from the government that their land won't be reallocated. Certification innovations come directly from perceived deficiencies in forestry conservation incentive systems: when people doubt their long-term use of land, they are unlikely to undertake long-term conservation measures (Bekele 2001).

Finally, others questioned the viability of the existing system and expressed doubt that every needy Ethiopian family was, in fact, provided land as promised by the government. Dr. Yared Amera noted that inequity is rife. Younger people don't get land, and female headed households don't get land. Amera estimates that the divorce rate in many Christian areas is 20-30%; oftentimes the men get the land and the children, and the women are left with few options but to move back in with their families (2001). One of the farmers I interviewed told a story that verified Amera's impression. Hussein Asha, a 36 year old Muslim man with one wife and 5 children, said he was never allocated land. During the Derg regime, he reported, a person had to be 25 years old to get land and he was too young. Later, all the land in his area was taken and no reallocation took place. He claims the PA has told him that if a person dies and has no family, then he will get their land; until that unlikely eventuality, he lives within the forest, has no cattle, and relies on selling wood for income (2001).

The government, says Amera, will never really consider privatization. Owning land is all about power and "so long as you control the land, you control the people," (Amera 2001). When the government retains tight control over people via the land, communities cannot be empowered to act independently.

I asked every farmer I met about land ownership; each replied as if by rote that the government owned the forest. One man offered his opinion on the issue, saying that under the Derg they were told that society owned the forest. Now, it belongs to the government and this makes more sense to him because "when it belongs to the society, every individual exploits it as he likes," (Kabato 2001). He went on to express his absolute faith that if somebody behaved illegally in the forest, the government as owners would "take action".

As an analyst I am hard-pressed to pass judgment on land tenure in Ethiopia. The history of the country is so unique and complex that I find it difficult to ascertain any sort of simple land tenure reform solution. That decision, fortunately for me, is outside the scope of this dissertation. On the more specific issue of the IFMP, however, I realize that the project simply wouldn't exist if land were privatized. The CPR regime is based on the fact that the land is owned by everyone, and that forest products are legally used by thousands. Privatization of the Adaba-Dodola FPA might or might not benefit the forest ecologically, depending on how private owners chose to manage their land. But there seems to be little doubt that without some common access, hundreds of thousands of residents would starve. Ethiopia's exploding population, deeply engrained poverty, and lack of opportunity for off-farm income conspire to make privatization of land an unrealistic aspiration, at least in the short term.

Tenure security is another matter. Building trust with the community is unavoidably long and arduous; it is a task which nobody but the government can accomplish and it is truly critical to the long-term success of community management in Ethiopia. A final forest policy, expressing the intentions of the government to respect tenure rights, to support community organization, to avoid relocating people whenever possible, and to build strong enabling legislation would go a long way toward accomplishing this goal.

3. Exclusion & Community Development

The organizers of the IFMP have achieved the key condition of exclusion by carefully and specifically targeting this at the outset of their planning. CPR theorists, too, begin with this assumption: if we conceive of the "commons" as meaning only "open access", then Garret Hardin's tragedy of the commons is, indeed, the likely outcome. If, however, we reconsider the idea and broaden it to signify gradations of property rights which exist outside classic private ownership, then institutional structures become central to the creation of sustainable use rules.

When I visited the project site, exclusion was proceeding without major difficulty (see Section *II.A.4* on enforcement for some examples of exclusion violations). Thousands of adjacent residents both rely on forest access for their livelihoods and will be excluded since they aren't residents of the forest itself; however, since the project is still proceeding one forest block at a time, everyone can still find portions of the forest which haven't yet been brought under the IFMP umbrella. Does exclusion, then, simply

mean displacement? If so, has the ecological condition of the forest overall really seen any benefit of sustainable practices in organized WAJIB islands?

The issue of exclusion raises questions of equity and off-farm community development. For a detailed analysis of equity and environmental justice in the IFMP, see Section *II.B.2* below. Community development is relevant here because if people who depend on the forest are excluded from it, alternative sources of income must be provided if the project is to succeed over the long term. However, IFMP organizers made a careful choice early in the history of the project to exclude community development from its mission.

Stepan Uncovsky, IFMP's first project manager, notes that even in the beginning, when GTZ saw building community capacity and infrastructure as a goal of their work, they knew it was "nonsense" (2001). Building grinding mills, schools and wells are all what he calls "confidence building measures", tools for buying the support of the community. Everyone at project headquarters knew these kinds of activities would be short-lived. Providing that kind of community development support almost always backfires, as an "island of opportunity" is created and suddenly everyone from the surrounding villages wants to migrate. Community development simply cannot be done independently of country development (Uncovsky 2001). Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of the IFMP, the link between sustainable forestry and community development wasn't clear to organizers. Kubsa notes that "the contributions of [community development] activities to forest conservation were insignificant," (2001). For these compelling reasons, IFMP chose to eliminate community development from its mission and instead focus more tightly on the creation of a "feasible conservation

approach" for sustainable forestry in the forest. (See Chapter V, section *III.D.* for a more detailed discussion of the factors which came into this decision.)

Although Uncovsky and Kubsa are clearly right about the unintentional dangers of community development work, some of the most critical challenges currently facing the project seem to stem directly from the lack of local development. Without community infrastructure development, I believe efforts to expand income opportunities have very limited potential. For example, if beekeeping can be developed to produce honey for market, it seems worthwhile to develop small business skills and infrastructure within the community. Honey could be bottled, labeled and sold in neighboring towns. Not only would the beekeepers be able to earn their income without cutting down trees, but townspeople could be trained in marketing and business skills, and distribution would require even more staff, at least part time. In a place like Dodola, where earnings are so low and opportunities so few that cutting trees is the only viable option, the creation of this kind of entrepreneurship seems like a win-win proposition. Indeed, when I inquired about the failure of the IFMP to follow-through on the development of beekeeping, Kubsa seemed to agree: "good question," (2001) was his only response. Community development concerns (discussed below) conspire to make this above scenario highly unlikely.

Without comprehensive and integrated community development and conscious provision of alternative off-farm income opportunities, exclusion for the IFMP simply means displacement. Farmers are not being educated about how to provide for their families when they have been excluded from their customary forest access. Tourism, the only regular form of additional income provided by the project, benefits participants

unequally and inconsistently (see Chapter V, Section *IV.E*). Effective exclusion is one of the most important preliminary conditions for an effective CPR regime. Prioritizing community development would mean the IFMP had longer-term and more comprehensive exclusion in mind. As it currently stands, exclusion is partial and ecologically inconsequential.

4. Monitoring & Enforcement

One critical piece for any effort to reduce deforestation is a reliable system of monitoring. As I discussed in Chapter V, the Ethiopian government is especially concerned with tracking the measurable progress of the IFMP. In order to assess whether their funding is well-placed, the Oromia regional government wants to see deforestation rates going down. Forest sustainability in the view of most in the government remains an issue of tree numbers, and despite the increased understanding of PFM monitoring systems remains attuned almost exclusively to quantitative measures. This expectation of consistent monitoring is problematic for several reasons.

First, the project's mission is to create a system whereby forest resources can be managed sustainably. If deforestation rates remain constant in the face of increasing population and livestock grazing pressure, the project might be considered a success. Reducing deforestation rates would be an exceptional result, and should not be expected. Deforestation may actually increase in the early stages of a PFM project, argues Zelalem Temesgen, PFM Advisor for FARM Africa, but that just isn't the point (2001).

Second, many of the steps required to create such community conditions are intangible. The creation of trust, the education of community groups, and public outreach

for buy-in are all examples of critical and very time-consuming activities that project staff engage in regularly. Measuring deforestation rates as an indicator of success does not capture the community organization piece at all. Temesgen points to regional competition over seedling numbers as a driving force behind the quantification of success in PFM. Qualitative changes, he argues, are just as important if not more so, but the government too often misses those in the search for quantitative results.

Third, IFMP staff insists on using a monitoring system that is accessible to community members both so they can participate in conducting the monitoring and so that they can read and assess monitoring results. Uncovsky reports that he and Baptist had different opinions on the issue, with Baptist favoring a more relaxed, subjective approach to monitoring. Uncovsky advocated the use of a simple tool called a relascope to standardize visual assessments. Still, however, no consistent and reliable method for monitoring has been established as evidenced by a recent round of measurements. In it, one assessor says the forest has improved, one says it has degraded to unacceptable levels, and others who go out to check on these results report a forest largely unchanged. Clearly, reliable technology, such as Geographic Information Systems, exists for this purpose, but GTZ is understandably reluctant to introduce that level of technology and expertise into the equation. Everyone seems to agree that hiring a GIS expert is out of the question, and that a measure needs to be developed which is usable by the average farmer. To that end, Tree Cover Assessment (TCA) has been chosen as a single, reasonably simple measurement which can be taken over time to track changes in the forest. Farmers can and have been trained to conduct this inventory. Clearly, TCA fails to take into account understory vegetation, wildlife and other indicators of forest health

and as such, is a very incomplete tool. However, it has the benefit of being easily taught, low tech and inexpensive to administer.

Enforcement presents another problem for IFMP organizers. Indeed, the problem of enforcement in the forestry sector in Ethiopia is much larger than the Dodola project. One informant estimated that in Ethiopia's Forest Priority Areas, only 10% of illegal forest users are arrested, and only 1% are fined (Temesgen 2001). Ato Tibebe, the Head of the Forestry and Wildlife Conservation Department for Oromia region, spoke to the lack of forest guards as well, noting that his office was frequently unable to satisfy its mission: "if. . . there is no guard, I think we are not really carrying out our responsibilities . . . for forest reserves," (2001). In the Adaba-Dodola region, Tsegaye Tadesse says guards have "zero impact on forest protection" (1999: 9). Capacity weakness is matched by corruption, and some argue that Ethnic Federalism has magnified favoritism at all levels of government. The powerful, argued Temesgen, are reinforced by relatives in power and "in the area of law enforcement, this [ethnic federalism] has a negatively affect" (Temesgen 2001).

The national context of poor enforcement translates directly to the IFMP. At first glance, it might seem that a weak governmental enforcement system might be a strong argument for the creation of a community-based forest regime. That is, if the government is unable to enforce its laws in the forest, perhaps organized community groups will have more success at regulating access and use. One informant expressed discomfort at the very idea that forest use might be heavily enforced by armed guards; instead, he argued, participatory norms mandate a "softening" of compliance management (Gurmu 2001). This inclination to redefine what enforcement means was echoed by others who linked

indigenous management with "traditional [planning and enforcement] systems," (Hailu 2001). In other words, as communities become empowered to manage their own forests, perhaps they will rely more on customary access rules to define use rights. Whether or not heavy-handed policing is appropriate for forest regulation, IFMP participants rely heavily on the government for enforcement support.

I asked farmers whether they or anyone they knew had experienced the need for enforcement in the context of the project, and whether that need had been met. Without prompting, virtually every informant separated problems into two categories: internal and external. Internal problems, conceived of as those which occur among forest dwellers, were reported to be few. Boundary disputes were the most frequently cited internal problem, and indeed many remain dissatisfied with the demarcation process. This issue, however, seems to be one more relevant to power relationships and the overall shortage of land; it cannot be resolved through improved enforcement. Unfair allocation of tourism benefits was another frequently cited gripe with the project. Again, this is a structural dispute and while it does present a real problem for project organizers, it is not a reflection of the need for improved enforcement.

External problems, in which those who live outside the forest seek to gain illegal access, were reported to be many. Stories varied. One expressed confidence that the government and the forest dwellers "help each other" (Wakiyo 2001) in times of need, and the government could be relied on for enforcement help. Another farmer saw enforcement as the responsibility of the WAJIB and confidently said that their group "will keep the exploiters out" (Tusa 2001). One IFMP participant said he had told government leaders about some non-forest-dwellers who were encroaching on WAJIB

land, but nothing happened "because they get money from the exploiters" (Kadir 2001). Instead, he explained, he took matters into his own hands, confiscated wood from a non-member and turned him in. Still, nothing happened. Finally the outsider came back to "steal my property during the night"; WAJIB members grouped together, blocked the thief's way back to town, and "beat him".

Clearly enforcement problems exist in the IFMP. Corruption, unclear jurisdiction, uninformed participants, and weak local government capacity are all challenges which face the creation of an effective and consistent system of enforcement. CPR scholars theorize that gradations of punishments should exist, and that these should be both clear to participants and appropriately scaled for different offense severity (Ostrom 1997, 2000). In the IFMP, WAJIBs have the responsibility to "expel outsiders from the forest", but it is the government's job to conduct conflict mediation, enforce payment of forest rent, "make sure that rules and regulations are respected" and impose "sanctions if the obligations in the bylaws are not met," (Tadesse 1999: 11). Tadesse, a Project Manager, explains that "it has been observed that the old practice of policing the forest is inadequate" and that instead forest dwellers will be entrusted to manage their forests with substantial support from government bodies (Tadesse 1999: 12).

The forest block contract, probably the most formal statement of WAJIB policies, does little to clarify vague enforcement rules. Sanctions are specified for deforestation (i.e. reduction in tree cover), non-payment of rent, excessive settlement, and non-eligible member participation. The punishments are mostly financial, but there is no provision for what means will be used to collect the fees, and what will happen if sanctions do not resolve the problem. During my visit, it seemed that issues meriting enforcement were

being handled on a case-by-case basis during project staff meetings. Indeed, problems were many and so far-ranging that perhaps developing a contingency plan for every issue is an impossible goal. A partial list of disputes and disagreements which came up in a single (5/24/01) IFMP staff meeting includes:

- A man in an organized block took another wife. This new wife has moved into the WAJIB, but there are already 30 members which means they aren't allowed to accept other settlers. The members of the block had come to project organizers to resolve this issue.
- In the Gede WAJIB, the two founding leaders of the group were having trouble working together. Some in the WAJIB reported that one of the leaders was "not fit", and a recent weekly meeting was postponed in the confusion. The IFMP staff member in charge of Gede reported having difficulty figuring out the nature of the problem; other staff members at the table gently chastised the Gede monitor for not working hard enough to resolve the problem before it became so problematic.
- In Berissa PA, intruders snuck into a forest block and felled 264 eucalyptus trees. As per project protocol, the WAJIB community elected elders to resolve the problem, and each young thief was fined 100 birr (=USD $12). Of the total 600 birr collected in this incident, the PA claimed 150 birr for themselves and allocated the remainder to the WAJIB. Whether or not the PA has the right to income from confiscated goods or fines has not been established, and long and heated debate ensued.

Most of these issues were not resolved during the staff meeting. Instead, follow-up actions were selected, with an emphasis on talking with the affected parties and gathering more information. As a whole, the IFMP lacks effective and reliable enforcement mechanisms. While individual issues seem resolvable with the aid of GTZ facilitators and PA muscle, the long-term prospects are uncertain. The reasons for enforcement weakness are multi-layered, but ultimate responsibility for enforcement of law must stop at the government level. The single most important point of agreement among my many and diverse interviewees was their conviction that the government lacked commitment to participatory forestry, and that while they may give lip service to community management, they fail to provide background support in the form of policy and enforceable legislation. GTZ staff are forcefully making this point to Ethiopian government officials. Guenther Haase, at a meeting with Ministry of Agriculture leaders (5/29/01), exclaimed "PFM doesn't mean to hand over the forest to communities and let them do as they like! There has to be monitoring and law enforcement." At the local level, PAs which have agreed to take on an enforcement role for the IFMP are not providing regular help for reasons discussed herein.

5. Criteria: The Resource, The Users, and The Institutions

Common Pool Resource research has yielded a wealth of information on which institutional arrangements are the most conducive for effective community resource management arrangements. I have provided an overview of this literature in Chapter II. Arun Agrawal conducted a meta-analysis of the research and compiled the results in a comprehensive list entitled "Critical Enabling Conditions for Sustainability on the

Commons" (2001). His criteria provide helpful indicators for the task here: assessing the extent to which IFMP matches conditions for success as proscribed by CPR theory. While I will not reproduce his entire list here, I will draw upon his insights to guide my discussion.

a. The Resource

Agrawal (2001) lists several characteristics of the resource itself which tend to be conducive for the effective management by community-based organizations. First, he says the resource itself should be relatively small. Surely this is a subjective measurement and ought to take into account the size of the population and the distribution of the resource. In the case of the IFMP, organizers approached this conundrum much as they did the issue of exclusion. The Adaba-Dodola Forest Priority Area as a whole is quite large (50,000 hectares). Subdividing the forest into tight 360ha blocks for WAJIB management directly addresses the need to shrink the size of the resource in order to manage it effectively. Second, Agrawal argues that the resource needs to have well-defined boundaries. Indeed, when I spoke with farmers in forest blocks with demarcated boundaries, each one could identify where the boundaries had been placed. Many disagreed with that placement, however, creating some discontent. Another of Agrawal's criteria is predictability. The presence of a resource with predictable products and yields makes advance planning possible. Indeed, generations of living in the forest has granted residents a strong sense of what to expect from their forest.

CPR theorists assert that only when a resource is not beyond the point of no return can community measures "save" it. However, in the case of the IFMP, only the extreme

degradation of the Adaba-Dodola FPA rendered exclusion a viable option (Uncovsky 2001). That is, CPR scholars are concerned with the presence of a resource that can be rehabilitated effectively; setting up a new community organization which will surely fail to protect the resource seems like a waste of time. However, in the case of Ethiopia, only a highly degraded forest is likely to be left to such "experimental" techniques as community-based management. GTZ's right to organize and work in Ethiopia is only because the government, at some level, condones its mission; a healthy and productive forest would not be left to the management style of an international actor.

b. Group Size and User Attributes: The Next Generation?

Again, Agrawal draws attention to relevant criteria here. In particular, he argues that when we consider the size of the group (i.e. the community), smaller is better. While other researchers seem to disagree with this conclusion (see Chapter II), his point is well taken: surely a metropolis would be unable to effectively manage a common resource without significant oversight. I began my description of the A-D forest by noting that approximately 200,000 people rely on it for their livelihoods; by virtually any measure, this is not a "small" group. IFMP organizers applied the same innovative approach to this problem as they did to shrinking the resource itself: they defined limited sub-sections of the population and granted them responsibility for management of a specific territorial area. So far, the process they have used to select members of the WAJIB group has gone surprisingly smoothly (Kubsa 2001); however, it seems unavoidable that as organizers move forward and place more and more of the forest under project management, villagers will increasingly find their access squeezed. At that point, being chosen to participate

becomes essential; now, users of the forest can still find land accessible to them if they make the effort to move to an as-yet undemarcated area.

Agrawal also notes that low levels of mobility among the populace will promote a long-term commitment to sustainable resource management. Most farmers in the region have been there for generations and see little opportunity to go elsewhere. I asked all the farmers I interviewed how long they had been there, and without exception they all seemed perplexed at the very question. They were born there and their families have "always" lived there.As discussed in Chapter III, mobility for rural dwellers is notoriously poor; interestingly, while this is generally considered a negative sign for development prospects, it does provide the stability and consistency required for a successful community regime.

There are some significant concerns in this section, however. The careful structuring of forest blocks and household allotments is implicitly based on a stable population over time. While migration has effectively been largely eliminated as a cause for fluctuation, the prospect of a new generation of forest dwellers challenges the very fabric of the IFMP structure. With each woman bearing 6.4 children (UNFPA 2000), the issue is critical. These children, born into the IFMP, are entitled to a block of forest to support their families; clearly, there simply isn't enough forest to accommodate these numbers. Kubsa says four options exist. First, the PA relocates this next generation to the plains where land is more plentiful. Second, the size of each homestead is reduced from its current 12ha to better accommodate growing numbers. Third, if the forest has become profitable by the time the next generation is ready to claim their ownership,

perhaps some new unforeseen options will then exist. Lastly, perhaps some of the youth will get educated and leave for town. (Kubsa 2001).

Uncovsky notes that this is a uniquely African phenomenon: the expectation of a rising generation that each will get a portion of the land held by his elders. In the Northern hemisphere, by contrast, primogenesis norms have the oldest child getting the land. This system is more sustainable and keeps expectations within ecological limits. When a family has 8 children, as is common in Africa, and each child expects a piece of land, the original homestead is divided and divided. Since there is a point at which further division is impossible, families expect to get more land. This is the case in Dodola. Dr. Bernd Meissner points to the generation issue as being so critical that controlling the population increase is a determining factor in the success of IFMP (Meissner, 2001).

The issue highlights the fragility of the IFMP arrangement. Perhaps the structure is overly time-bound to survive. After all, Ethiopia is a state which continues to experience massive transformations in its political and climactic context with frequency. If the coming of age of the next generation can call the entire project into question, it raises the possibility that other, unforeseen, changes would similarly cause a crisis of legitimacy.

c. Institutional Design: What Will Happen When GTZ Leaves?

Institutional arrangements are extensively covered in the CPR literature. One key point made by Agrawal (2001) is that there is a danger in the development of overly

complex and nested institutional structures, as often advocated by experts. Unless the community can understand the rules, they will be unable to implement and enforce them. IFMP organizers are cognizant of the illiterate and uneducated population in the area; combined with multiple languages and remote dwellings, a complex structure would be untenable. Project organizers make every effort to translate rules and regulations in all four working languages at the project: German, English, Amharic and Oromigna. Additionally, ever aware of the challenges posed by illiteracy, organizers and staff routinely visit with farmers and participants to explain the project and answer questions. The results of these efforts seem to be mixed.

Researchers with the project regularly conduct studies to ascertain how well forest dwellers understand the terms of their contract and the parameters of the project. Methods of inquiry include questionnaires and field observation. In one such questionnaire, 20 questions were posed to respondents. The questions were true/false, and each one was read aloud, translated into Oromo, and then "followed by an explanation," (Getu 2001). Certainly the quiz lacked scientific rigor, and some of the questions on the survey were worded so as to be confusing even for me. The exam was given to 180 men and 26 women. Men scored an average 15; women averaged 12.8 (Getu 2001). The researcher concluded that these results were "satisfactory" and attributed the lower scores on behalf of the women to be a function of "the cultural and social barriers that limit the access of women to information," (Getu 2001).

Despite these good-faith efforts to assess participants' understanding, institutional structure in the IFMP is just not simple. GTZ staff is able to translate languages and reduce the bare bones of the project into relatively straightforward terms, but the overall

administration of the project is nested and complex. When GTZ started the IFMP, it, like any good aid project, was seen as involving a limited period of commitment. The German agency would give seed money, time, expertise and technical support for a fixed period and then quietly leave. Community members, empowered through years of work by GTZ, would take over the helm. Legitimacy of the system would have been firmly established and the departure of the founding agency would be possible. As any foreign aid worker will testify, this is oftentimes an insurmountable hurdle. The creation of dependency among the very population they seek to empower is a classic aid foible. All too often, the money, the authority or the mere presence of the organizing body drives the project more than anyone recognizes. GTZ is acutely aware of the problem; indeed, in newly decentralized states with burgeoning participatory policies, the pattern is all too common:

> "where decentralization remains limited to a deconcentration of government administration and services, and financial resources for local development are not handed over but remain with central government or the line ministries, the danger is that – in the absence of resources at local level – a small number of participatory islands pop up, nurtured by project support and resources but destined to vanish as soon as external funding stops," (GTZ 1998: 13).

When GTZ will depart is still an open question. If the Ministry of Agriculture sees IFMP as a success and agrees to help replicate the program in other locations, then GTZ will likely have a longer term role to play in the development of PFM throughout Ethiopia. If, however, the Ministry is not convinced, then GTZ will likely leave sooner (Uncovsky 2001).

Virtually every informant contacted for this research raised this issue as one of their most pressing concerns. Overwhelmingly, people expressed some degree of doubt

as to whether the project would survive in the absence of GTZ's funding and authority. Many say that the answer lies entirely in the hands of the Ethiopian government. If the government is committed to the project and continues to oversee it, enforce the law and conduct administrative duties, then perhaps IFMP can last beyond GTZ. If, however, factions within the government disagree then cracks in the government's commitment could quickly lead to the downfall of the entire scheme. Uncovsky stresses that the most important level for government buy-in is at the PA level. The state, he argues, is still too weak to provide the kind of backing that IFMP will need. Perhaps more disturbingly, many of the benefits of the project are abstract or long-term; PAs need to have not just an interest but a strong sense of its importance if IFMP is going to last.

Gunter Haase, the GTZ forestry advisor in Addis, said that staffing changes have been an ongoing problem, and speculates that as soon as GTZ withdraws, the team of Ethiopians who have been involved in the project will leave and return to their families which are overwhelmingly living elsewhere. Local governments lack the capacity to manage the project themselves and if all the current institutional wisdom departs with GTZ (instead, for example, of taking jobs with the local government for example and remaining involved) things are likely to fall apart.

Enforcement is an area in which GTZ muscle is especially felt. Without the presence of external authority to oversee local officials, some fear justice won't be done. Zelalem Temesgen, the PFM advisor for FARM Africa in Addis, expressed the importance of the wereda, kebele, police and courts in enforcing the law. If an offender is brought to court and the court doesn't take action, then "I fear it will collapse," (Temesgen 2001). Pulling out, he notes, will be very difficult without legal and

institutional support at all levels of government. This kind of support simply doesn't exist yet, and the lack of a final forest policy is one of the most cited reasons why. Dr. Bernd Meissner, a German professor who has done years of research on the Dodola project, especially stresses this connection, arguing that there is a history in Ethiopia of community decisions ending up in direct conflict with the central government (2001).

Current GTZ staff is painfully aware of the pending issue of their departure. Uncovsky stresses that they are not there to replace the state (2001). In order to smooth the transition, project functioning is being kept as simple, low-tech, and low-cost as possible. This might explain why some of each year's budget goes unused; project staff is being careful to minimize dependency on GTZ resources for project functioning. In this final analysis, the over-reliance on GTZ stands out as one of the most pressing concerns I have for the long-term success of the project.

From what I saw, it seems that every facet of project management still leans heavily on the expertise, funding, technical support, and even simple facilitation skills of the GTZ staff. There is no easy cause to blame. GTZ has seemingly done everything it can to minimize its role and empower the community while simultaneously fostering rigor and consistency. Within the staff, disagreement simmers over how far they should let the WAJIBs go in making decisions. I sat in on one GTZ staff meeting (5/24/01) which was indicative of the division within the agency.

Two staff members reported that the Salula forest block had made an important decision about timber use in their territory: 5 trees annually would be harvested. The trees would be individually selected by the WAJIB, saws would be issued by the PA, and individuals chosen to take the trees. Income from the harvest would be divided between

the producers (2/3) and the WAJIB (1/3). The GTZ staff charged with the Salula WAJIB felt strongly that the group had demonstrated their ability to protect their resource over time, and were now ready to begin deciding on sustainable harvest levels. It was, argued Abdurrahiman Kubsa, "good progress". Other staff members disagreed and expressed suspicion at the WAJIB taking unilateral action without consulting GTZ staff first. Tedasse Tseguy noted that usual practice was for WAJIBs to discuss even very small issues with their assigned GTZ observers; making this decision on their own indicated to him that "something is up". An extended debate ensued. Some at the table were concerned that the 1/3-2/3 benefit sharing arrangement might not be agreeable to all members of the WAJIB. Others suggested that WAJIB members still needed substantial technology assistance, including the use of a donkey to transport the lumber to Assassa where it could be sold; members were simply not self-sufficient yet. Supporters of the WAJIB's choice seemed surprised at such strong opposition. One insisted that ecological conditions supported this limited harvest, that WAJIB leaders were ensuring successful regeneration, and that they were already successfully utilizing fallen trees for firewood. Kubsa noted somewhat sardonically, "It seems we are still not comfortable with their indigenous knowledge which we repeatedly advocate. . . we are too sensitive and concerned to restrict forest utilization by them. They are doing it right!" Tseguy Tadesse, the Acting Project Manager, deftly facilitated the meeting, fostered communication among staff, and ultimately wrapped up the debate by suggesting follow-up and further discussion at the next meeting.

This meeting highlighted the difficulty felt within the agency in assessing how much control to relinquish, and how much supervision to retain. It underlines how

diverse GTZ's role has become in the project. Not only does the agency financially and technologically support the IFMP, but the presence of a large and educated staff in the small town of Dodola rewrites community relations and power arrangements. Small groups of illiterate forest-dwellers are starting to make ecologically sound harvesting decisions, direct others in their community about the viability of taking trees, and establish benefit-sharing mechanisms! GTZ staff second-guessed these moves, perhaps for good reason. While I was living and working on the project compound in Dodola, I saw a steady stream of villagers come through to ask questions, deliver information, express concerns, and even just make a social call. There is no doubt that if GTZ left town, the project would evaporate. Longer-term prospects might be more promising, but until and unless the Ethiopian government at all levels embraces the concept of community forestry and gains both the capacity and the will to enforce its institutions, communities are flatly dependant on external agents for their existence.

d. Role of Government

This is a critical piece of the IMFP puzzle. As I described in Chapter II, CPR theorists have conducted meta-analysis of case studies and distilled critical functions for government, including three fundamental roles: disseminating information and scientific data, providing conflict resolution and mediation as needed, and assisting with enforcement needs (Gibson 2000). The common thread here is the need for strong enabling legislation at the federal level which both sanctions and supports community organization. Does Ethiopia provide enabling conditions for community forestry to

thrive in the country overall? Does the Ethiopian government fill this role in the case of the IFMP?

The answer to both questions is a categorical no. No forest policy exists, and informants are unanimous that without formal legislation communities will be undermined at every turn. Policy must specifically provide political space and meaningful support for PFM. This means that not only does a forest policy need to be drafted, but that many of Ethiopia's existing policies need to be reworked to more carefully describe the roles and responsibilities of communities in forest management. In short, as Hans Lipp, the incoming Project Manager of the IFMP in May 2001, put it: "law should express the will of society." (2001). Forest policy, he explained to Ato Million Bekele in the Ministry of Agriculture, becomes a reference standard for the entire country. Its existence demonstrates good faith on the part of the government, and illustrates the existence of a consultative process. He was careful to caution, however, that policy is only the first step. Supporting legislation is the muscle and "what really counts in the end is the law." (Lipp 2001).

The IFMP case study is a stark example of the failure of government to fill its role. Scientific information is available only through GTZ, and even that source is cut off from the international community and largely removed from the scientific and academic world. Nobody on the project staff had ever heard of CPR (although all were highly versed in PFM terminology). Local governments provide neither conflict mediation nor reliable enforcement. Corruption in rampant and support is inconsistent.

Based on the CPR criteria, then, IFMP is not likely to succeed. Weak capacity in virtually every sector is the chief reason for government's failure to fill its ideal role.

Recent CPR literature confronts some trends in developing countries which have contributed to states' inability to perform well: decentralization and shifting administrative responsibilities, subsequent reforms of forestry and environmental ministries, and tensions between NGO and state actors (Arnold 1998). Certainly, these have been powerful factors in the case of Ethiopia.

Recall one of the chief research questions posed at the start of this dissertation: where is the locus of governance for community forestry? The answer is at least partly revealed by this analysis of how decisive government weakness is for local prospects. The IFMP is exceedingly successful in many ways, and indeed surpasses expectations given the extreme circumstances; however, in the final analysis, the project is foundationally flawed by its presence in a shaky political regime with what everyone agrees is a lack of federal commitment to the participatory process. My research suggests that this lack of commitment stems primarily from capacity weakness, but doubts about the participatory process and a strong fear of relinquishing control also contribute to the central government's political behavior.

CPR theorists stress the appropriate role of government, but only the capacity literature effectively captures this difference between intention and ability in government. That is, much attention has been paid by CPR scholars to the specific roles most appropriate for government in community management of resources. In the case of Ethiopia and many developing countries, however, it is more important to examine the ability of the government to occupy that role. Understanding the ideal role is certainly important and in the unusual case of Ethiopia, this information can help guide the formation of policy and legislation. But not clearly labeling government deficiencies as

manifestations of larger capacity weakness risks engendering misguided solutions. The next section explores the implications of this distinction for theory building.

B. Theory Building

1. CPR/PFM and Replicability

As Ethiopia proceeds with its vision of Ethnic Federalism, and enacts decentralized administrative reform, participatory norms are increasingly included in policy documents in all sectors. In the case of forestry, the lack of a forest policy has practitioners scrambling to create projects with a trial and error approach. Community forestry organizations, including GTZ and FARM Africa have for years now regularly held workshops to share information and created opportunities for groups to communicate with one another about successes and failures. Certainly, the goal of the implementation phase of the IFMP was to create a program which would be replicable in other parts of the country. GTZ did not intend to create a project which thrived in isolation; rather, it hoped to sponsor something of a demonstration project and thereby foster the development of community empowerment through participatory resource management in Ethiopia (Uncovsky 2001). However, despite the success of IFMP in general, most agree now that nothing in PFM is replicable. Haase calls the very idea "dangerous" (2001) and warns against blindly reproducing the IFMP system in another context.

Indeed, some of the elements of IFMP would indeed be difficult to implement in different circumstances; for example, given the extreme impoverishment of the Adaba-Dodola FPA, IFMP was able to restrict access to the forest. This would be political

disaster and practically impossible in many other situations in Ethiopia, where all land is public land and so many rely on it for their livelihood.

However, developing something of a blueprint for effective PFM is exactly what CPR theorists have done. Lists of criteria, institutional structure, and specific roles for government fill the literature. Indeed, examples from around the world do indicate some important and replicable empirical evidence. In Ethiopia, and many developing countries, the issue takes on weight when institutionalizing participatory rules in forest management signifies government support for community involvement in the political process. One informant summed it up: PFM "is a negotiation about power," (Temesgen 2001). This same forestry leader defined participation as a process of giving communities corresponding rights and responsibilities. He reiterated a common refrain: Ethiopia has a long history of top-down governance, and communities are not accustomed to taking on active role in policy-making. The IFMP and its brethren, then, are critical social experiments which test the limits of Ethiopia's stated desire to devolve power and foster democratic norms at the local level.

Is the IFMP valuable if it fails to produce lessons which transcend time and place? I would argue that yes, even if lasting governance truths are not gleaned from the project, it is succeeding in important ways. These successes have been detailed here (see Chapter V), and include benefits to community members and the ecological integrity of the forest. However, I also argue that the implications of the project do, in fact, include ramifications for political structure and governance in Ethiopia overall. As one government informant (who was highly skeptical of PFM during our interview) put it, "since this idea of community participation is a new idea. . . there has to be a transition

from the present understanding of what the role of community is to the future," (Tibebe 2001). In the same discussion he warned against replication, noting that "our community is perhaps a little bit different from the other socio-economic conditions that have been studied," (ibid).

There is a spectrum, then. At one end is the IFMP, perhaps producing immediate benefits and longer-term ecological awareness, but not able to provide any sort of guidance for future projects. At the other end is the IFMP as a strict blueprint for other community foresters to follow as they re-create project structure all over the country and possible internationally. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, with due caution for either extreme, and highlights the difference between PFM and CPR. The former, as described in Chapter II, does not claim to be a theory in the strict sense. Rather, it is a set of practices and structures which encourage participation and promote sustainable forestry. The latter, on the other hand, is a macro-theory based on countless empirical studies. While a theory may succeed in providing information which is neither temporally nor spatially bound, a framework tends to be more constrained by the conditions under which it was produced. The biggest gains will be had by merging the two literatures, and studying more challenging case studies, like the Ethiopian IFMP, through CPR theory.

2. Participation & Equity: Environmental Justice

I introduced the importance of environmental justice concerns in Chapter II with a discussion of the concept of community. Critics of PFM and CPR work object to the frequent (and untested) assumption that communities are homogenous units. Later in the same chapter, I explored concerns of participatory exclusion. Power relationships exist in

community organizations, as they do everywhere, and these relationships tend to follow ethnic, gender, or income lines. I noted that GTZ is well aware of this potential undertow in community organizing, and had lamented its own tendency to gloss over the problem when formulating and assessing projects. I posed two research questions: do marginalized groups, especially women, have a just role to play in the current IFMP regime? If not, does this threaten the project's legitimacy?

When I analyzed environmental policy capacity in Ethiopia, I observed that many of the sustainable development documents recently issued by the government (i.e. SDPRP 2002) place particular emphasis on the need to empower women. Finally, my depiction of the IFMP included a substantial section on the role of gender in the project. I suggested that gender divisions were sharp and defining in Dodola, as they are throughout Ethiopia. Project organizers are cognizant of the pattern, and have sought to confront it by keeping a "gender consultant" on staff. Research conducted by consultants over time indicates several ways in which the project could be re-structured to better include women. For example, meetings could be rescheduled to coincide with non-market days so that women might attend.

Despite specific and helpful suggestions from the gender consultant, the IFMP clearly remains a male-dominated enterprise at all levels. GTZ staff is entirely male, with only two exceptions: the gender consultant is always female, and when Hans Lipp was hired in 2001 to serve a 2-year term as Project Director, he successfully proposed a job-share arrangement with his highly qualified wife, Antje. Participants in the WAJIB structure formally include both male and female members, but in practice management

decisions are almost entirely male. Except for secretarial support, government staff I encountered were 100% male.

Does this reality mean the successes of the IFMP are compromised? After much analysis, I conclude that it doesn't. There are, however, important ramifications of ongoing gender inequities at the village level, and the IFMP is probably guilty of reinforcing gender norms through its approach to organizing. However, as I discussed in Chapters II and V, there is a strong argument to be made for GTZ making a conscious choice not to challenge long-standing, religious and cultural gender roles in Ethiopia. When asked about these roles, one informant explained it to me this way: "Socially, there are accepted laws. You know, a sort of division of labor. Everybody knows what to do. The child knows the division of labor. The household knows the division of labor. And the male knows the role he should play. That is entirely innate. They know it. They know it. Who must do what. It's innate," (Gurmu 2001).

Stepan Uncovsky, the co-founder of the IFMP, said that the project helps smooth over divisions between the rich and the landless by granting all forest-dwellers identical sized plots of land. However, when it comes to gender, the issue is not so simple. Of course there is gender inequality in Oromia, and "you can't change this" (2001). The project can strive to give women a voice, he argues, and seek to better understand their views as the planning process evolves; employing a gender consultant is a positive step toward this objective. After visiting the project site, I am inclined to agree. Had GTZ organizers sought to rewrite gender roles in Dodola, they would have surely been greeted with suspicion and abject hostility. Their goal is to create an institutional structure at the community level designed to foster sustainable forestry. In this, they have made great

gains. If and when Ethiopia's rural areas begin to see the results of poverty reduction plans, opportunities for women can and will be tightly linked with the provision of alternative income sources for community members. These reforms will come from the highest levels of government, and will take a very long time to produce real change.

Community forestry must be seen as both a social and natural process; that is, it is not only important that the resource be protected, but also that the fundamental rights of community members be honored. Environmental justice issues always contain normative assumptions, and I have accepted the premise that social inequities reproduced through environmental management decisions are matters of concern. Nevertheless, given the extenuating circumstances, IFMP organizers have behaved within generally appropriate bounds when it comes to fostering social change.

3. Policy Capacity

I have argued throughout this dissertation that the CPR literature fails to account adequately for the impact of capacity weakness on community organizing prospects. This is not to suggest that scholars in that theoretical school are unaware of the problem, but only that the work on environmental capacity remains inadequately integrated with the community resource management work. The case of the IFMP and the example of Ethiopia make this theoretical weakness plain.

Chapter IV is entirely devoted to an analysis of environmental capacity in Ethiopia. Chapter V's description of the IFMP illustrates the impact of government capacity weakness on community-level management. The analysis undertaken in this concluding chapter, too, has repeatedly made the link between capacity weakness and the

efficacy of CPR regime formation. Every serious concern facing the future of the IFMP can be traced to a dimension of capacity weakness; that is, if capacity in Ethiopia were stronger, many of the ongoing battles within the IFMP would not have been fought. The two most worrisome aspects of the project as raised in this analysis are indicative.

First, the apparent dependence of the community on GTZ for the survival of the project is clearly an outcome of weak government capacity at all levels. Counter-factual analysis is helpful here. It is easy to speculate about the difference it would make if the central government passed a strong forest policy with supporting legislation which specifically fostered community rights to manage forests. At the regional and local levels, this national level support might then translate into consistent enforcement provision, monitoring assistance and technological aid. An even larger point can be legitimately made here. If basic services such as health care, transportation, and education were improved, and poverty substantially reduced, villagers would be more able to manage their resource, and less dependent on GTZ for a range of services.

Second, I have here criticized project organizers for failing to integrate community development into their planning. In the process, however, I accept and understand the many complex analyses that went into GTZ's decision to proceed with a narrower objective. Creating an island of opportunity in a sea of poverty would, indeed, lead to the certain downfall of sustainable forestry as migration would destabilize community numbers and relations. Again, capacity weakness at all levels is the ultimate culprit. With weak human capital, and pervasive poverty throughout the country, external providers of local aid can't afford to be too good at what they do! Instead, systemic changes must be prioritized before site-level reforms can be implemented.

Martin Janicke is correct in his assertion that in many important ways, environmental capacity determines the outcomes. Indeed, his very first justification of the usefulness of the concept is "to stress the importance of objective limitations on successful intervention. Failure in environmental policy. . . cannot be explained just by the wrong choice of instruments or other kinds of 'intervention failure'," (2002: 3). This is exactly my concern when faced with only CPR tools for evaluating a government's involvement in a community forestry project. Without insights from the capacity literature, I might conclude that the local institution was flawed or that policy instruments were ineffective. Remedies for those flaws would then fail to resolve the problem. Indeed, once the two sets of literature are linked, great gains can potentially be made at the national level as government recognizes the far-reaching implications of capacity weakness and begins to prioritize its actions. Scholarly understanding of the forces which shape the international trend toward community management of resources will be strengthened by merging these two theoretical schools.

IV. Conclusion: Whither Participatory Forest Management in Ethiopia?

The IFMP in Ethiopia is truly an exceptional case. The Ethiopian context presents challenges which are primarily outstanding in degree, not kind, but still push the boundaries of current empirical observation. Analysis of the case study with insights from three different theoretical schools has led me to make two important and overarching arguments in this dissertation: one which is primarily theoretical, and one which comes out of the empirical evidence presented here.

First, I conclude that Common Pool Resource theory provides a sound and largely accurate portrait of institutional dimensions for community resource management. When I apply its maxims to the case of the IFMP, most (but not all) of the specific institutional guidelines fit what I saw on site. If forced to make a judgment on that narrow question, I would answer affirmatively: this project has confirmed the CPR theoretical argument by applying it to a challenging case. However, while CPR does explain why some features of the project work and others don't, it fails to capture the full complexity of community forestry in Ethiopia. Thus, what I am proposing is not a refinement of the theory, but a broadening of its boundaries to include environmental capacity and environmental justice issues. Once these literatures have been linked with CPR theory, what might be seen as institutional failure is more correctly understood to be a reflection of, for example, deep seated gender expectations, or weakness in human capital.

Second, at the outset of this dissertation I set out to discover the locus of governance for community forestry. Although I am only qualified to make conclusions based on the case of Ethiopia, it seems my analysis likely applies to developing countries throughout the world. The community level is by far the most essential center of information and activity in community forestry; as such, the importance of carefully crafting local institutional arrangements and management protocols cannot be overstated. However, even the best locally-designed forest management regime will simply fail without adequate government support. In the case of Ethiopia, the lack of this support is a direct result of capacity weakness in every sector and across scales. Informants' refrain that the government lacks "commitment" is, in fact, an indictment of more than the state's poor efforts to support community-based forest management. Instead, it is a larger

critique of the state of Ethiopia's violent history and ongoing repressive policies. Thus, community forestry cannot be studied independently of national politics and environmental capacity.

The prospects for the viability of long-term community forestry in Ethiopia are, sadly, not good at this time. Positive signs include a thriving network of communication among groups practicing and interested in community-based resource management, and a government which is increasingly supportive of this reform. Decentralization in the Ethiopian state is another promising development, as devolution of power will ultimately benefit community groups with strong organizational structures in place. However, the negative evidence is overwhelming. Without GTZ's constant presence and infusion of money, the IFMP would likely fall apart in short order. Unless and until the Ethiopian state is able to pull itself out of poverty, a process which will undoubtedly require massive amounts of international aid and support, communities which seek to develop lasting local management regimes may experience immediate success but will ultimately fail. In the meantime, the smaller price tag and ambitions of projects like the IFMP do improve the lives of communities and their forests, even if they do not permanently resolve the problems there.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS

I. Introduction

The IFMP case study has been used in this dissertation for two fundamental purposes. First, the case has helped to illustrate the importance of institutional dynamics of the kind identified by CPR theory. Applying CPR theory to the challenging case of Ethiopia is primarily an exercise in testing the limits of the theory, and I will explore that in some detail in this chapter. Second, the case study highlighted here exists within the context of exceedingly weak environmental policy capacity, as discussed in Chapter IV. In this way, the case has served as a mechanism for linking two seemingly disparate bodies of literature: CPR theory and policy capacity. Here I will more carefully describe the ways in which the two theories inform one another and might be applied, in tandem, to other cases in the future.

II. Theory Testing

Recall the conceptual pieces which comprise CPR theory, initially presented in Chapter II and reproduced here in Table 7.1. In this section, I will systematically summarize the results of my case study research according to the parameters laid out in the CPR literature. As I progress through each category for assessment, I will describe the extent to which the IFMP succeeds; most importantly, I will focus on the role played by environmental policy capacity.

A. Attributes of the Resource

The first category for analysis includes several characteristics of the resource; in this case, the Adaba-Dodola Forest Priority Area. It is important to remember that GTZ project organizers, when faced with the expansive forest, opted to break it down into

TABLE 7.1: SUMMARY OF COMMON POOL RESOURCE THEORY CRITERIA

I. Attributes of the Resource
   - A. Feasible improvement
   - B. Indicators available
   - C. High predictability of availability of resource
   - D. Relatively small spatial extent

II. Attributes of the Users
   - A. High Salience
   - B. Common understanding of the resource
   - C. Low discount rate
   - D. All community members similarly affected by current resource use
   - E. Mutual trust
   - F. Autonomy
   - G. Prior organizational experience

III. Design Principles for Community Institutions
   - A. Clearly defined boundaries – exclusion
   - B. Congruence of costs / benefits
   - C. Consistent collective – choice arrangements
   - D. Monitoring accountable to users
   - E. Graduated sanctions
   - F. Conflict resolution mechanisms low cost and accessible
   - G. At least minimal recognition of rights to organize by national government
   - H. Nested enterprises for large operations

IV. Role of Government
   - A. Clearinghouse of information
   - B. Provision of sites for conflict resolution
   - C. Enforcement assistance

(Baden, 1998; Burger, 1998; FAO 1992; Gibson, et. al., 2000; McCay, 1998, McKean, 2000; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1999;)

smaller units for the purposes of exclusion and management feasibility. Thus, my analysis here will not refer to the forest as a whole; rather, I will apply the criteria to the concept of 360ha forest blocks, each one ostensibly managed by a single WAJIB.

Forest blocks are highly degraded, but most agree that they are not beyond being restored. Indeed, the emphasis on regeneration in the IFMP is indicative of the degree to which leaders are convinced that the forest needs more biomass, more natural forest, and

more biodiversity if it is to return to a healthy condition. Use of the forest is quite predictable, especially once WAJIBs have taken over management and excluded additional settlements. Grazing use of the forest occurs in predictable seasonal patterns, and the restricted rules for timber harvest create reliable use levels. Once broken down into forest blocks, the resource is indeed small enough spatially to allow for effective monitoring. Three out of the four categories for measurement, then, seem to suggest that the IFMP forest is indeed a resource which is conducive to CPR management.

The remaining criterion, however, has proven to be continually difficult for organizers. It has been stubbornly difficult to identify indicators which are measurable with regularity and accuracy. As discussed in this dissertation, the establishment of a reliable monitoring system has presented a strong and important challenge for GTZ. In the early years of the project, organizers did contract out for scientific assessments of vegetation, tree density, wildlife and related biological and socio-economic data. However, GTZ has not maintained regular contracts for this kind of information. Outside of the project, scientific information about the forest is scant. It is here that capacity weakness plays a role. On the one hand, it is the project itself which has a vested interest in gathering forest block-specific indicator data. To that end, the tension between scientific rigor and local accessibility has frustrated project managers for years. On the other hand, however, it is indicative of poor capacity at the national, regional and local government levels that baseline environmental and social information does not exist for the area in the first place.

B. Attributes of the Users

Again, in this section the only meaningful way to approach an assessment of the users is to assume the WAJIB system is in place, and the users are thus tightly defined; exclusion has already taken place. This is consistent with the preconditions for a CPR regime, as discussed in Chapter II.

Certainly, given the nearly complete dependence on forest products for daily survival, it is safe to conclude that users of forest blocks attach high salience to the resource. However, within this context, some households are more immediately dependent on an uninterrupted supply of forest products than others. Some families succeed in creating small surpluses of crops, such as barley, which they then sell in town; others remain bound to a day-to-day survival strategy. Some families are benefiting from their participation in IFMP tourism; others are not. Thus, it seems probable that not all families are benefiting similarly from current resource use as mandated by the IFMP. Farmers I interviewed confirmed this impression, as some reported immediate benefits from the projects and others expressed resentment that their families had not yet seen any direct rewards for participation.

Given these disparate levels of poverty, and the desperate situation in which many families live, it is probable that they do not fully trust one another. Even though most of the families have lived in this area for generations, competition for limited resources exerts tremendous pressure on community relations. In this same vein, families who rely on a resource for their daily survival must hold a high discount rate; that is, if they see future benefits from a more sustainably managed forest, these benefits are meaningless if they aren't able to provide for themselves in the present.

Likewise, the meager evidence that exists suggests that users of the resource share some similar perceptions of its extent (Domnick 2001), usefulness and condition. Resource restriction rules are also understood at rates which are relatively consistent among various groups within the community (Getu 2000). However, one important exception merits attention here: women and men seem to have fundamentally different perceptions of the forest (Domnick 2001, Hassen 1999, Popp 1999). Whether or not this division within the community has lasting and important significance for the ultimate success of the IFMP is an open question. I have discussed this at some length in Chapter V.

Many parameters discussed here by which the IFMP might be considered a failure by CPR standards in the 'user' category stem from overall capacity weakness in Ethiopia. In particular, the abject poverty within which the vast majority of Ethiopians live does not create conditions conducive for conservation efforts of any kind. The last two criteria listed here are especially striking for the extent to which policy capacity plays a key role in ensuring either success or failure. Given the lack of funds, poor human capital, and failure of decentralization to reach the local level, communities lack autonomy. For these same reasons, they have had very limited experience organizing themselves before. The link is important here. Without looking to policy capacity as an underlying force in both creating and maintaining Ethiopian standards of living and potential for change, CPR theorists will misdirect their efforts.

C. Design Principles for Community Institutions

This dissertation has provided a detailed analysis of the institutional structures which organize the IMFP, and I have carefully assessed CPR criteria in that dimension.

For the most part, I argued that IFMP organizers have effectively structured the project consistent with CPR guidelines. However, despite these superficial successes, I also described some serious and long-term problems with the project. Here, I will link capacity issues more closely with institutional structures, examining the extent to which institutional design failures might in fact be better seen as manifestations of larger capacity weakness.

Aside from the more general contextual limitations which stem quite directly from environmental capacity weaknesses, there are two particular links between the CPR institutional design framework and the capacity assessment conducted here. First, CPR theorists agree that securing exclusive use rights of a given resource is one of the most critical pieces required for successful community organizing. The IFMP has succeeded in this under extremely challenging conditions, as described here. However, the longevity and defensibility of this exclusion must be seen as tenuous in Ethiopia. Without the 'muscle' of GTZ as a constant presence, WAJIBs would have a difficult time expelling new settlers, prohibiting their own offspring from obtaining land, and forbidding access to thousands of nearby residents. Indeed, it is a combination of history and current land use policy which create conditions whereby exclusion becomes nearly impossible to maintain without transformative changes in other sectors. Only when non-forest income sources are available to farmers will they cease relying on the forest for their livelihoods. Only when the government is able to provide consistent and committed support in the form of enforcement assistance and conflict mediation services will the community be able to effectively limit use of the forest. Only when some semblance of private property rights are officially recognized by the central Ethiopian government will farmers be able

to claim exclusive use privileges. None of these conditions exist in Ethiopia at the time of this writing, and as a result the functioning of the project has become overly reliant on the presence of an external agent, GTZ.

Second, CPR theorists speak of the important role of government in institutional success. Governments must recognize a community's right to organize. In the case of the IFMP in Ethiopia, as has been discussed extensively herein, this is not only absent from policy documents, but has been directly threatened by regular human rights abuses and ruling party domination. Without at least some substantive democratization in the country, communities will continue to feel unsafe acting outside of official channels. In the case of forestry in Ethiopia, the lack of a final forest policy contributes in no small measure to the insecurity felt by project participants and organizers.

D. Role of Government

It is in the analysis of the role of government that the gaps in CPR theory are the most visible, and the need to link with capacity work the most pressing. The Ethiopian government has consistently failed to play any of the three fundamental roles prescribed by CPR theorists. As has been argued in this dissertation, the government has said many of the "right" things in its policy documents, indicating at least a basic level of understanding of its own position in ensuring local level resource sustainability. However, the lack of funds, shortage of trained staff, and weak capacity in many other dimensions has rendered the Ethiopian government powerless to implement even its own ideas for providing community support. Acceptance of its ideal role is not insignificant, but the Ethiopian government continues to be unable to occupy this role in any meaningful way. CPR theory by itself fails to account for this gap.

Annex A:

Complete List of Informants

Interviews conducted

- Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: December 2000 & May 2001
- Dodola, Ethiopia: May 2001
- Berlin, Germany: December 2001
- Eschborn, Germany: December 2001

ANNEX A

Interviews / Contacts in Ethiopia

Name	Title	Date
Amera, Yared Dr.	Social Development Unit Coordinator for Institute of Development Research; Assistant Professor of Anthropology Addis Ababa University	5/15/01
Andre, Larry	United States Regional Environmental Officer for East Africa.	12/00
Bekele, Million	Team Leader for Forestry Conservation & Development	5/01
Behre, Kahsay	Research Technologist: Highlands Research Project. ILRI.	5/10/01
Bell, Rick	Acting Head of Political / Economic Section US Embassy	5/8/01
Dukale, Bogale	Expert of Forest Development in Extension Department, Oromia Bureau of Agriculture	5/9/01
Genemo, Goa	Wildlife and Forestry Extension Expert, MoA.	12/16/00
Gurmu, Deribe	Head of Forestry Research Centre, EARO	5/8/01
Haase, Guenther	Project Coordinator: Advisory Assistant to The Forest Administration, GTZ.	5/29/01
Hailu, Girma	Program Manager for Environment, Water, & Energy, UNDP	5/16/01
Kubsa, Abdurahiman	Community Forestry Backstopper, GTZ	12/00 & 5/01
Lipp, Hans	Project Director, IFMP, GTZ	5/01
Mengesha, Asrat	Forester, IFMP	5/01
Mengesha, Berhanu	Local Forest Management Expert, GTZ	12/27/00 & 5/14/01.
Meriame, Asfaw	Social Forestry Expert, IFMP	5/01

Nune, Sisay	Forest Inventory Expert, MoA	5/16/01
Payne, Jennifer	Regional Refugee / Environmental Assistant; US Embassy	5/7/01
Rockman, Kurt	Supervisory Agricultural Development Officer, USAID	5/18/01
Tadesse, Tsegaye	Head of Regional Forest Priority Area & IFMP, GTZ	5/01
Temesgen, Zelalem	Participatory Forest Management Advisor, FARM Africa	5/17/01
Van ter Beek, Maarten	Ecotourism Consultant, hired by GTZ	5/23/01
Worku, Moges	Regional Environmental Specialist for East Africa: US Embassy	5/15/01

Interviews / Contacts in Germany & Switzerland

Domnick, Immalyn	Cartographer and Geographer	12/10/03
McShane, Tom	Coordinator of WWF Tropical Forest Portfolio Directorate General of International Cooperation	12/14/01
Meissner, Bernd Dr.	Professor of Geographic Information Systems	12/10/03
Schneider, Sabine	Geographic Information Systems Expert	12/10/03
Uncovsky, Stepan	Project Manager, GTZ	12/13/01

Note: If a specific interview was conducted, I have given the date of that interview. In several cases, however, my contact was ongoing with a given person, and I have indicated this by identifying the month or timeframe in which we worked together.

Annex B:

Regional Poverty Head Count Data

Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
July 2002

Annex Table 1.3: Trends in Consumption Poverty Indices[14] among Major Towns

Major Towns	1995/96	1999/00
	P_0	P_0
Mekele	0.46	0.43
Gonder	0.34	0.18
Dessie	0.72	0.31
Bahir Dar	0.38	0.22
Debrezeit	0.44	0.37
Nazreth	0.29	0.28
Jimma	0.29	0.37
Harar	0.29	0.35
Addis Ababa	0.30	0.36
Dire Dawa	0.25	0.32

Annex Table 1.4: Trends in Food Poverty Head Count Indices

Region	1995/96			1999/00		
	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Tigray	0.60	0.44	0.57	0.52	0.65	0.54
Afar	0.46	0.00	0.30	0.64	0.29	0.53
Amhara	0.55	0.32	0.52	0.32	0.35	0.32
Oromiya	0.39	0.31	0.38	0.37	0.49	0.380
Somali	0.38	0.00	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.42
Benshangul-Gumuz	0.54	0.27	0.51	0.56	0.41	0.55
SNNPR	0.46	0.42	0.45	0.55	0.54	0.55
Gambella	0.33	0.19	0.283	0.62	0.433	0.57
Harari	0.14	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.48	0.33
Addis Ababa	0.37	0.31	0.31	0.36	0.48	0.48
Dire Dawa	0.26	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28
Total	0.47	0.32	0.45	0.41	0.47	0.42

[14] P_0= head count index; P_1= normalized poverty gap index; P_2 = squared poverty gap. P_0 measures the number of people below the poverty line. P_1 reflects the depth of poverty as it refers to the difference between the income (expenditure) of the poor person and the poverty line. P_2 being the square of P_1 reflects the severity of poverty -gives more weight to the poverty of the poorest.

Annex C:

Structure of the Ministry of Agriculture

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
May, 2001

STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE



Annex D:

Capacity Building Programs in Ethiopia

Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
July 2002

Annex Matrix Table 6.1 Capacity Building Programs and Major Activities Completed To Date And Planned For The Next Three Years

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
1. Civil Service Reform • Expenditure control and management • Human resource management • Service delivery • Ethics • Top management	- To build a civil service that helps achieve Government development policies, programmes and projects; capable of promoting the principles of federalism and democracy; serves the citizenry honestly and diligently; and is transparent, responsive; and accountable to elected representatives of the people; and imbued with professional ethics.	1.1. Promulugation of Federal Government Financia Administration Law and Regulations; issuance o financial administration directives based on the law by the Ministry of Finance and Economi Development (MOFED); adoption as appropriate o the laws, regulations and directives by most of th Regional Governments;. conducting various training programs at federal and regional levels to creat awareness among stakeholders.	X			
	-	1.2. Assessing the applicability of the Federal PIP Forma in different Regional Governments and preparing th appropriate documentation for the assessment of th result	X			
	-	1.3. Assessing and identifying strengths and weaknesses i the present budget practices and making the necessary recommendations to be encapsulated in policy papers	X			
	-	1.4 Designing improved and expanded government accounting system including • Purchase of PC Servers, printers, PCs, network accessories, software and consumables, • Installation of Local Area Network (LAN). • Conversion and redevelopment of the Medium System Payroll and Government Accounting system (BDA) packages to a PC based system. • Drafting of the Internal Audi Principal Manual and Procedural Guide	X X X	X X X	X X	X
	-	1.5 Preparation of systems, procedures and guidelines or job evaluation and grading, performance appraisal & tim management, recruitment, selection, transfer and promotion remuneration and conditions of service, human resource planning, human resource management information system human resource development, records management	X			
	-	1.6 With respect to service delivery, formulation of service delivery policy; preparation of a service users complaints handling directive; and		X	X	
	-	1.7 A program to undertake service delivery improvement in selected civil service institutions;	X	X	X	
	-	1.8 Develop technical guidelines for the measurement an setting of service standards and prepare training manual/modules for civil service employees in th application of the guidelines;	X	X		

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
	-	1.9 Prepare the organizational structure, staffing plan and other resource requirement of the central body that oversees the implementation of the Policy;	X	X		
	-	1.10 Widely publicize the civil service program and its modalities of implementation among civil service institutions (providers) as well as service users and enable civil service institutions to share good practices.	X	X		
	-	1.11 Explore and recommend organizational arrangement options for the establishment of the Civil Service Reform Program implementing bodies within civil service institutions; and		X	X	X
	-	1.12 Develop the capacity of Civil Service institutions in preparing and implementing service delivery improvement programs by providing technical, material and financial support through service delivery performance improvement program support	X	X		
	-	1.13 Develop an award system for exemplary institutional performance in service delivery so as to promote healthy competition between institutions in organizing, managing and delivering services	X	X		
	-	1.14 Development of codes of ethics for elected representatives, political appointees, judges and civil servants	X	X		
	-	1.15 Establishment of a central body (The now Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission), with the proper organizational set-up, powers, and duties	X	X	X	X
	-	1.16 The preparation of protocol on government-press relation and a code of conduct for journalists, media and press and consultation with stakeholders				
	-	1.17 The preparation for capacity building of the Police the Prosecution and the Judiciary a training manual and an anti-corruption manual intended to enable government line institutions to prevent, detect and investigate corruption and impropriety, and conducting a series of training of trainers Finalizing the National and Institutional charters on citizens right and responsibilities and presenting it to a stakeholders' workshop	X	X		
	-	1.18 Developing a syllabus for ethics education .				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
2 **Tax System Reform** • Tax policy and legislation project • Tax identification number project • Presumptive taxation project • Value added tax project • Operational program, systems and procedures • Large Taxpayer Office project • FIRA Reorganization • Taxpayer recruitment project	To encourage capital investment and development, improve tax revenues and ensure equity and fairness in the tax system through a comprehensive overhaul of the current legislation; to develop a modern tax administration system capable of executing the Government's revenue policy initiatives, and to effectively collect revenues that the economy generates. As the government envisages policies to reduce poverty by allocating more funds to social sector development including education, health and roads, which require domestic resources mobilization, the tax system reform program measures by enhancing revenue would support the implementation of PRS.	2.1.Amend the current income tax legislation to reflect the current business environment and strengthen in the legislation the enforcement powers for the revenue authorities	X			
		2.2 Achieve a better understanding by taxpaying community	X	X	X	X
		2.3.Develop and introduce Value Added Tax legislation replacing the existing sales tax		X		X
		2.4.Implementing the *TIN* system • Within FIRA • In the regional and city administrations		X	X	X
		2.5. Promulgate a Proclamation providing for the presumptive taxation schemes	X			
		2.6. Undertake legislative and administrative amendments to address problems encountered in the course of implementation		X	X	X
		2.7. Finalize the legislation of Income Tax Proclamations	X			
		2.8. Complete the development of the VAT implementation plan and identification of potential registrants		X		
		2.9. Establishment of the Large Tax payer base, operational programs and procedures and the Large Tax Payer (LTP) Office organization		X	X	X
		2.10.Implementation of the operational programs, manual systems and procedures to support the revenue accounting and receivables management functions • in the newly create d LTP Office • in the other offices of FIRA	X	X	X	X
		2.11. Reorganize FIRA to carry out its proposed strengthened functions				
3 **Urban**	To create an enabling environment	3.1.To formulate a national urban development policy and		X	X	

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
➢ Management ➢ CBP • Policy and strategy formulation • Local Gov. (Municipal) restructuring and empowerment • Human resource development including institutional CB for urban management training • Urban service delivery • Investment in urban in infrastructure - re-habilitation	and to strengthen the capacities of major institutions that are involved in urban management at the federal, regional and local levels with a view of helping urban areas to realize their potential to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country, poverty reduction and healthy living conditions of urban dwellers. To support the development of autonomous and self-sufficient municipalities and strengthen their capacities for achieving improved urban management; and leading and coordinating local economic development,	strategy on the basis of the assessment of the socio-economic development policies of the country and their impact on urban development.				
		3.2.Consultation with regions, municipalities and other stakeholders during the preparation of the study leading to the formulation of policy and a awareness raising and promotion at regional and municipal levels.		X		
		3.3.Evaluation of implementation experiences of urban land leasehold policy.	X	X		
		3.4.Support and training for implementing organizations Workshop discussion and reflections on related international experiences.		X	X	X
		3.5. Restructure the MWUD, its specialized arms, the regional bureaux and the zonal departments on the basis of the overall policies and strategies developed for the urban sector.		X	X	X
		3.6. Develop a working definition of urban areas and national criteria for the incorporation of municipalities as well as their classification prepared and used by regional states		X		
		3.7. Formulate an effective urban land policy that facilitates the allocation of plots and ensures efficient use of prime land		X		
		3.8. Establish the Urban Development Capacity Building Office (UDCBO), which will have improved organisational capacities for the effective implementation of the urban management capacity building programme.	X			
		3.9.Organise an urban information system (database) within MWUD, the RBWUDs and the UDCBO to enable		X		

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		them to properly document various urban management experiences and to support research undertakings and disseminate results to users.				
		3.10. Establish regional and national associations of municipalities.		X		
		3.11.Create a conducive operating environment for urban management by issuing municipal proclamations defining the legal status, powers and duties, governance structure and management system of municipalities in Tigray, Oromiya, SNNPR and Harari regional states.		X	X	
		3.12.Create an institutional capacity within the Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC) for sustainable urban development and efficient urban management systems consistent with decentralisation and good governance.		X	X	X
		3.13.Set up within the ECSC an Ethiopian Urban Management Centre (EUMC), which will be able to offer assistance to Municipal capacity building throughout the whole country through research, consultancy and training programmes on various levels (short courses, diploma, bachelor and master's degree courses).		X	X	X
		3.14.Develop a revised personnel service system on the basis of the review of the system currently in use in the municipalities of the four major regions		X	X	X
		3.15.Institute improved systems of financial resource mobilization and financial management practices in municipalities. introduce a computerised land 3.16.Information system that will assist municipalities in raising land and building related taxes in an efficient manner		X	X	X
		3.17. Train and develop the staff of urban management institutions operating at the national, regional and local levels with a view to improve municipal capacity for planning and management of projects.		X	X	
		3.18. Procure operating equipment and essential instruments for municipalities.				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
4.District Level Decentralisation • Capacity Building for Woreda institutional structure • Capacity Building for Woreda working systems for planning and implementation and service delivery Capacity Building for manpower development	Establish institutional arrangements to ensure empowerment, democratization and efficient administration at Woreda and Kebele leves ; set efficient and effective working systems at Woreda and Kebele; establish systems for minimum standard services and monitor the systems to facilitate the delivery of services at Woreda and Kebele levels; develop human capital, set systems of training in specialized and general fields to enhance the capacity of public servants, electorates and other stakeholders at Woreda and Kebele levels and support decentralisation & democratization process through capacity building at woreda level towards poverty reduction and overall economic and social development.	1.Conducting workshop to share experiences and disseminate findings of the Woreda and Municipal Studies(WMS)	X			
		2. Carry out studies in the Woredas and Kebeles of the four major Regional Governments through various task forces	X			
		3. Sensitization workshop for the task forces assigned in different studies	X			
		4. Exploratory field works by the task forces				
		5. Completion of studies on overall organizational structure and studies of organizational structure of public bodies		X		
		6. Undertaking Studies on working environment and incentives		X		
		7..Implementation of organizational structure and incentive packages		X		
		8. Consultation and sensitization activities		X	X	X
		9..Preparation of budget reform manual adaptable to woreda		X	X	
		10. Implementation of budget reform manual		X	X	
		11. Design and implementation of Woreda block grant formula and community funding			X	
		12. .Preparation and implementation of working guideline for disbursement of Woreda block grant, capital and recurrent expenditure			X	
		13.Undertaking preliminary of studies on revenue collection, utilization and revenue sharing arrangements				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		14.Developing proposal on community participation arrangements and implementation monitoring systems				
		15..Improvement of Woreda block grant formula and community funding				
		16.Undertaking inventory of manpower and determining manpower requirements and scertaining short-term and long-term requirement of for existing and additional employees				
		17.Technical support to shot-term training of Woreda civil servants, administrators and electorates on key fields				
5. Justice System Reform Program • Enhancing the institutional capacity of legislative and affiliated organs structure, system and process of law making and related tasks; • Enhancing the institutional capacity structure, system and process of the judiciary; • Enhancing institutional capacity structure, system, process of the law enforcement; • Enhancing institutional capacity structure, system and process of legal education, and research; and Enhancing	• Achieve the level of justice that provides a conducive environment to all actors (private, civic society, etc.) to tackle institutional & normative aspects of the various legal transactions in the society and the prevalence of the rule of law as envisaged in the constitution of the country and ultimately serve as one of the corner stone of the effort of poverty reduction & sustained growth.	5.1. Develop a comprehensive Justice System Reform Program document with the assistance of consultants to conduct detailed design study	X			
		5.2.Undertake a study to explore ways and means that would improve efficiency and effectiveness in the operation and management of courts	X	X	X	X
		5.3. Implementing the results of the study at the Supreme Court level and at the lower Federal and Regional courts and replicate it at all courts in the countr y		X	X	X
		5.4.Revising existing laws in light of the Constitution and the present needs of the country and study and propose the issuance of several new laws that are timely and necessary for enhancing the socio-economic development of the country		X	X	X
		5.5 Conduct continuous skill upgrading training programs for members of parliament on parliamentary procedures, upgrade their legal and information technology (IT) skills;	X	X	X	X

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		5.6.Revise and improve rules of Ethical Standards for members of parliament; 5.7.Revise the parliaments' public consultation mechanism in its law making process with a view to strengthen the participation of the public, civil society and other stakeholders;		X		
		5.7.Establish the office of the ombudsman and Human Right Commission; and see to it that the two organs are properly equipped with the necessary facilities, equipment, budget and personnel; and	X			
		5.8 .Increase the number of judges and conduct continuous professional development program for judges upgrade their IT skills;	X			
		5.9 .Establish training center/institute for members of the judiciary;		X	X	
		5.10. Establish the office of the Public Defender and see to it that the office is equipped with the necessary facilities, equipment, budget and personnel; 5.12.Conduct and implement case load management system within the federal and regional courts.		X		
		5.12.Conduct continuous professional development training programs for prosecutors;	X	X	X	X
		5.13. Conduct continuous professional development program for members of the police on crime prevention, Human Rights, constitutional and criminal procedure laws *as well as for penitentiary administrators engaged in* rehabilitation works	X	X	X	X
		5.14. Conduct special training programsfor police officers at the higher level to enable them to properly direct and manage police institutions with a view to develop a modern police force.	X	X	X	X
		5.16. Conduct public awareness programs to fight crime and its causes; and		X	X	X
		5.17. Establishing a National Justice Information Center.				
		5.18.Reform the curriculums of legal education institutions with a view to make the learning institutions more responsive to the needs of institutions who employ trained professionals;	X	X	X	X
		5.19. Establish new law faculties at regional universities;				
		5.20. Conduct continuous professional developments for members of the Lawyers and Civic Legal Associations;				
		5.21.Establish and/or strengthen lawyers, civic legal associations and community level legal service institutions; and				
		5.22.Promote legal training and awareness programs for community level legal service institutions and the public.				
6. **TVET (Agriculture)** • Middle level training • Junior level	Produce practitioners for agricultural transformation and rural development as well as poverty reduction as linked in the ADLI and RDS	1.**Middle level training**				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
training • Human resource development Program development						
		1.1 Selection of 28 training centers.	X			
		1.2 Major maintenance and design of civil works for future expansion	X			
		1.3 Necessary arrangements made for classrooms dinning facilities etc.	X			
		1.4 Establishment of 6 new training centers	X	X		
		1.5 Training of trainers		X		
		2.**Junior level training.**		X		X
		2.1 Establishment of training centers		X		X
		2.2 Selection, training and employing trainers		X		X
		2.3 Develop new curriculums, revise and improve the existing once.		X		X
7. **Co-operative Development** • Human resource and institutional development. • Strengthening capital base • Systems development • Credit facility	Organize, strengthen, and diversify autonomous co-operatives so that they provide better marketing services and competitive edge for farmers, thereby enabling them to increase their income which would necessarily entail poverty reduction and sustained growth.	1.**Education and Training**				
		1.1 Members education (in 000) **Short-term training**	X	X	X	X
		1.2 Staff training	X	X	X	X
		1.3 Board of Directors	X	X	X	X
		1.4 Cooperative societies employees	X	X	X	X
		Long-term training 1.5 Diploma level				X
		1.6 Degree level		X	X	
		2.**Institutional Dev't**				
		2.1 Strenthing Ardayita national training Institute				
		2.2 Establishing 5 Regional cooperative training				
		centers (Tigray,Amahara, Oromia,SNNP and A.A City)				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		• Tigray			X	
		• Amahara			X	
		• Oromia			X	
		• SNNP			X	
		• A.A City Administration				X
		2.3 Establishing cooperative dev't Banks				X
		3.**Formation and strengthening cooperatives**	X	X	X	X
		3.1 New primary cooperatives	X	X	X	X
		3.2 New secondary	X	X	X	X
		(Unions) Cooperatives				
		3.3 Reorganizing (Restructuring) Derg's time cooperatives	X	X	X	X
		3.4 Feasible cooperatives awarded certificate (registering)	X	X	X	X
➢ 8. Higher ➢ Education Reform • Expanding undergraduate program • Expanding post graduate program Overhauling the system	*Produce medium- and high-level* trained manpower resources in sufficient quantity and quality for poverty reduction and sustained growth.	1.**Expanding Undergraduate Programs**				
		1.1 Open new degree programs		X	X	X
		1.2 construct necessary infrastructure (classrooms laboratories, computer centers workshops, etc	X	X	X	X
		1.3 prepare necessary requirement for each program and institution and procure teaching equipment, furniture, computers.	X	X	X	X
		1.4 Recruit and employ required local and expatriate teaching staff.	X	X	X	X
		1.5 Train the required academic staff locally and abroad at masters and doctorial level.		X	X	X
		16 Promote and assist the involvement of the private and NGOs in HEd.		X	X	X
		2.**Expandig Postgraduate Programs**				
		2.1 Open new PHD and Masters programs and strengthening the existing one in AA University.		X	X	X
		2.2 Open new PHD and Masters programs in Alemaya University		X	X	X
		2.3 Open Masters programs in Jimma, Debub and Mekele University as well as Arba Minch Water Technology Institute and Gonder College of medical science		X	X	X
		2.4 Construct necessary infrastructures and other requirements	X	X	X	
		2.5 Recruit and employ expatriate teaching staff, and train Ethiopian academic staff both locally and abroad		X	X	

X

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		3. **Overhauling the Higher Education System.**				
		3.1 Establish a Higher Education Strategic Institute/Brain Centers and procure equipment, facilities and employ staff.		X		
		3.2 Establish a Higher Education Quality and Relevance Assurance Agency.		X		
		3.3 Recruit and employ international co-managers for Universities.		X		
		3.4 Train top and middle level management and administrative staff of HEIs.	X	X	X	X
		3.5 evaluate and improve the working system and procedures.		X		
		3.6 Introduce cost-sharing/ cost-recovery scheme		X		
	0	3.7 Include civic education and ICT in all curricula and activities of HEIs.	X	X		
		3.8 Evaluate and improve the quality and relevance of higher education curricula and programs.		X	X	
		3.9 Networking HEIs and provide ICT networking facilities		X	X	
9. Private Sector Development	Enhance the capacity of selected manufacturing industries, in particular the small and the medium ones to broaden the bases for income generating activities for poverty reduction and sustained growth.	1. **Human Resource**				
• Strengthening the financial base of the manufacturing sector.		1.1 Training of 200 technicians in various fields.		X	X	X
• Studying sub-constructing mechanisms		1.2 Up grade the capability of 100 managers through training		X	X	X
• Establishing food R&D institute		1.3 Conducting workshops and seminars		X	X	X
• Human resource development		1.4 Support 20 in-house training initiatives		X	X	X
• National industrial network		2. **Inistitutional Development**		X	X	X
• Quality improvements and service promotion		2.1 Establishment of a food R&D Institute		X	X	X
• Introductions of quality management system, establishment of quality accredited certification centers and improvement of national standard regulation system		2.2 Establishment 5 quality accredited certification centers		X	X	X

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
• Introduction of waste treatment plants and implementation of industrial environment protection.		2.3 Establishing MSEs training centers at regional level		X	X	X
• Clustering MSEs, and establishment of MSEs training centers at regional level		2.4 Establishing Chambers Commerce and Sect oral Associations		X	X	X
• Establishment of business incubation centers		2.5 Study for/and establishing business incubation centers		X	X	X
• Establishing industrial zones		3.**System Development**				
• Supporting the installment of public-private partnership		3.1 Studying and establishing sub-constructing mechanisms		X	X	
• Establishing and strengthening chambers & association		3.2 Establishing National industrial information network			X	X
		3.3 Quality improvements and service promotion		X	X	X
		3.4 Clustering MSEs		X	X	X
		3.5 Studying and establishing industrial zones			X	X
		3.6 Supporting the installment of public-private partnership (PPP)		X	X	X
		3.7 Introduction of waste treatment plants and implementation of industrial environment protection		X	X	X
		3.8 Establishment of business incubation centers			X	X
		3.9 Strengthening the financial base of manufacturing sector		X	X	X
10. **Textile and Garments CBP.**	Create a competitive textile and garments industry capable of generating revenue in export market for overall national development.	1.**Human Res. Dev't**				

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
• Establishing textiles and garments industry support institute		1.1 Training of 300 managers in modern management system		X	X	X
• Human resource development, skill training.		1.2 Undertaking skill training for 5000 middle level & supervisory staff		X	X	X
• Modernizing management system		1.3 Train about 8000 middle level technicians in Textile and Garment technology and fashion design		X	X	X
• Establishment of Textile and Garments industry promotion agency.		1.4 Training of trainers				
		2.Institutional Dev't				
		2.1 Establishing Textile and Garments Industry support institute with well equipped central laboratory			X	X
		2.2 Establishing Textile and Garment Industry promotion Agency			X	X
11.Construction Sector CBP	Create an effective and efficient construction sector that can support poverty reduction effort and sustained growth.	**1.Creating Conducive Working Atmosphere**				
• Create conducive working environment.		1.1 Undertaking studies and issuing building code & standards		X		
• Capital base enhancement.		1.2 Review foreign exchange regulation		X		
• Human resource development		1.3 Review taxation system for the sector		X		
		1.4 Device credit facility methodology		X	X	
		1.5 propose investment incentives		X		
		1.6 Strengthening CIA's & data center		X	X	X
		1.7 Establishing 9 Regional LAB's		X	X	X
		2.Capital Base Enhancement				
		2.1 Strengthening Crew for Road Projects (5 crews)	X	X	X	X
		2.2 Strengthening contractors (crew for power supply)	X	X	X	
		3.Human Res. dev't				
		3.1 Rehabilitation of training centers		X	X	

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		3.2 Training of trainers (for lower level short-term training of semi-and skilled laborers)	X	X	X	X
		3.3 Execution training programs for semi- and skilled laborers		X	X	X
		3.4 Provision of equipment for training		X	X	X
		3.5 Capacity building for middle and higher level decision makers and professional staff of the public and the private sector		X	X	X
12.TVET (non-Agriculture)	Enhance and support ADLI by providing new generation middle level skilled manpower, especially to industrial as well as construction sector.	1.1Preare and introduce standards for TVET traing centers	X			
		1.2 Evaluate and revise the existing curriculum for TVET for middle level TVET programs	X			
		1.3 Develop new multilevel programs based on socio-economic need assessment in different areas			X	X
		1.4 Developing a legal framework for delivery of TVET by public and non- public institutions.		X		
		2. Infrastructure dev't (training centers) 2.1 Upgrading of 7 TVET centers to college level		X	X	X
		2.2 Rehabilitation of existing TVET centers				
		2.3 Establishing additional 7 new TVET colleges		X	X	X
		3. **Training of trainers**				
		3.1 Skill up-grading (pre-service training for 1500 teachers)		X	X	
		3.2 In service training (for 1700 trainers)	X	X	X	
13.Civil Society & NGOs CBP	Create the necessary institutional environment and capacity for effective participation civil society and NGOs in poverty reduction and democratization process.	1.Establihing and strengthening program management unit		X	X	
		2.Desining the program		X		
		3.Implementing the program			X	X
14. .National ICTs policy implementations and evaluation capacity • ICTs human	Develop ICT capacity that can enhance efficiency and competitiveness in production as well as service sectors by narrowing the gap in information to bring about poverty education and sustained growth in the economy	14.1.National ICTS HRD requirement study	X			
		14.2.Capacity building in ICTs education and training		X	X	X

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
resources development • Establishment of Gov. information network. • Content and application development • Community based information system and services.		infrastructure of the higher education system				
		14,3.Strengthen existing AAU units engaged in ICTs education and training and lay a foundation for a national ICTs excellence center;	X			
		14.4.Capacity building in regional universities		X	X	X
		14.5.Capacity building in teachers training colleges	X	X	X	X
		14.6.National ICT Technical Institute Establishment		X	X	X
		14.7.Launch distance learning program in ICTs		X	X	
		14.8.ICTs curriculum development for use at the middle and higher level education and training		X	X	
		• For the entire government information network & systems activity, contract out a system study development and supervision service.		X	X	
		• Procure Hardware & software facilities for federal and regional government offices as deemed necessary.		X	X	X
		• Expand the existing Digital Data Network		X	X	
		• Expand Internet points-of-presence (PoPs) across the country.		X	X	
		• Lease telecommunication circuits, both dedicated and dialup		X		
		• Hire ICT experts and supporting staff for federal and regional offices		X	X	
		• Collect, analyze and compile data and generate output and make available in electronic format		X		
		• Procure software packages for content development, licensed for all stake-holding institutions.	X	X	X	
		• Develop electronic content in standardized and usable format (preferably web-based) for all federal and regional institutions				X
		• Establish an ICT documentation and electronic library.		X	X	X

Programs & Components	Objectives	Major Activities	Completed To Date	Planned		
				2002/3	2003/4	2004/5
		• In all stake-holding institutions, create service portfolio to deliver information to users (institutional as well as individual).		X		
		• Study and lay down a frame work for the establishment of the community based information systems and services.		X	X	X
		• Sensitizing authorities and the community at large.		X	X	X
		• Procure and install ICTs facilities			X	X
		• Provide connectivity to the local and world pool of information			X	X
		• Study and organize appropriate community based local contents for a wider usage				
		• Identify and establish ranges of government services to be provided for the local community through the center		X	X	X
		• Repackage globally available knowledge in the form usable to the community structure			X	X
		• Regularly organize awareness raising events and forums for community participation in the development process.			X	X
		• Conduct regular training programs to maximize the level of exploitation of ICTs at varying levels.		X	X	X
		• Acquisition and development of basic reference sources/ materials				

Annex E:

Problem Matrix for Participatory Forest Management in Ethiopia

National Workshop of
Participatory Forest Management
Ministry of Agriculture, FARM Africa, GTZ
April 3-4, 2000
Ghion Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

ANNEX E

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM MATRIX FOR PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA

Major Issue	Major Problems	Important Causes
Policy Related	• No clear policy statement • Inadequate budget allocation • No clear land use statement	• No forest policy exists • Low priority for forest sector • No land use policy exists
Legislation Related	• Absence of enabling legislation for PFM • Proclamation 94/1994 ambiguous • Current financial legislation does not allow for revenue sharing with communities • Some species with high value are protected by law • Forest Priority Areas without clear ownership	• Intention was to protect valuable timber
Organization Related	• Low status of forestry sector at all levels • Decision – makers usually not foresters • Insufficient accountability • Lack of strong rural institutions • Low level of accountability within communities	• Low recognition for forestry sector • Little attention / priority for forest conservation & development • Forest Protection Committee members not elected by communities
Inadequate Commitment	• Lack of long-term commitment from government and donors • Inadequate attention to forests by government • MoA does not commit enough resources	• Limited awareness of timeframe of forestry programs • Focus instead on economic aspects of forests • Limited resources
Inadequate Law Enforcement	• Lack of appropriate enforcement mechanisms • Inability of community to take all PFM responsibility	• Absence of detailed guildelines, no judicial support • Low community capacity
Limited Awareness	• Low dissemination of PFM experience • Limited understanding that PFM results take a long time • Low understanding of PFM at all levels	• Low priority for dissemination by projects, absence of networking • Lack of training and education at all levels

Incentives	• Communities not given incentives to conserve forests	• Open-access forests
Revenue Sharing	• Lack of legal background to share forest resources • Lack of revenue guidelines • No mandate to utilize revenue	• No regulation
Approval Mechanisms	• Lengthy and unclear approval procedures for forest plans	• Lack of guidelines, unclear mandate, lack of commitment
Forest Boundaries	• Failure to respect official boundaries	• Demarcation exercises conducted without full involvement of community
Skill & Technology Development	• Foresters lack skills for participatory planning • Foresters unable to advise on management of forests for multiple uses • Classical forestry not based on indigenous knowledge	• Forestry training does not include PFM tools, lack of practical experience, lack of women on staff • Little recognition or respect for indigenous systems
Monitoring	• No established technological forest monitoring system • Absence of monitoring indicators • No methodology for PFM by/with communities	• Foresters not trained in monitoring • Lack of recognition of importance of indicators • Lack of training on PFM
Attitudes	• Attitudes between foresters and communities inappropriate for PFM • Communities do not trust foresters • Difficult for foresters to be both police and PFM advisors • Communities do not trust use agreements with government • Participation supported only the theory, not in practice • Insufficient experimentation	• Foresters trained to function as police • Traditional forestry and PFM incompatible • Government policies have changed too often • Government does not believe communities can manage forests • Insufficient resources

This matrix has been largely reproduced from the Proceedings of the National Workshop of Participatory Forest Management (PFM), organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, FARM Africa, and GTZ; 3-4 April 2000, Ghion Hotel, Addis Ababa.

Annex F:

Lessons Learned During Pilot Phase of IFMP

IFMP Project Brief 1999
Dodola, Ethiopia

Lessons Learned

Conservation efforts tried during the pilot phase of IFMP were either misconceived, had only a very marginal impact or required excessive budgets. The experience made and conclusions drawn can be summarized as follows:

- *Creating awareness, mobilizing, appealing, training.* Such means of trying to convince people that they should rate common interest higher than their own are useful only as a complementary measure. They remain hollow if the message to be carried across is not there or if its implementation is beyond what farmers can do.
- *Licensing of pit-sawing.* Despite considerable efforts, IFMP could not achieve implementation. It could not have been more than a very partial and marginal success. It would have tackled only a minor aspect of the whole problem. This is because tree regeneration is the limiting factor, much more than tree felling.
- *Village development activities.* It was necessary to gain the confidence of the peasants who finally gave up suspecting the project to have commercial logging intentions. At the same time farmers made material support a pre-requisite for their promises to conserve the forest. At this stage it became clear that buying cooperation is self-defeating and not sustainable.
- *Wood confiscation and re-sale by government services or forest protection committees.* The inherent characteristic is that it provokes even more deforestation than it can curb. Law enforcement is essential but works only within an appropriate framework.
- *Artificial plantations of exotic tree species or enrichment plantations with natural species in, or between the remnants of the natural forest.* When these activities are publicly funded, villagers consistently sabotage them. They do not feel ownership, but hope instead for another round of casual labor income.
- *Fencing of area closures to prevent grazing and encourage natural regeneration.* Similarly, when these activities are publicly funded, villagers consistently sabotage them. They do not feel ownership, but hope instead for another round of casual labor income.
- *Participatory rules and regulations.* Even when agreed upon by a whole village, they are not implemented or enforced. In a forestry context, a village community is too heterogeneous and anonymous. Due to conflicting interests between, and varying status of internal groupings, consensus is only an apparent one. Enforcing the rules is not less demanding than classical repression, the cost of which is excessive if it is to work.

Integrated Forest Management Project (IFMP). 1999. Project Brief. Adaba-Dodola: 4-5.

Annex G:

Forest Block Contract

Integrated Forest Management Project
Dodola, Ethiopia
March, 2000

INTEGRATED FOREST MANAGEMENT
PROJECT *ADABA-DODOLA*

FOREST BLOCK ALLOCATION

CONTRACT DOCUMENT

DODOLA
MARCH 2000

Forest Block Allocation Contract

Context

After an unsuccessful experience with classic approaches of forest conservation, the Integrated Forest Management Project Adaba-Dodola, during 1998, conducted a series of intensive consultations involving professionals at the local and regional level, other stakeholders of forest conservation as well as village elders. In conclusion, conservation efforts tried so far are either misconceived, have only a very marginal impact or require astronomically high budgets. This negative feasibility evaluation applies to all of the past strategies of forest conservation, notably:

- *Creating awareness, mobilizing, appealing, and training.* Such means of trying to convince people that they should rate common interest higher than their own are useful only as a complementary measure.
- *Licensing of pit-sawing.* In fact, it has never been implemented. If it had, it would have tackled only a minor aspect of the whole problem. This is because tree regeneration is the limiting factor, not felling.
- *Village development activities.* Farmers tend to turn them into a pre-requisite for their promises to conserve the forest. Buying co-operation is self-defeating and not sustainable.
- *Wood confiscation and re-sale by government services or forest protection committees.* The inherent characteristic is that it provokes even more deforestation than it can curb. Law enforcement is essential but works only within an appropriate framework.
- *Artificial plantations of exotic tree species or enrichment plantations with natural species in, or between the remnants of the natural forest.* When these activities are publicly funded, they are consistently sabotaged by villagers. They do not feel ownership, but hope instead for another round of casual labour income.
- *Fencing of area closures to prevent grazing and encourage natural regeneration.* When these activities are publicly funded, they are consistently sabotaged by villagers. They do not feel ownership, but hope instead for another round of casual labour income.
- *Participatory rules and regulations.* Even when agreed upon by a whole village, they are not implemented. In a forestry context, a village community is too heterogeneous and anonymous. Due to conflicting interests between, and varying status of internal groupings, consensus only seems to be reached.

The outcome of the series of various workshops conducted at progressive levels, was the conclusion that something much more holistic and systemic must be tried. Instead of counting on mobilization and enforcement, the self-interest and self-organizing capacity of manageable groups would have to be relied on. Thus, the last resort seems to be allocating of forest blocks to forest dwellers collectives. They can be expected to safeguard and sustainably manage their block. This concept is basically the same as the system of allocating farming land. The government allows farmers to till but not own the land.

The terms of a corresponding forest block allocation contract are the subject of this document.

Forest Block Allocation Contract

Whereas

- The Forest Proclamation No. 94/1994 stipulates the need for community-based forest management;
- All land is owned by the government;
- The forests within Adaba and Dodola districts belong to the Regional Government of Oromia;
- Farm land is allocated by the government to peasant associations for their utilization and sustainable management;
- Land covered by forest can, by the same token, also be allocated by the government to collectives for their utilization and sustainable management;

Now therefore,

The OADB[12], represented by Adaba-Dodola *RFPA*[16], on the one hand and the *FODWA*[5] of the *Forest Block*[6] specified in paragraph 2 below on the other, together conclude the following allocation contract of a *Forest Block*[6].

1. Attached Documents Forming an Integral Part of this Contract

i. Definition of expressions and abbreviations used:
Carrying Capacity, District Agricultural Development Office, District Council , Eligibility Criteria, FODWA, Forest Block, Forest Produce, Founding Members, Homestead, Initial Tree Cover, Maximum Number of Homesteads, OADB, Peasant Association, Precision, Recognized Members, RFPA, Subsidiary By-Laws, Tree Cover, ZADD.

ii. List of *Recognized Members*[15]

iii. Sketch map of the *Forest Block*[6]

iv. Methodology of *Tree Cover*[18] Assessment

v. Report on *Initial Tree Cover*[10] Assessment

2. Identification of the Forest Block[6]

a) Name

The *Forest Block*[6] to which this contract applies is known under the name of: .....

b) Location

It is situated in ..... *Peasant Association*[13], between the four geographical UTM co-ordinates:

....

c) Boundaries

Natural boundaries are indicated on the attached sketch map, which forms an integral part of this contract.

d) Size

The total size of the *Forest Block*[6] is ..... hectares.

e) Number of Members

The size of the *Forest Block*[6] allows for a *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11] .....

3. Waiver of claims

a) Local

The *Peasant Association*[13] confirms that the demarcated *Forest Block*[6] belongs to its territory and that no rightful opposition exists. If such opposition arises later, then the *Peasant Association*[13] engages to defend the *FODWA's*[5] interests.

b) Regional

The *OADB*[12], represented by the Head of *RFPA*[16], confirms that the demarcated *Forest Block*[6] is situated within the *RFPA*[16] and that no land or lease rights have been granted to other parties prior to this contract. If claims arise later, then the *OADB*[12] engages to defend the *FODWA's*[5] interests.

4. Tree Cover[18] Assessment of Forest Block

a) Procedure

Tree Cover[18] is estimated in percent of the *Forest Block*[6] size. The methodology is explained in the attached document.

b) Precision

Estimating a *Tree Cover*[18] average for a *Forest Block*[6] implies random fluctuations due to sampling. The *Precision*[14] of the *Tree Cover*[18] average is expressed as the standard error of the sample average for *Tree Cover*[18]. The statistical procedure is outlined in the attached Methodology of Tree Cover Assessment.

c) *Initial Tree Cover*[10]

Initial Tree Cover[10] of the *Forest Block*[6] is: _____ percent according to the attached report.

d) Monitoring

Tree Cover[18] will be re-assessed annually by *RFPA*[16] in order to determine the rent to be paid by the *FODWA*[5], and to monitor the *Tree Cover*[18] in the *Forest Block*[6].

e) Deforestation

If the value of an annual *Tree Cover*[18] assessment is below the *Initial Tree Cover*[10] by more than two times the standard error (cf. 4.b] on *Precision*[14]), then *Tree Cover*[18] is taken to have been reduced.

5. Duration of the Contract

The contract remains valid for an indefinite period unless the *Tree Cover*[18] of the *Forest Block*[6] is found to have been reduced (cf. 4.e] on Deforestation).

In this case the contract is cancelled and all *FODWA*[5] members will be expelled from the forest area. The *Forest Block*[6] will be attributed to a corresponding number of dependants of the members of a successful neighboring *FODWA*[5].

If the government for some reason needs the forest block in the future, then the *FODWA*[5] is entitled to get an increment compensation including coverage of expenses for resettlement.

The *FODWA*[5] can cancel the contract after settlement of all dues and on condition of renouncing to all settlement and use rights in the *Forest Block*[6].

6. FODWA[5] Membership

a) List of Members

Recognized Members[15] are numbered and named in the attached list signed by each individual member. The list also identifies the *Founding Members*[8] as well as the elected head and his or her deputy.

b) Size of the *FODWA*[5]

The number of *Recognized Members*[15] is compatible with the *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11] of the *FODWA*[5] as determined by the *Carrying Capacity*[1] and the size of the *Forest Block*[6].

c) Commitment of Members

The attached signature or finger print of each one of the *Recognized Members*[15] testifies of each individual's:

- Consent to the composition of the *FODWA*[5],
- Voluntary commitment to respect the terms of this contract as well as of any *Subsidiary By-Laws*[17] of the *FODWA*[5],
- Willingness to contribute in due proportion to the implementation of collective decisions and the fulfillment of obligations,
- Preparedness to bear responsibility for any arrears in rent payment that can lead to the confiscation of property assets belonging to individual members.

d) Indivisibility of Membership

The number of members cannot increase by splitting the right of membership or by partially transferring it. Every member has one vote of equal weight. The number of members and corresponding votes will remain the same over time.

e) Transferability of Membership

Membership can be transferred by either inheritance or transaction. In both cases the transfer is never partial but always integral and implies the complete withdrawal from the *FODWA*[5] of the member who transfers his membership.

f) Inalienability of Membership

Whether membership is acquired or inherited, every new member replacing his predecessor must fulfill the *Eligibility Criteria*[4]. His or her membership becomes recognized only if approved by two thirds of the other *FODWA*[5] members in a meeting attended by a representative of *RFPA*[16].

g) Attendance of Meetings

Every member should be present on all *FODWA*[5] meetings. Substitutes may be accepted according to arrangements detailed in *Subsidiary By-Laws*[17].

7. FODWA[5] Organisation

From among the *Recognized Members*[15], a head and a deputy are elected. Their names are marked in the attached members' list. Any replacement of the *FODWA*[5] head or his or her deputy as well as any changes in membership are to be communicated immediately to the *Peasant Association*[13] and the representative of *RFPA*[16] who will inform other concerned bodies.

Otherwise, all other organizational matters are at the discretion of the *FODWA*[5] that may elaborate *Subsidiary By-Laws*[17] with the assistance of the appropriate government services.

8. Rights of the FODWA[5]

a) Settlement

The *FODWA*[5] has the right to let its *Recognized Members*[15] and their dependants dwell in the *Forest Block*[6]. Every one of the *Recognized Members*[15] can have one, and only one *Homestead*[9] within the *Forest Block*[6]. The *Homestead*[9] can be upgraded, structures expanded or annexes built. However, opening up of new compounds or extending the existing ones is not allowed.

b) Use of Forest Products

The *FODWA*[5] has the exclusive right of forest use. Forest use comprises production, collection, consumption, processing and trading of *Forest Produce*[7] by family or hired labour.
The exclusive use right has the following limitations:

i. Sub-leasing of use rights is not allowed, be it to other members, outsiders or commercial enterprises.
ii. The average *Tree Cover*[18] of the *Forest Block*[6] must not decrease over time.
iii. The number of *Homesteads*[9] within the *Forest Block*[6] must not exceed the number of *Recognized Members*[15].
iv. Utilization of wildlife resources within the *Forest Block*[6] will be in accordance with the existing regulations.

c) Collective versus Individual Forest Use

The *FODWA*[5] as a collective is responsible for the proper use of the forest against rent payment. The operational details are at its discretion. They can vary between communal work on the one hand and the distribution among members of individual shares with a corresponding control by the collective on the other hand. The mode of organization may be defined in the *Subsidiary By-Laws*[17] of the *FODWA*[5].

In any case, the liability for rent payment is collective.

9. Duties of the FODWA[5]

a) Restrict Settlement

The *FODWA*[5] will not allow any additional *Homestead*[9] and maintain its assigned size of membership. To this end, it will:

i. Limit membership to a number in line with the *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11].
ii. Maintain the number of *Homesteads*[9] within the *Forest Block*[6] to one per family of the *Recognized Members*[15]. *Homesteads*[9] belonging to dwellers that are not *Recognized Members*[15] have to be dissolved after the present contract enters into force.
iii. Cancel the membership of inactive members. If a member does not assume the right to dwell in the *Forest Block*[6] for a period of over one year, the *FODWA*[5] will obligate the absentee member to transfer his membership for free or against payment to somebody of his choice fulfilling all *Eligibility Criteria*[4].
iv. Prevent any member from permanently sub-letting his or her *Homestead*[9] or his or her membership for free or against payment.

b) Maintain or Develop *Tree Cover*[18)]

The *Tree Cover*[18)] of the *Forest Block*[6)] must be developed or at least maintained at its initial value. To this end, the *FODWA*[5)] will take measures such as:

i. Prohibit and prevent livestock herding in certain regeneration areas of the *Forest Block*[6)] until the young trees are big enough.
ii. Establish nurseries for tree seedlings.
iii. Plant tree seedlings in certain regeneration areas of the *Forest Block*[6)] and protect the plantation from livestock herds.
iv. Make proper use of the forest resources by harvesting as much as possible old and dead trees in favor of young ones and by minimizing the construction of fences made from cut trees and branches.
v. Prevent practices that hamper tree growth such as debarking, burning out of trunks etc.

Periodic forest management plans are elaborated in collaboration with the technical government services providing assistance with regard to their implementation within the scope of available means.

c) Pay Rent

RFPA[16)] grants exclusive use rights to the *FODWA*[5)] against payment of an annual rent. The annual rent is five percent of the value of one cubic meter of standing volume for every hectare of the forest block. However, as an incentive to maintain or increase *Tree Cover*[18)], the area of the *Forest Block*[6)] under *Tree Cover*[18)] is exempted from rent payment. Thus, for example, the annual rent to be paid for a 400 ha block with 50% *Tree Cover*[18)] presently amounts to 1600 birr, or 53.33 birr for each one of the 30 members. The current value of 160 birr per cubic meter is subject to periodic revision by the competent government services.

Once per year *RFPA*[16)] determines the *Tree Cover*[18)] of the *Forest Block*[6)] according to the attached procedure. The resulting rent for the *Forest Block*[6)] is communicated to the *District Agricultural Development Office*[2)] that gets it collected through the *Peasant Association*[13)] and transfers it to the appropriate government service responsible for receiving such forest generated revenue. Rent payment is enforced by the *Peasant Association*[13)] (see paragraph on sanctions on page 8).

The forest block rent is additional to whatever other tax the *Peasant Association*[13)] levies.

As a compensation for the traditional rights foregone by community members who are not *Recognized Members*[15)], 40 % of the rent remains with the *Peasant Association*[13)].

d) Restrict forest use by non-members

Access by non-members to the *Forest Block*[6)] for the pursuit of operations such as livestock herding, farming, honey collection, tree felling activities is prevented or controlled by the *FODWA*[5)]. If tolerated, then the *FODWA*[5)] assumes full responsibility for any detrimental impacts on *Tree Cover*[18)]. Practical arrangements are detailed in *Subsidiary By-Laws*[17)] of the *FODWA*[5)].

10. Rights of RFPA[16)]

The representative of *RFPA*[16)] and his or her aides can at any time access the *Forest Block*[6)] without having to forward reasons.

The representative of *RFPA*[16)] can summon and attend *FODWA*[5)] meetings and suggest points of the agenda.

RFPA[16)] can obtain the assistance of other government services to make the *FODWA*[5)]respect the terms of the contract.

11. Duties of RFPA[16]

As a government service, *RFPA*[16] will, as far as its resources suffice, grant advice and logistical support in technical and organizational matters of forest development within the *Forest Block*[6].

RFPA[16] will bear the costs of determining the *Tree Cover*[18] percentage and of conducting settlement census as necessary.

By coordinating the concerned higher bodies, *RFPA*[16] will take appropriate measures to legally defend the interests of the *FODWA*[5] and provide assistance for cases of litigation with unauthorized forest users.

12. Sanctions for Breach of Contract by the *FODWA*[5]

a) Deforestation

Deforestation as defined under 4.e) is sanctioned by a cancellation of the contract with consequences as specified under 5 (Duration of the Contract).

b) Non-payment of Rent

Any unpaid rent will be added by the *District Agricultural Development Office*[2] to the tax that is to be collected through the *Peasant Association*[13]. The latter, in order to avoid burdening community members which are not *Recognized Members*[15], can use its powers to confiscate livestock or other property assets belonging to any member of the *FODWA*[5] in order to cover the arrears.

c) Excessive Settlement

RFPA[16] will conduct annually a settlement census in the *Forest Block*[6]. If the number of *Homesteads*[9] exceeds the *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11] the rent will increase by 20 percent for every excess homestead. Thus, for example, if a *FODWA*[5] of 30 members allows 33 *Homesteads*[9] in the *Forest Block*[6], the rent of the forest block will increase by 60 % of the ordinary value.

d) Non-eligible Members

If it is found that the *FODWA*[5] admits a member not fulfilling the *Eligibility Criteria*[4], the head and deputy are demoted and re-elections conducted under the supervision of the representative of *RFPA*[16].

13. Signatures of Contracting Parties and Peasant Association[13)]

The *Peasant Association*[13)] acts as a co-signatory accepting the role assigned to it in the contract. All three signatories attest by their signatures and initials on every page of the contract (including the attached documents) that they accept to adhere to the contractual terms, to fulfill their assigned duties and to impose or sustain the sanctions drawn up for breach of contract.

Represented Body	***Function***	***Full Name***	***Date***	***Signature and Seal***
RFPA[16)]	Head			
FODWA[5)]	Head			
Peasant Association [13)] (co-signatory)	Chair-person			
Witness				
Witness				
Witness				

14. Official Recognition

The model of this contract is signed by the Heads of the *OADB*[12], *ZADD*[19], *District Agricultural Development Office*[2], and *District Council*[3] respectively, expressing their commitment to enforce the contractual terms.

Each one of these higher bodies receives a copy of the present contract. Within a maximum of three months, official recognition can be denied. However, this is possible on procedural grounds only. If no objection is raised in writing to *RFPA*[16] before this delay, the contract is officially recognized.

Representation	Function	Name and Signature	Date	Official Seal
OADB[12]	Head			
ZADD[19]	Head			
District Agricultural Development Office[2]	Head			
District Council[3]	Chair-person			

15. Definitions

(In alphabetical order)

1) *Carrying Capacity* is the presently accepted estimate of 12 hectares necessary for a forest dweller family unit to gain a livelihood from dwelling in a sustainably managed *Forest Block*[6] of *RFPA*[16] Adaba-Dodola. Due to changing natural and economic conditions, this value can be revised periodically. Until a revision is officially approved, the current value remains the same for all contracts entering into force within *RFPA*[16] Adaba-Dodola irrespective of the actual resource conditions existing in the *Forest Block*[6].

2) *District Agricultural Development Office* is the appropriate technical service charged by the regional government at district level in Adaba and Dodola with the development of forests and/or natural resources.

3) *District Council* is the government service in charge of administrative matters at district level to whose territory the *Forest Block*[6] belongs.

4) *Eligibility Criteria* are applied by the *Founding Members*[8] to rank would be members according to criteria such as the following:

   - The *Homestead*[9] belongs to a married couple or to an adult husband or wife, widow(er) or divorcee.
   - The *Homestead*[9] is permanently occupied.
   - The *Homestead*[9] was established before a specified number of years.
   - The inhabitants of the *Homestead*[9] depend on *Forest Produce*[7] for a living.

If the number of would-be members exceeds the *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11], then the *Founding Members*[8] establish a list from which the admissible number of *Recognized Members*[15] is selected according to priority. The weighting and combination of *Eligibility Criteria*[4] is at the discretion of the *Founding Members*[8] who report to the two other signatories of the present contract for the sake of transparency.

5) *FODWA* (Forest Dwellers' Association) is collective officially recognized by *OADB*[12], and whose statutory rights and duties are defined in their *Forest Block*[6] allocation contract concluded with the *RFPA*[16].

6) *Forest Block* is, or is expected to become, a demarcated area within the territory of *RFPA*[16] inhabited by a limited number of *Recognized Members*[15] of a *FODWA*[5] to which the *Forest Block*[6] is allocated for an indefinite period lasting as long as *Initial Tree Cover*[10] is maintained or developed.

7) *Forest Produce* is the combined set of products obtained for a livelihood of forest dwellers by different kinds of land use within a *Forest Block*[6]. It includes field crops, livestock products, honey, grass, browse, wood, trees, medicinal plants etc.

8) *Founding Members* of the *FODWA*[5] are up to five elders elected by the *Forest Block*[6] dwellers from among themselves under the supervision of a representative of *RFPA*[16] and approved by the *Peasant Association*[13].

9) *Homestead* is a unit formed and permanently inhabited by a married couple or a single adult spouse, widow(er) or divorcee together with own children or first degree relatives (i.e., dependants). If two or more married, unrelated mothers of the same generation live together, then the number of homesteads corresponds to their number.

10) *Initial Tree Cover* is the one observed at the time when the *Forest Block*[6] allocation contract enters into force.

11) *Maximum Number of Homesteads* of any *FODWA*[5] does not exceed 30. This number is considered to be the upper limit for a *FODWA*[5] to be able to fulfill and enforce its duties, since the organizational ability and means can be expected to be moderate. *Carrying Capacity*[1] (12 ha per *Homestead*[9]) limits membership to even less than 30 if the *Forest Block*[6] is smaller than 360 ha.

12) *OADB* is the Regional Agricultural Development Bureau of Oromia, one of the duties of which is the conservation and development of natural resources including forests and wildlife, or the appropriate technical service charged by the regional government at regional level with the development of natural resources.

13) *Peasant Association* is the government service in charge of administrative matters at village level to whose territory the *Forest Block*[6] belongs.

14) *Precision* refers to the statistical variability of independent *Tree Cover*[18] assessments performed by forestry experts in order to judge the same *Forest Block*[6]. It is expressed as the standard deviation of an annual *Tree Cover*[18] assessment. With N sample plots within the same *Forest Block*[6] the sample standard deviation is S. the *Precision*[14] of the sample average is then the square root of S^2/N.

15) *Recognized Members* of the *FODWA*[5] represent their *Homestead*[9]. They must fulfill the *Eligibility Criteria*[4] and be selected according to a priority list set up by the *Founding Members*[8] of the *FODWA*[5]. The ranking procedure is to be made transparent to the *Peasant Association*[13] and *RFPA*[16]. Top candidates become *Recognized Members*[15], but only a number of them, which is in line with the *Maximum Number of Homesteads*[11].

16) *RFPA* is the Regional Forest Priority Area Adaba-Dodola or the appropriate service charged by the *OADB*[12] with the conservation of plantations and natural forests in the Districts of Adaba and Dodola,

17) *Subsidiary By-Laws* are internal regulations set up by the concerned body to rule on matters the treatment of which is not feasible at a higher level.

18) *Tree Cover* of the *Forest Block*[6] is expressed as the percentage of the block area, which is covered by woody plants. It is assessed according to a methodology approved by the *OADB*[12]. The presently used assessment key and procedure is attached (cf. paragraph 18 on page 14).

19) *ZADD* is the Zonal Agricultural Development Department of Bale Zone in Goba, or the appropriate technical service charged by the regional government with the development of forests and/or natural resources at zonal level.

16. List of Recognized Members[15]

Ser. No.	Own, Father's and Grand father's name	Sex	Age	Function	Family size	Signature or fingerprint

17. Sketch Map of the Forest Block[6)]

17. Kaartaa Daree Bosona Eddoo-Sibiiloo



Furtuu

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Siiyum G/Kidaan
Caamsaa 13, 1993

18. Methodology of Tree Cover[18] Assessment

1. Organise the block assessment by inviting WAJIB-members to participate as witnesses. For every recorder hire one **ASSISTANT** from among the block residents.
2. **EQUIPMENT** (per recorder): A copy of the present rules, sketch map of the forest block, compass and GPS-set if available, chain or string relascope, special gauge displaying virtual DBH and DBH-class bounds, recording sheets, clipboard, pencil, eraser, pen, pocket calculator, 2.5-m string.
3. Choose the starting point arbitrarily anywhere on the block border. Choose a **SECTION LINE** across the block in any convenient direction. Keep the distance between successive section lines at 100 meters. Cover the whole forest block with parallel section lines.
4. If **SEVERAL RECORDERS** conduct the assessment simultaneously, adjacent section lines rather than separate block sub-divisions are distributed among the recorders.
5. Locate a first **SAMPLE SPOT** on a section line at some distance from the block border. Assess sample spots spaced at 100-m intervals along a section line. Make an approximate slope correction for the distance between sample spots. Measure distance by pacing. Apply different pace-units for level ground and slopes. At some distance from where the next sample spot is to be throw a fist-sized conspicuous (painted) stone in the proper direction for chance-locating the spot.
6. Count **SEEDLINGS** higher than 25 cm within a radius of 2.5 m from the sample spot. Only count healthy plants of regular shape. Skip dwarfed or stunted plants or ones with mosses or lichens growing on them. Mark every count of a proper seedling using the species codes listed on the recording sheet. If more than 10 seedlings are observed stop marking after the tenth seedling.
7. For every sample spot carry out a relascope sweep. **RECORD RELASCOPE COUNTS** separately for saplings, young trees, mature trees, oversized trees and bush. Mark every count in the appropriate category using the species codes listed on the recording sheet. In the case of bush made up of several species mark only the code for the dominating species.
8. Assess **BUSH** in terms of virtual DBH using the special gauge. Determine bush diameter as the average of at least two diagonal measurements. Consider as the bush periphery the line around the bush that can be paced freely. Keep the distance between gauge and recorder the same as the distance between bush centre and recorder.
9. **COPPICE** with 3 or more shoots (of any size) on a stool of less than breast height (1.3 m) is to be treated as bush. With only two shoots remaining on a stool of less than breast height both shoots are separately measured with the relascope and assigned to an appropriate DBH-class if counted.
10. **FORKED TRUNKS** are given as many relascope counts as there are big enough shafts at breast height.
11. Take relascope counts irrespective of whether crowns overlap or grow in **MULTIPLE STOREYS**. Bush or trees growing underneath tree crowns are to be assessed separately from the cover trees.
12. Calculate **TREE COVER PERCENTAGE** separately for seedlings, saplings, young trees, mature trees, oversized trees and bush. To do so, multiply the cell count with the corresponding factor indicated on the recording sheet. Sum up the products in the same line to obtain the tree cover percentage of the sample spot. Calculate the tree cover index of the whole block as the average of N sample spot percentages.

13. Determine the variance (V) of the N sample spot percentages. Calculate the **PRECISION** (P) of the tree cover index for the whole block as the square root of (V/N).
14. File the completed recording sheets and calculated parameters for future impact assessments and for **MONITORING** the change over time of forest condition. If the current assessment is for initial tree cover, establish the document to be attached to the forest block allocation contract. If there is a previous assessment compare it to the current one. If the current index is significantly different from the previous one, or from the initial one, revise the forest rent or proceed to impose sanctions, respectively.

19. Report on Initial Tree Cover[10] Assessment

The *Tree Cover*[18] assessment was carried out during the month(s) of .....in the year ..... by the undersigned forestry experts. The *Initial Tree Cover*[10] of the *Forest Block*[6] is found to be ..... percent.

Function	**Full Name**	**Signature**
Expert 1:		
Expert 2:		
Expert 3:		
Expert 4:		
Head of *RFPA*[16]		

Established in ..... On the day of:.....

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